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Theoretical auditing models have recently changed from a single-person to a multi-
person setting. This change has been prompted by the inability of decision theory to
recognise that the manager has the potential to influence the outcome of the audit.
The auditor's uncertainty about the manager's motivations can also influence the
outcome. One of the motivating factors for audit work is the auditor's uncertainty
about the rate of error or fraud occurrence. This is incorporated in the Audit Risk
model in the "inherent risk" term, which has only been considered in a decision-
theoretic setting. A game theoretic consideration leads to a signalling game.
Two models of the audit are developed to consider settings of both error
detection and fraud prevention. In the model of error detection the players' actions
include the effort put into maintaining the internal control system and investigation
of these controls by the auditor followed by substantive testing and qualification. The
effects of changes in the players' outcome costs on the number and type of
equilibrium pairs is investigated. The model is shown to have the following
properties; Costly information acquisition can form part of a pure strategy
equilibrium, and the manager can send signals that are conditional upon the inherent
chance of errors occurring. An example is given to illustrate the above properties.
This also shows that raising an outcome cost to encourage hard work can be counter¬
productive.
Fraud and its detection do not occur in isolation. A model is therefore
developed where fraud detection occurs against a background of unintentional errors.
The auditor must divide his resources between error detection and fraud prevention.
The manager is classified into two types by his difficulty in committing a fraudulent
act. The manager has a choice over the level of effort to put into maintaining the
internal control system and whether or not to commit a fraudulent act. The auditor
chooses the level of substantive testing and subsequent in depth testing to carry out
before issuing an audit report. It is shown that no equilibrium exist where the
manager always reveals his type to the auditor.
The equilibrium set is shown to be dependent on the probability that the
manager is the type who finds it easier to commit fraud. The effects of varying the
costs of actions on the equilibrium behaviour of an example are considered. Whilst
lowering the cost of in depth testing will reduce the equilibrium fraud rate, a
decrease in the cost of substantive testing may have the opposite effect. The
components of audit risk are assessed and it is shown that measures to reduce the risk
of errors going undetected may increase the risk of fraud going undetected. In both
models there are costs for which there is not a unique equilibrium. This suggests that
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For many years theoretical models of the auditing process were based on a decision
theoretic approach, where it is assumed that the likelihood of events occurring is not
influenced by the actions of the decision maker. This approach effectively regards the
audit as a sampling problem for the auditor. Although such models have given a
theoretical foundation to various areas of auditing, such as the assessment of
sampling risk, they suffer from a crucial shortcoming; Decision theory cannot
recognise that the managers of a company have an interest in, and the ability to
influence, the outcome of the audit.
Within the last twenty five years game theory has been used to consider
various aspects of the strategic interaction between the auditor, the management and
the shareholders during a financial audit. It is suggested that one of the motivating
factors for audit work is the auditor's uncertainty about aspects of his client's
business. In particular the auditor will not know the rate of error or fraud occurrence
in the accounting systems. This is recognised in the Audit risk model which has been
traditionally assessed in a decision theoretic setting. This model includes an
"Inherent Risk" term that recognises that the risk of errors occurring varies between
companies and will have a crucial effect on the auditor's testing strategy. In a one-
person decision problem the auditor's uncertainty about this inherent risk term is
overcome by estimation. The auditor uses his knowledge of the company and
experience with similar companies in the past to make an educated estimate of the
level of this risk. In a strategic setting the auditor may be able to infer the level of
this risk from the manager's behaviour. This leads to a formulation of the audit as a
signalling game.
An increasingly difficult problem in auditing is the auditor's degree of
responsibility to shareholders in those cases where a serious error goes undetected.
At present the penalty associated with this outcome is determined through the courts,
either directly through litigation or through an out of court settlement. Since the
auditor's responsibility in this situation is determined through the courts, auditors can
find themselves facing a large penalty for negligence despite having performed the
x
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audit to a level deemed responsible by the profession. An associated problem is the
method used to allocate responsibility, and subsequent financial penalties, for such
an error between the auditor and the manager of the company.
This problem can be analysed using a game theoretic model. If the costs of
some of the outcomes are considered as variables, the effects of different levels of
financial penalty on the auditor's and manager's behaviour can be observed. This can
be used to consider whether the current high levels of litigation provide suitable
motivation for both parties to work hard during an audit. The problem of the
allocation of responsibility between the auditor and manager can also be considered
by including additional constraints in the model.
This thesis develops two signalling game models of the auditing process. The
first model regards the audit as a means of preventing accounting errors from going
undetected and investigates the auditor's acquisition of costly information in such a
setting. The second model views the audit as a means of both detecting random errors
and preventing fraudulent activity and considers how these two potentially
conflicting responsibilities influence both the auditor's and manager's optimal
behaviour. The optimal behaviour of the participants in each model is analysed using
game theory. The models are then used to consider how changes in factors such as
cooperation, the degree of liability, the relative costs of hard work, and the
responsibility for fraud detection will affect the players' optimal behaviour.
The following chapter discusses the audit in so far as is necessary to provide a
setting for the theoretical models to be developed. It starts by sketching the
development of the modern audit function and describing some of the defining
characteristics of an audit. The auditor's responsibilities and potential actions during
an audit are described by dividing the audit into five stages; Planning, investigating
the internal controls, substantive testing, drawing conclusions from the evidence and
qualification. The Audit Risk model mentioned above is introduced and the auditor's
legal responsibilities are discussed.
xi
INTRODUCTION
The second chapter describes the relevant concepts and definitions of game
theory which will be used to both develop and analyse the models. The chapter starts
by discussing the assumptions made about the players in a game theoretic setting and
introduces some of the basic concepts and definitions of game theory. The concept of
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is defined and this is used to motivate the
introduction of mixed strategy profiles and the idea of equilibrium set refinement.
Games of incomplete information are discussed in broad terms before signalling
games are defined in more detail.
Chapter three outlines previous work that has considered auditing in a game
theoretic setting. These models are divided into five categories by their approach to
modelling the audit. A brief outline of the models is given which highlights the
important results of each. The relationship between the models to be developed here
and the existing models is then discussed.
Chapter four develops a model of the audit as a means of error detection. The
model is used to consider the implications of the present increase in the rise of
auditor liability to third parties. This is achieved by regarding the cost of the
unqualified material error outcome as a variable The model includes the three main
stages of the audit described in section 1.3; Investigation of the internal controls,
substantive testing and qualification. The model is analysed using game theory and
the auditor's strategy set is reduced. This enables the auditor's optimal strategy set to
be classified. A method for determining the equilibrium set of the model as two of
the costs vary is developed and this is illustrated with a numerical example. The
effects of increased litigation damages on the behaviour of both the auditor and the
manager are discussed for the numerical example.
Chapter five extends the analysis of the optimal behaviour to include
randomised strategies and pareto domination as an equilibrium refinement. The
example of chapter four is investigated in two alternative settings. Firstly, the model
is considered in a cooperative setting. This allows the auditor and manager to enter
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into pre-play commitments to minimise their joint costs. In such a setting the
auditor's perceived independence may be called into question. In the error detection
model the players behaviour can vary between implicitly cooperative (where both
players prefer the same outcome) to non-cooperative where the players' interests are
at odds. The player's behaviour is compared with the optimal behaviour in chapter
four to see to
what extent the ability to explicitly cooperate influences the optimal behaviour.
Secondly the optimal behaviour is considered in a setting of proportionate liability.
This is achieved by an additional constraint modelling the interdependence between
the penalties imposed on the auditor and manager. The optimal behaviour as the
penalties increase in this setting is compared with the unconstrained case.
Chapter six develops a model of the audit where the manager has the ability
to commit fraud. This fraudulent activity is considered against a background of
random errors so that the auditor must divide his resources between error and fraud
detection. The effects on the optimal behaviour of altering the costs of actions are
considered. The equilibrium set is classified and the auditee's motives for concealing
his private information are discussed. A numerical example is given to illustrate the
types of optimal behaviour that occur. For this example the components of the audit
risk model are considered and it is shown that measures to reduce the risk of errors
going undetected may increase the risk of fraud going undetected.
Chapter seven starts by comparing and contrasting the analysis of the two
models. The interesting equilibrium behaviour and the conclusions that can be drawn
from each model are then discussed. The limitations of each model are considered
and these limitations motivate a discussion of areas for future research. Finally, a
summary is given which describes the development of the models, the contributions
that these have made and the conclusions which can be drawn from them.
Xlll
1 AN INTRODUCTION TO AUDITING
1.1 Background
The idea of an audit has been around since at least the fifteenth century. Originally an
auditor's responsibility was to ensure the absence of fraud in the accounts kept by
stewards ofwealthy estates. Until the 19th century businesses were mainly small and
owned either by individuals or partnerships. There was therefore little demand for
either complex accounting or auditing. The Companies Act of 1844 made the first
distinction between the providers of capital (shareholders) and the management of a
business. This led to a need for an independent examination of accounts to ensure the
safety of the shareholders' interests. Initially a company would appoint one of its
shareholders as an auditor, with no requirements for either relevant qualifications or
independence. As companies became more commonplace and increased in
complexity there was a corresponding increase in the demands on the auditor. This
led to the development of auditing as a profession. Flint [18] gives seven postulates
that define an audit. These can be summarised to give the following three
requirements:
The Need For an Investigation
The primary condition for an audit is that there is a relationship of accountability
between two parties where one party is dependent in some way upon the actions or
information issued by another whose aims may not coincide. Furthermore, the
second party owes a duty of acceptable conduct to the first. There is therefore a need
for reassurance that the second party is fulfilling his duty.
The Existence of a Profession
The subject matter must be suitably complex or remote to deter the interested party
from reassuring themselves directly. Thus audits are restricted to matters where a
large degree of formal training and experience are needed to form a reasonable
opinion. There must also be certain standards of behaviour that both parties perceive
as appropriate. Conformance to these standards must be verifiable (albeit by someone
possessing the necessary skills and judgement) if the auditor is to express a
1
considered opinion on that conformity. Standards of accountability can be set and
actual performance can be measured against these by reference to known criteria. The
process of this measurement and comparison requires both special skill and the
exercise of judgement.
Credibility of The Report
For an auditor's report to carry any weight it must be possible to collect sufficient
evidence to reach an informed opinion. Also, the meaning of the manager's statement
to the interested party must be unambiguous if the auditor is to comment on the
reasonableness of its content. For his client to gain any reassurance from the report,
the auditor must be independent and free from investigative and reporting
constraints. If the auditor is not given freedom of investigation then any opinion that
he forms about the state of affairs as a whole will be fundamentally flawed.
These requirements can be combined to give a broad definition of an audit. Although
a precise definition can only be given for a particular field, such as financial auditing,
the Auditing Concepts Committee [4] give the following general definition:
"A systematic process of objectively obtaining and evaluating evidence
regarding assertions about economic actions and events to ascertain the
degree of correspondence between those assertions and established criteria
and communicating the results to interested users"
Although auditing developed as a practical discipline, much work has been done to
develop a theoretical basis. This work falls into two categories, a philosophical
approach which considers the essential characteristics of an audit and theoretical
models which have been developed to reflect different aspects of the audit. The
philosophical approach concerns itself with the ethical side of auditing. It discusses
concepts such as auditor independence and considers how factors such as personal
relationships or financial interest might compromise (or be seen to compromise)
independence. An abstract discussion of the concepts involved in auditing can serve
as a good introduction to a complex subject. This discussion can lead to a generalised
description of an audit which is applicable to a wide range of circumstances and can
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be easily understood. Secondly, discussion may lead to a consensus as to what makes
up an audit. This can be used, often in conjunction with a theoretical model, to
establish criteria for "good practice".
The theoretical models of the auditing process ignore the ethical implications
of the interaction between an auditor and the manager (and shareholders) and
consider how the participants behave as economically rational agents. This approach
can be used to consider how self-interested individuals will interact. For example
principal/agent models have considered the circumstances under which the
shareholders will benefit from the appointment of an auditor. These economic
models have several uses. Focusing on one aspect of auditing can act as an aid to
understanding the whole process. The simplified nature of any such model can
highlight interactions that may be obscured in practice. The models can then be used
in practice as a planning aid (such as the audit risk model described in section 1.4).
The sensitivity of the models to changes in certain costs or factors can also be
considered. This can suggest the possible effects of a similar change in a real-world
setting. This thesis develops two theoretical models of the audit considering both
error and fraud detection. This chapter gives a brief description of the auditing
process and mentions some of the issues which are later considered using the models.
1.2 Financial Auditing
The need for reassurance on the credibility of a set of financial accounts led
historically to the development of the auditing profession. The management of a
company is responsible for the stewardship of the shareholders' investment. To
demonstrate the effectiveness of their stewardship the management annually issues a
financial statement. There is a clear need for an independent investigation of the truth
and fairness of this report. The size and complexity of modern businesses mean that
such an investigation will require a degree of formal training.
Other types of audit now exist, such as internal or operational audits, which
use many of the same techniques and procedures. However, these types of audit are
often used by management to improve and monitor the efficiency of the company,
whereas financial audits are primarily for the benefit of the shareholders. Although
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an external auditor is appointed by the shareholders, in practice the shareholders
usually agree with the appointment suggested by the management. A financial audit
differs from other types of audit as the auditor's and manager's interests may be at
odds. This thesis considers the interaction between the management and the auditor
and will therefore focus on financial auditing. The purpose of a financial audit has
been defined by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants [1] as:
"The objective of the ordinary examination of financial statements by the
independent auditor is the expression of an opinion on the fairness with which
they present financial position, results of operations and cash flows in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. The auditor's
report is the medium through which he expresses his opinion or, if
circumstances require, disclaims an opinion"
Detailed information about a company's activities would be of use to their
competitors. The shareholders access to detailed accounting information is restricted
as otherwise competitors could also gain access by becoming shareholders. However,
the auditor must have access to this private information if he is to make an informed
judgement on the fairness of the financial statements. It is important therefore that
the management regards the auditor as independent so that he can gain access to this
information. Any concerns about this independence will at the very least put a strain
on the working relationship between the auditor and management and may lead to
restrictions upon the freedom of the investigation. If on the other hand the
shareholders do not feel that the auditor is impartial they will gain no further
confidence from the audit as they will now question the "truth and fairness" of the
auditor's report as well as the manager's. An obvious lack of independence on behalf
of the auditor can negate any benefits that his presence and investigation may have
given.
Perhaps even more important than the auditor's independence is the
commonly held views on the independence of the profession as a whole. It is the
public's trust in the auditor's independence that gives the audit report credibility.
Furthermore, the shareholders can tell little about an individual auditor's
independence and integrity apart from that commonly associated with his profession.
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It is therefore in every auditors' interest to avoid even the appearance of
compromising their independence. The professional bodies issue ethical guidelines to
help auditors on questions of independence. These guidelines help to maintain
public confidence in the independence of the auditing profession.
If the auditor's fee is determined by management then again the auditor's
independence is brought into question. The size of the fee being conditional upon a
certain report being given is clearly unacceptable. However, the fee can influence the
audit in other ways. For example, if the fee is agreed before hand (which is usually
the case) then a low fee may influence the amount of work done by the auditor which
will impair his freedom of investigation. A business can effectively limit the fee
(and thus the investigation) by giving the job to the lowest bidder. If a
disproportionate amount of an auditing firm's revenue comes from one company
(through consultancy for example) then the auditors may feel reluctant to issue a
qualified report for fear of losing revenue. A combination of the two issues can
occur, when a firm bids a lower auditing fee than they think reasonable with the aim
ofmaking up this deficit with the more lucrative consultancy for the business.
1.3 The Stages of an Audit
Materiality is a key concept that is used throughout the auditing process. The three
main points at which it is used are during planning, evidence gathering and drawing
conclusions. Ideally, an auditor would be able to account for every misstatement in
the accounts. The constraints of time and cost-effectiveness mean that this is not
feasible. The auditor needs to decide which misstatements will affect the fairness of
the financial report. Another problem is that if an auditor was to draw attention to
every discrepancy then those reading his report may miss important points that are
snowed under by irrelevancies. The decision of which items to consider important is
a matter of judgement and is very case-dependent. It is thus very difficult to formally
define materiality, yet it is a concept so central to the auditing function that many
attempts have been made. DePaula's Auditing [3] offers the following definition:
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"A matter is material if its non-disclosure, misstatement or omission would be
likely to distort the view given by the accounts or other statement under
consideration."
Planning the Investigation
The auditor needs a thorough familiarity with the business. This should take into
consideration any special tax laws or regulations peculiar to their business, the
location and scope of their operations, the accounting methods for previous years and
the financial performance of the industry as a whole. Such information can be gained
from prior experience with the company, other clients in the same industry, or by
talking to auditors that have the relevant experience. The management of the
company will obviously be a good source of information but their views may be
biased. Perhaps the most useful means of learning about the client is by reviewing
the working papers from previous years. These factors are included in the "inherent
risk" term of the audit risk model discussed in section 1.4. Having familiarised
himself with the business the auditor can make an assessment of the likelihood that
the accounts may contain a material error.
Investigating the Internal Controls
A business will take measures to minimise the risk of fraud and error occurring and
going undetected. These measures will include both accounting information
processing techniques and organisational policies. All these measures are referred to
collectively as internal controls. These should be documented by the company, who
should also ensure that these procedures are known and understood by the relevant
employees. The standard of the internal controls will be of great interest to the
auditor when planning an audit. Clearly, the less faith the auditor can place in the
internal control system, the more evidence he will need to gather to reasonably assure
himself that the accounts are in order.
The first step in examining the internal controls is to review the procedures,
through review of the documents and discussions with staff. This gives the auditor an
idea of how the internal controls should be working. However, before he can place
too much faith in them he needs to see how they work in practice. One of the
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simplest ways to achieve this is to observe the personnel going about their duties to
determine to what extent the procedures are followed. Of course for this to work it is
important that the personnel do not realise that they are being observed. The very fact
that there is an audit about to take place may also give workers a tendency to follow
procedures closely.
Another method of investigation is compliance testing, where the auditor runs
sample accounts through the system and observes their progress through each stage.
If this reveals serious flaws in the system the auditor may make recommendations for
changes. If these changes are made he will then be able to re-test the system. The
degree to which the internal control procedures are followed, and the stringency of
these procedures will determine how much substantive testing needs to be done.
Substantive Testing
After considering the effectiveness of the internal controls the auditor can resort to
searching for errors himself. Probabilistic sampling techniques provide a theoretical
basis on which to plan substantive testing, although sampling is seldom used in a
formal sense in practice. These techniques arose in response to the threat of litigation
and the competitiveness of audit fee which have forced auditors to become more cost
effective. These methods are used to estimate a characteristic (the error rate) of a
population (the accounts). As the items to be sampled are randomly selected, an
assessment of the accuracy of the estimate can be made. There are four main benefits
in principle to probabilistic sampling:
• The techniques are cost-effective as they are designed to give a good estimate for
as small a sample size as possible.
• It forces the auditor to formally plan the sample of a population.
• The required sample size is determined objectively from the acceptable risk level.
• The sampling risk is quantified and can thus be used to show due care in the face
of litigation.
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The auditor conducts substantive testing to determine whether the level of error in the
accounts is material. There are two ways that the sample may lead to the wrong
conclusion:
Type 1 error The estimate of the error rate from the sample is too high. The auditor
incorrectly concludes that the level of errors is material, [false
positive]
Type II error The estimate of the error rate from the sample estimate is too low. The
auditor incorrectly concludes that the level of errors is not material,
[false negative]
Type I errors will lead to a waste of time and resources on behalf of the auditor as he
gathers further unnecessary evidence. Type II errors on the other hand will mean
issuing an unqualified audit report when there are in fact material errors. Clearly the
auditor wishes to avoid this, but for a given level of materiality and sample size,
reducing the risk of one type of error increases the risk of the other.
It has been argued that objective sampling can detract from the application of
the auditor's intuition and experience as to where the problems may lie. Also,
although the sampling is objective and formalised, the assessment of acceptable risk
upon which the sampling is based is itself based upon the auditor's judgement of
other risks. Thus the objectivity can be thought to be only skin-deep.
Drawing Conclusions from the Evidence
In the case where an error in the financial statements has been discovered during the
evidence gathering phase, the auditor needs to decide whether this error should be
disclosed to the interested parties. Ideally any error should lead the auditor to
question the accuracy of the accounting system, or the honesty of those using it. The
concept of materiality is used here to consider whether the errors found are
significant. Another question to be considered is whether the errors discovered are
indicative of other errors in the population that would, when taken together, be
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material. The auditor can use the evidence gathered and the assessment of acceptable
risk to help him decide the likelihood of other such errors having gone undetected.
If the auditor has gathered sufficient evidence, to his mind, to show that the
financial statement is a fair one he may decide that an unqualified report is in order
even if errors are present. In this situation, he is using the concept of materiality and
his judgement to decide that the level of error indicated is unlikely to affect his
clients' views. A second factor based upon the auditor's judgement is the "going
concern" consideration. The financial statement of a business is expected to conform
to certain accepted accounting principles. Most of these deal with acceptable
approaches to the recording of financial transactions and events. However, financial
statements are usually prepared under the assumption that the enterprise will continue
for the foreseeable future. The shareholders' biggest fear in any business is the
collapse of operations which may irretrievably swallow their investment. An
important assurance they will want from the statements is that the company will
continue to be a going concern. An auditor will consider explicitly whether any
uncertainty relating to the company's going concern status is adequately disclosed in
the financial statements. If the uncertainty is fundamental it will be referred to in the
audit report.
Qualification
Once the auditor has drawn his conclusions about the materiality of any errors and
the compliance to accepted auditing standards he will be in a position to give an
informed opinion on the state of the accounts. This takes the form of a short,
standardised opinion. If the auditor has found nothing wrong, the report will
positively state that the financial statements give a true and fair view of the state of
affairs. If the auditor is unable to report affirmatively he will qualify his report by
referring to all the matters about which he has reservations. The Auditing Practices
Board [5] describe circumstances that, if deemed material, lead to a qualified
opinion. Either there is a limitation on the scope of the auditors' examination or the
auditors disagree with the treatment or disclosure of a matter in the financial
statements. The APB give two forms of qualified opinion for a disagreement:
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"An Adverse opinion is issued when the effect of a disagreement is so
material or pervasive that the auditors conclude that the financial statements
are seriously misleading. An adverse opinion is expressed by stating that the
financial statements do not give a true and fair view. When the auditors
conclude that the effect of a disagreement is not so significant as to require an
adverse opinion, they express an opinion that is qualified by stating that the
financial statements give a true and fair view except for the effects of the
matter giving rise to the disagreement."
If the scope of the auditor's investigation is limited the APB give two other
forms of qualification:
A Disclaimer of opinion is expressed when the possible effect of a limitation
on scope is so material or pervasive that the auditors have not been able to
obtain sufficient evidence to support, and accordingly are unable to express,
an opinion on the financial statements. Where the auditors conclude that the
possible effect of the limitation is not so significant as to require a disclaimer,
they issue an opinion that is qualified by stating that the financial statements
give a true and fair view except for the effects of any adjustments that might
have been found necessary had the limitation not affected the evidence
available to them."
1.4 The Audit Risk Model
A widely used theoretical model is the Audit Risk model. This considers the overall
risk of an error going undetected to be the product of separate underlying risks.
Because of its simplicity the audit risk model is frequently used as a conceptual tool
during the planning process. After the auditor has investigated the internal control
system and familiarised himself with the company background and area of operations
this model can be used to help determine the amount of testing to be done. By
assessing the risks that are not under his control, the auditor can determine a level of
testing needed to limit the overall risk to an acceptable level. Audit risk and its
components are set out by the Auditing Standards Board [6]:
"Audit Risk is the risk that the auditor may unknowingly fail to appropriately
modify his (or her) opinion on financial statements that are materially
misstated. It can be viewed as comprising the components of inherent risk,
control risk and detection risk. Inherent risk relates to the susceptibility of an
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account balance or class of transactions to error that could be material ...
assuming that there were no related internal controls."
Control risk is the risk that material errors are not prevented or detected by the
internal control system. Detection risk is the risk that errors that are not prevented or
detected by the control structure are not detected by the auditor. This gives the
following relationship:
AR = IR x CR x DR
where
AR = Audit Risk (also known as universal risk)
IR = Inherent Risk
CR = Control Risk
DR = Detection Risk
One of the three factors (IR) is determined by the nature of the business, one factor
(CR) can be influenced by the manager of the company, and the remaining factor
(DR) can be determined by the auditor. To achieve a certain level of audit risk, the
auditor can rearrange the audit risk equation and solve for DR. This gives the level
of audit assurance required from the substantive testing as (1-DR)%. This value of
audit assurance can be used to calculate the size of sample needed to obtain this level
of assurance. However, despite the neatness of the calculation, all the variables have
been assigned values by the auditor. Thus the method can be no better than the
judgements upon which it rests.
1.5 Legal Responsibility
The basic legal responsibility of an auditor is that he can be brought to account if the
standard of his work falls below a level deemed reasonable. The advantage of this, to
the profession as a whole, is that it lends authority to the opinions of an auditor. As
mentioned above, the auditing profession is worthless unless there is widely accepted
trust in the standards of their work and their integrity. However, deciding what
constitutes a reasonable standard of work will vary from case to case and is not
always clear cut.
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The biggest problem is that when an auditor's standard of work is called into
question it will often be in a courtroom setting. In this case the reasonable standard
will be determined by a Judge and jury. This can cause problems since the auditors
are expected to conform to standards of work which others outside their profession
deem reasonable. If the public expectation is higher than standards thought
reasonable within the profession (the "expectation gap") then auditors can be found
negligent despite having performed with due care as they understood it. The auditor's
liability can arise in two ways; statute law and common law.
Statute law covers cases concerning criminal or wilfully dishonest acts. These
might be the wrongful use of authority, wilfully making a materially false statement
in a report, or dishonestly obtaining funds. These kinds of offences are not specific to
the auditing profession but rather apply to anyone in a position to commit them.
Common law covers cases where the auditor is accused of negligence in his duties to
his clients. These are the more common liabilities that an auditor will face and
largely define the legal requirements upon the auditing profession. Some of the
auditors main legal responsibilities, as determined by previous legal cases, are
outlined below:
• The auditor is liable for any damage sustained by his client by reason of his
omission of verification of assets stated in the balance sheet.
• The auditor is liable for any damage sustained by his client as a result of
falsifications that should have been uncovered by the exercise of reasonable care
and skill.
• The auditor is responsible for the full disclosure of any material inadequacies.
• On the other hand, the auditor is not responsible for guaranteeing the accuracy of
the accounts.
The auditor's responsibility for reporting and detecting fraud has been ambiguous for
many years. Although this was at one time a major objective of the audit, as the
modern audit function developed (and the accounting became more complex) the
audit came to be regarded as a report on the quality of the financial statements. So
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whilst fraud was of concern as a potential source of error its detection was a
secondary objective. However fraud, particularly by management, has always
remained a source of concern for shareholders. In recent years the auditors
responsibility for fraud prevention has increased in response to shareholders'
concerns about a number of highly publicised cases of fraud. This may lead to
another "expectation gap" because, as Tweedie [37] points out, "a properly designed
and executed audit may not detect a material or other irregularity." since the auditor
is unable to take into account the effects of collusion and concealment. At present the
auditor's responsibility is limited to planning and performing his work so that he has
a reasonable expectation of detecting material misstatements caused by either fraud
or error. It is generally considered sufficient for the auditor to bring evidence of fraud
to the attention of the management. It is normally only in extreme situations, where
the auditor suspects the management of being involved for example, that the auditor
reports directly to a regulatory body (the Department of Trade and Industry).
1.6 Limiting Auditor Liability
The auditor has inherited a legal responsibility to third parties. It used to be the case
that no right of negligence existed to third parties (those outside the contract) except
for cases of physical injury. However, it has been successfully argued in the courts
that in some cases if an auditor's report is acted upon in good faith by a third party,
and the information proves to be incorrect, then the auditor should bear some
responsibility for this (although this depends on proximity). The third party can claim
that, although the report was not intended for him, he would not have acted without
the added assurance of the report. This raises alarming questions for the profession as
to how far this liability will extend.
Both the auditor and the manager have a responsibility for preventing and
detecting errors. In the UK this is reflected by a policy of joint and several liability.
This basically means that both parties can be held responsible for losses as a result of
negligence by either party. However the largest losses are suffered by shareholders
when a company goes bankrupt. As the management's finances are often closely
related to the company, bankruptcy can leave them unable to pay damages to the
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shareholders. This then results in very high costs to the auditor, no matter how small
his share of the blame. The extent of this potential liability has led to calls for the
liability to be limited in some way.
One such proposal would permit the auditors to form limited liability
companies. Until 1989 audit firms existed as partnerships (or single practicioners).
Under partnership law all partners within a firm are joint and severally liable. If
damages are awarded that exceed the firms indemnity insurance the shortfall is made
up from the personal assets of the negligent partner, with any excess made up from
the personal assets of the other partners. Thus a partner may lose personal assets as a
result of a poorly performed audit which he had no involvement in. The Companies
Act 1989 permits audit firms to form limited liability companies. With such an
arrangement the assets of the company are used to meet the excess of any claim
greater than the insurance cover. The personal assets of the responsible partner can
also be used to meet any deficiency, although the assets of the other partners cannot.
However, even with incorporation, a large claim may still force the audit firm out of
business. Furthermore, it seems that some firms question whether an incorporated
entity provides the appropriate environment for carrying out professional services.
Major audit firms in the US, for example, have instead formed limited liability
partnerships registered in the state of Delaware. These combine limited liability with
the working environment of a partnership.
A second proposal being considered is a statutory cap to limit the size of a
claim, or to fix the maximum liability as a multiple of the audit fee. The latter
method is already used in some European countries as it has the advantages of
simplicity and reducing the chance of an audit firm being forced out of business by a
single damages claim. Within such a system however audit firms have the potential
to limit their liability by reducing the size of their audit fee, with a corresponding
reduction in audit quality. Another potential drawback is that a client who suffered
losses as a result of negligence may be prevented from fully recouping his losses.
A change in policy has recently occurred in the US to proportionate liability
which awards damages against those responsible in proportion to their responsibility
for that loss. This has the advantage of linking the damages awarded against the
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auditor to his degree of responsibility without limiting the size of the claim. Thus
aggreived clients can fully recoup their losses whilst the audit firm shoulders no
more than its share of the blame. The UK auditing profession is currently lobbying




Game theory considers the area ofmulti-person decision making processes. Its aim is
to predict the optimal behaviour of the participants. To do this it is necessary to
consider which outcomes each player prefers. The theory of utility was developed to
express non-quantifiable preferences by assigning a numerical value to each
outcome, so that preference could be reflected by an ordering of these numbers.
Ordinal utility (best, second best, etc.) can be insufficient to describe a player's
motivations in a game theoretic setting. If a compromise is to be reached between
outcome A and outcome B for example, what matters is not just which outcome is
preferred (ordinal utility) but by how much (cardinal utility). Shubik [35] points out
that in situations where the benefit from an outcome is subjective, the assignment of
cardinal utility may be inappropriate. However, if the outcomes can be assigned
monetary values by the decision makers then cardinal utility can be used. Monetary
values seem a fair approximation to the payoffs in an auditing setting where the costs
involve the time spent working and potential legal costs. The model developed here
will therefore assign cardinal utility to each outcome.
In game theory the players are considered to be rational and risk neutral, and
each player's motivations and preferences are described entirely by the utility of an
outcome. A rational player will aim to maximise his utility from the interaction. To
derive an optimal strategy, a given player must consider what every other player is
likely to do. Effectively this means that each player needs to consider the game from
every players point of view. This leads to the assumption of "common knowledge",
discussed in Binmore [9]. Not only is each player rational and aware of all the rules
and options in the game, but all players know that all players are rational and aware
of the rules, and all players know that all players know this (and so on....). The
assumption of risk neutrality means that the player's preferences are not influenced
by the occurrence of chance. This means that we do not need to distinguish between
a guaranteed value and some chance events with the same expected value.
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2.2 Basic Definitions
A game theoretic model of decision making must consider the actions available to
each player, a timetable for when each decision can be made, a set of outcomes and a
means of describing how the actions taken lead to an outcome. There are two ways of
representing such a decision problem, the extensive form and the strategic form. The
former of these is more useful for considering situations that involve timing.
Extensive Form: A graphical method of describing in chronological order the
actions that are available to each of the players and the choices determined by chance
for the game in question. These decision trees consist of nodes and branches. Each
node either represents a decision by one of the players or a chance event. Each
branch represents an action and the sub-tree below a branch determines the
consequences of that decision. At the end of each final branch there is a payoff
determined by the choices that led to that point.
The extensive form is a useful means of expressing situations in which the players
move in sequence. If this is the case then the game also needs to specify whether
each player will know the actions of the players that preceded him before making his
choice. This leads to a consideration of the information available to each player.
Information set: A set of nodes within the decision tree where a certain player must
make a decision but he does not know which of these nodes (with identical options
for him) represents the actual state of play. This happens if the player has incomplete
knowledge of the history of the game, caused either by a simultaneous move on
behalf of the other player or by an element of chance. If a player does not have this
uncertainty he is said to have a singleton information set. There are two ways in
which the players can have non-singleton information sets. This leads to two classes
of a lack of information:
Incomplete Information: A game has incomplete information if some or all of the
players in it do not know all the structure of the game. Each player may not know
the payoffs, utility functions or strategies available to the other players.
Imperfect Information: In contrast, a game has imperfect information if the players
do not have all the information about the previous moves.
Each player will have a set of actions that can influence the outcome. He will want to
choose amongst these actions to find a "best" action that maximises his payoff. In
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some games however the players choose actions more than once. In these cases the
player's sequence of choices is equivalent to choosing a "best" plan of action for all
eventualities before play starts. Such a plan of action is known as a strategy:
Strategy: A strategy outlines the action a player will take for any eventuality. It
tells the player which action to take at each node of the tree where such a decision is
called for.
In situations where a player observes the outcome of some event before choosing his
action a strategy will prescribe an action for each possible outcome. Thus each player
can choose a "best" strategy before play begins and then effectively plays no further
part in the proceedings. Player i's choices are reduced to choosing a strategy <T; from
his set of possible strategies Ej. We can then describe the payoffs of the game as
functions of these strategies:
Payoff function: Player i's payoff in an n-player game can be described as a function
U^a^CTj, ...., crn ) of each player's strategy.
A comprehensive list of strategies and subsequent payoffs for each player is
sufficient to describe a game. This leads to a second way of representing a multi-
person decision problem.
Strategic form: The strategic form (normal form) of an n-player game G specifies
the player's strategy sets and their payoff functions. G = {E,,E2,...., En ;U,,U2,...,Un}
A game can be categorised by the nature of the payoff functions and the ability of the
players to make binding pre-play commitments. If the players can make pre-play
commitments the game is said to be cooperative. Luce and Raiffa [26] identify a
further division that can be made between cooperative games where the payoffs have
a monetary equivalent and those where payoffs are in terms of subjective utility. If
payoffs are in monetary terms (and the player's utility is linear in money) then
players can commit themselves to side payments in the pre-play agreements. In these
18
situations the players should all agree upon the best outcome (the largest amount of
money) and the only remaining problem is how to divide this amongst the players.
If the payoffs represent subjective utility (preferences over outcomes) then,
even if comparisons of utility can be made between the players, side payments are
meaningless. In these situations there will be a pre-play negotiation game, where the
player's attempt to agree to a mutually beneficial course of action through arbitration.
In this case the theory, discussed in Thomas [36], focuses on the likely results of this
negotiation. Attention here will be focused upon the non-cooperative theory since the
auditing process will be modelled as a non-cooperative game. In chapter 5 the model
is considered in a cooperative framework as a comparison. However since the
player's payoffs can be considered in monetary terms it will be assumed that they act
to maximise their joint profit.
Non-cooperative games can be classified in terms of the player's payoffs. If
the player's interests are diametrically opposed, so that what one player wins another
loses, the game is said to be zero-sum. In these settings the players behaviour will
always be competitive. However, in many situations the players' payoffs, although
influenced by the others' actions, are not influenced by their payoffs. Every player's
payoff function therefore needs to be considered separately. Since zero-sum games
are a special case of non-zero sum games the discussion below will focus on the
latter.
The important question for any game is "how are the players likely to
behave?" Since we are considering rational utility maximising players this question
can be rephrased to "how should the players behave to maximise their payoffs?". To
answer these questions we will need to consider the strategic suitability of each
potential combination of strategies. For an n-player game each way of playing the
game will be an n-tuple with a strategy for each player.
Strategy profile A strategy profile ctn = (a,, a2, ..., an) contains a strategy for each
player and therefore describes one way in which the game could be played. The set of
all such strategy profiles contains every possible play of the game G:
En = { (or,, ct2, ..., crn) | cr,el,, a2eS2, ..., aneEn }.
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Opposing strategy profile: Any approach to finding a "best play" solution to a
game must consider how some player i can maximise his payoff for a given set of
strategies for the other (n-1) players. Define the following:
^N-i {(^I> ^2> ®i+l» ®n) I ®2^^2> ^i-l^^i-1' ^i+l^^i+1' •••» }
Each player i may be able to rule out some of his strategies by considering strategies
that he will never want to use. Suppose that one of player i's strategies x is
consistently better than y, for any strategies that the other n-1 players might use.
Then a rational player i will never use strategy y. Formally we can say that strategy x
dominates strategy y:
Domination: A strategy x dominates a strategy y for player i if
Uj(x, aN.f) > Uj(y, CTN.i) VaN.i e
This can be used for the iterated elimination of strategies. After player i removes
strategy y from his strategy set, player j may find that one of his strategies (which is
consistently worse than another unless y is played) can also be eliminated. This in
turn may mean that further strategies can be eliminated. This process can reduce the
number of strategies that we need to consider to predict the optimal play. One
concern with this might be that the solution we find after eliminating strategies is not
a solution of the original game. However Owen [31] proves that for a two person
game:
Lemma Ifa dominated strategy is removedfrom a two player game then the solution
ofthe reduced game is a solution of the original game.
There is a problem however that solutions of the original game can be lost through
domination unless a strict inequality is a used in the definition of domination
(referred to as strict domination). Although domination can reduce the number of
potential strategies it is usually insufficient to find a solution to a game.
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2.3 Equilibrium Concepts
A basic requirement of any solution concept should be stability. An optimal play
suggestion for the n players is worthless if any of the players can improve their
payoff by ignoring the suggested strategy. This motivates the following definition:
Nash equilibrium If each player i has a set of strategies then a strategy profile
ctn* =(ci*> ct2*> •••> CTn*) is a Nash equilibrium if for each player i = 1,..., n
Ui(<h*,°N-i*) ^ Uj(Oi, aN.i*) V cT[£ I,
Thus no player can benefit by unilaterally deviating from a Nash equilibrium.
However, not all games have a such an equilibrium. It is easy to construct a game
where the players interests are at odds in such a way that no combination of strategies
satisfies the requirements for equilibrium. In these games the players best action can
be to randomly choose between several of their strategies. This led to an expansion of
the idea of a strategy to include chance. Playing strategies with a certain probability
makes the choice irrational, however we can still choose the randomisation scheme
rationally.
Mixed Strategy: A mixed strategy s( for player i consists of a probability distribution
over player i's strategy set E( so that player i plays strategy a,k with probability pk
k
where ^pJ = 1 and a/, a(2, ..., a,k e E;
j = i
A mixed strategy may only put a positive probability on some subset of the available
strategies. To distinguish between those strategies involved in the randomisation and
those which are not we refer to the support of a mixed strategy Sj as those strategies
CTjk that occur with positive probability. Clearly the set of pure strategy equilibrium is
a subset of mixed strategies (i.e. mixed strategies with a support of one). The above
definitions for pure strategies (such as the strategy profile) can easily be extended to
the broader mixed-strategy case. It can be shown that with the inclusion of mixed
strategies a Nash equilibrium will always exist:
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Theorem (Nash 1950) Every finite strategic-form game has a mixed strategy
equilibrium
Another potential difficulty with the Nash equilibrium set is its non-uniqueness. In
zero-sum games each equilibrium will have the same value (gain or loss) to each
player and so each equilibrium is equivalent. In non-zero sum games each
equilibrium can have a different value for each player. The players may therefore
disagree on which equilibrium is preferable. This leads to the idea of domination of
strategy profiles
Domination: A strategy profile (s,, s2,..., sn) dominates another, (s,\ s2', ..., sn') if
Uj(s,, s2, ..., sn) > Ui(s,', s2', ..., sn') for each player i (with strict inequality in one
case)
Pareto Optimality: A strategy profile is Pareto optimal if it is not dominated. A
two person non-cooperative game is an antagonistic game if all outcomes are Pareto
optimal.
As equilibrium pairs are not necessarily equivalent or interchangeable it is not clear
which equilibrium point should be chosen as a solution. Therefore further solution
criteria are needed to select a "best" solution to a game. One of the most compelling
equilibrium refinements can be applied to dynamic games. In these games
equilibrium points can exist which are "unreasonable" as they rely on an empty
threat. This involves one of the player's threatening to play an action if a certain
point off the equilibrium path is reached, even though it would not be optimal for the
player to do this. Selten (1965) proposed the idea of sub-game perfect equilibrium
which requires the players to act rationally at each decision point (sub-game). This
eliminates equilibria which rely on a threat of irrational behaviour.
Subgame: A subgame G' of an extensive form game G consists of a single node and
all of its successors in G, where the structure of information sets and payoffs of
G' are inherited from G.
Subgame-perfect equilibrium: A strategy profile sN of an extensive-form game G is
a subgame-perfect equilibrium if the restriction of sN to G' is a Nash equilibrium of
G' for every subgame G'.
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2.4 Games of Incomplete Information
Very little work had been done on games of incomplete information before
Harsanyi's [23] three papers in 1967 - 1968. This was due to the difficulties in
analysing how one player could predict the actions of his opponents (which is a
necessary step in determining his best strategy) if he does not know what they can do
or what they prefer. This situation leads to an infinite regression of expectations
between the players. Harsanyi's work developed an alternate theory for the analysis
of such games based on the construction of equivalent games which have complete
but imperfect information. These equivalent games could then be analysed using
existing techniques for games of imperfect information. There are two main
assumptions that Harsanyi uses in constructing these equivalent games:
"Bayesian Hypothesis": Each player will assign a subjective joint probability to all
unknown independent variables. Having done this they will try and maximise their
expected payoff in terms of this probability distribution.
Consistency: Beliefs held by different players can be regarded as conditional
probability distributions derived from a basic probability distribution over all
variables unknown to the players.
Harsanyi's method for constructing an equivalent game of imperfect information is to
introduce a chance move by nature at the beginning of the game that exogenously
determines the variables unknown to all players. The consistency assumption ensures
that the probability distribution for this chance move is common knowledge. Each
player then learns the values of those variables he is entitled to know before the game
begins in earnest. This leads to the concept of "types" of players, where for example
different types may have different utility functions. The chance move by nature can
then be thought of as a lottery choosing which types of player get to play. Each
player will know his own type but not necessarily those of the other players. Games
of incomplete information which are modelled in this way are referred to as Bayesian
games. The strategic form representation of an n-player Bayesian game G* is given
by:
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G*={S„S2,Sn ;U,,U2,Un ;T„T2, ...,Tn; p„ p2,pn}
Where Si and Ui are strategy spaces and payoff functions (similar to a game G)
T, is player i's type space
Pi is player i's belief about the types of the other players.
A strategy in a Bayesian game will be contingent upon type and will therefore be
described as a function of type Sj(tj). Player i's payoff function can in general be a
function of each player's type as well as action. Each player's belief is determined
using Bayes' rule after learning any new information. In a static Bayesian Game G*,
we can extend the definition of a Nash equilibrium to a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
This essentially applies the Nash requirement that each player's strategy be a best
response to the others' to a Bayesian game.
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium: The strategies sN* = (s,*, ..., sn*) are a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium if for each player i and for each of i's types t( e T; Sj*(tj) satisfies:
s*(ti) = ARGMAX X P(tN-i|ti)xUi(Si*(tI),S;(t,),sn*(tn); tN.i; t;)
si tN.j e TN.j
In dynamic games of incomplete information the concept of Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium can be extended to include subgame perfection. Since the player's
optimal actions are influenced by their beliefs the concept of perfection must be
extended to impose restrictions on the player's beliefs after a certain history. A
slightly stronger equilibrium refinement is Kreps and Wilson's sequential
equilibrium which restricts the beliefs at an information set which is off the
equilibrium path. Both of these equilibrium concepts require lengthy definitions for a
general case, which can be found in Fudenberg and Tirole [19]. Instead a formal
definition of the requirements for a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium is given below
for a particular class of dynamic games of incomplete information. It has been shown
that for simple games the two equilibrium refinements are equivalent.
Theorem (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991): If either each player has at most two types
or there are two or less periods then the equilibrium sets for perfect Bayesian
equilibrium and sequential equilibrium are the same.
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2.5 Signalling Games
Signalling games are amongst the most simple dynamic games of incomplete
information. These are two player games of one sided incomplete information, where
the informed player moves first. Since the informed player moves first, the other
player may be able to infer the first's type by his choice of actions. The players can
therefore be referred to as the Sender (the informed player that moves first) and the
Receiver. This class of games is discussed in some detail since the audit is modelled
as a signalling game in subsequent chapters. The timing of the basic game is
described by Gibbons [20] as follows:
(1) Nature draws a type tf e T, for the sender, according to a probability
distribution (known to both players) p(t() where
P(tj) > 0 V t, e T,
2>(t.) =i
'i
(2) The sender learns his type t; and then chooses a message nij
(3) The receiver observes nij and then chooses an action ak
(4) Payoffs are given by Us(t;, mj5 ak) and UR(t„ mj5 ak).
The requirements for Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (which is equivalent to sequential
equilibrium in this class of games) are simplified for a signalling game:
Belief about uncertainty After observing any message nij the Receiver must have a
belief about which types would send m^.
£p(ti|nij)= 1
t,eT,
Receivers optimality: For each message the Receiver will act to maximise his
expected utility given his belief about which types could have sent the message:
a*(mj) = MAX X P& lrnj)xUR-(t«» mj' ak) v mj e M
akeA t.6T
Senders optimality: Since the Receiver will act to maximise his expected utility
after receiving message nij the Sender can effectively predict how the Receiver will
behave after each message. The Sender will therefore choose a message so that the
message and the Receivers subsequent response maximises the Sender's utility
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=
MAX Usft' mj' a*(mj))
n^e M
Bayesian updating: beliefs on the equilibrium path can be obtained from Bayes'
rule and the Sender's strategy. Given m*^) let Tj denote the set of types whose
optimal signal is m,. After observing nij the Receiver's beliefs are given by:
p(,'|m') = TSG ,ft'sT'
l.eTj
= 0 if t; g Tj
There are three kinds of pure strategy equilibrium in a signalling game:
Pooling equilibria - each sender type sends the same message. The Receiver learns
nothing about the Senders type from the message.
Separating equilibria - each sender type sends a different message. The Receiver is
certain of the Sender's type after receiving the message.
Partially pooling - with more than two types of sender all types in a subset send the
same message, but different subsets send different messages. The Receiver can
update his beliefs about the Sender's type, as certain types are ruled out by each
message. However, the Receiver will only know that the Sender is one of the types in
that subset.
There are also mixed strategy equilibria which, since they can show aspects of both
pooling and separating equilibria are referred to as hybrid equilibria. If only one
auditee type has a randomised signalling strategy the equilibrium will be referred to
as partially hybrid.
Hybrid equilibria - one or more Sender types has a randomised signalling strategy.
The Receiver can update his beliefs about the Sender's type but he will not always




For many years theoretical models of the auditing process were firmly grounded in
decision theory. An important assumption in decision theory is that the likelihood of
events occurring is not influenced by the decision-maker's actions. In other words the
events are considered to be actions of "nature" determined by probability
distributions known to the decision maker. Auditing can be modelled using this
theory by considering the auditor as the decision maker. A theoretical basis for the
interaction between, for example, sampling and audit risk can be developed. Whilst
this approach has advanced the understanding of the audit process considerably it
suffers from one crucial shortcoming: It cannot recognise that the auditor's actions
may influence the actions of the managers of the company. The ability of the auditor
to influence the behaviour of the managers has been recognised in practice for a long
time. An example of this phenomenon is the anticipatory effect of an audit. The
prospect of a particular department being audited can affect the performance of that
department. To capture this strategic interaction between the managers and the
auditor a theory permitting multi-person strategic decision choice must be used -
game theory.
Game theory was first used in various principal-agent models to consider
such topics as the value of information, the need for an auditor and the design of
optimal contracts. In a principal-agent model the principal determines contracts
which define the payoff for the agent. In auditing terms the shareholders are clearly
the principal player (as they collectively own the means of producing wealth) whilst
both the auditor and the manager of the business can be regarded as agents since they
are employed by (or on behalf of) the shareholders.
Attention subsequently focused on the strategic interaction between the
auditor and the manager. The models developed so far can be divided into two
classes; models ofmajor directional choice and hypothesis testing models. Models of
directional choice such as Fellingham and Newman [16] consider a sequence of
distinct but limited actions, such as High or Low effort by the manager or two levels
of substantive testing by the auditor. These actions represent large changes in the
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players' conduct during the audit and clearly illustrate the strategic interaction
between the two players.
In more operational models, such as Newman and Noel [30], the auditor uses
a hypothesis test to accept or reject the reported account balance. The auditor's
testing is regarded as an imperfect signal of the account balance. An important
assumption in these models is that the distribution of the signal (or the errors) is
known to the auditor. The auditor's strategic decision is the size of the region of
rejection in the hypothesis test. An extension of this approach allows the auditor to
choose the sample size, which determines the accuracy of the testing signal on which
the hypothesis test is based. These hypothesis testing models have recently been used
to consider the auditor's responsibility for fraud detection.
3.2 Principal / Agent Models
A principal / agent model is used by Froystein Gjesdal [21] to consider the value of
an audit report. He identifies two reasons for financial statement demand; Decision
making and stewardship demand. The latter of these represents the situation where
the owners of a business have delegated responsibility to a manager and wish to
check on his performance. Whereas the theory of the value of information in decision
making can be analysed using decision theory, the value of information for
stewardship requires a game theoretic analysis. To this end, Gjesdal develops a very
general agency model where the results of some information system are used to
motivate the players. Using a two player principal-agent model as a simplified
version of the general case, Gjesdal shows that an information system (such as an
auditor's report) is of value to the principal. This is an advancement over previous
accounting literature which starts with the assumption that such information is of
value.
In a similar vein, Baiman and Evans [7] consider six principal-agent models
where the agent is hired to provide some sort of productive input to a project funded
by the principal. Two information systems are considered; A private pre-decision
signal to the agent and a public post-decision signal correlated to the state of the
project and the agent's action. In two of the models the agent also has the option of
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sending a signal to the principal. The models are compared in terms of the Pareto
optimal frontiers (neither player can increase their payoff without reducing the
other's) of the payoff regions. These comparisons are used to determine conditions
for the introduction of an information system or a communication system to benefit
the players.
In contrast to Baiman and Evans' assumption that the agent learns his private
information before his action, Dye [14] considers a similar model where the agent
receives private post-decision information. This signal can then be (perhaps falsely)
relayed to the principal. By making the agent's contract depend upon this
communication, the principal is in effect offering the agent a choice between a family
of contracts conditional on the signal. The communication is valuable if offering
such contracts can give a Pareto improvement over a single payment scheme. Dye
develops a scheme that improves upon the single optimal compensation scheme
available if there is no communication. This new scheme makes both players better
off and also enforces truth telling in the agent's communication. However, this result
depends upon the original solution - if public knowledge of the agent's private
information does not improve the contract then communication is useless.
Having considered the value of information systems and communication in
Baiman and Evans; Baiman, Evans and Noel [8] develop a principal-agent model in
which the agent has private information, which he agrees to communicate to the
principal. To reduce the inefficiency caused by this information asymmetry the
principal hires an auditor to attest to the validity of the agents message. The model
used, in which the agent has a private information system which he reports to the
principal and there is public ex-post information is similar to the most general model
considered in Baiman and Evans. Here however they include a second agent (the
auditor) to attest to the validity of the manager's report.
Restrictions are placed upon the punishment for the manager misreporting.
Otherwise, since the ex-post public information system reveals the managers private
information with positive probability, a sufficiently large penalty will ensure the best
result without the need for an auditor. The auditor's inability to misappropriate assets
directly is one reason why the principal may find it easier to motivate the auditor
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(who then subsequently influences the manager's behaviour) rather than trying to
motivate the manager directly.
The model can be considered one of fraud prevention since the manager
keeps any production not reported and handed over to the principal. The principal
will only hire an auditor for those manager reports where the auditor can improve the
situation (for example suspiciously low reports). The reports that lead to an audit can
be divided into audit regions. The size of these regions influences the auditor's
behaviour. For example, larger regions reduce the attractiveness of shirking since it
becomes harder for the auditor to guess the right outcome. Having determined the
optimal audit region (all reports below a certain level result in an audit) and an
optimal contract pair, the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is shown to be
consistent reporting where the manager reports honestly but not fully i.e. "the
outcome lies in this subset ...." and effective auditing followed by honest reporting
by the auditor.
Antle [2] uses an agency model to tackle another area of auditing. He
attempts to form a plausible definition of auditor independence within an agency
model. A general model is developed involving the principal (owner) and 2 agents
(manager and auditor). Firstly the owner chooses an incentive scheme based on the
manager's report, the auditor's report and some publicly observable ex-post
information variable (such as the company's gross profit for the year). Secondly the
manager observes some private information (such as net income), then chooses a
productive act and a reported value of the privately observed variable (reported net
income).Thirdly the auditor has a non-productive action that generates a privately
observed variable correlated in some way to the action / information of the manager.
The outcome is then determined, influenced by both the manager's action and a
random variable (this outcome can be thought of as some amount of money received
by the owner). The owner then pays both the agents according to the incentive
scheme.
Having derived this model Antle turns his attentions to the question of
independence. He points out that the model cannot be regarded as a cooperative one
because if it were the owner and manager could enter into binding pre-play
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agreements and there would be no need for an auditor. Each of the players is
considered to be utility-maximising. The problem is where to draw the line between
self interest (which involves at least maximising utility) and collusion to the
detriment of the owner. With utility maximising players the manager and auditor will
play a Nash equilibrium in the subgame generated by the owners incentive plan.
However, the Nash equilibrium may not be unique, indeed all equilibrium
refinements are intended to reduce this set of feasible solutions. Antle suggests that
auditor independence could be used as an equilibrium refinement. He defines a
strongly independent auditor to be one who plays the Nash equilibrium most
preferred by the owner.
The owners incentive problem with a strongly independent auditor can be
simplified by considering only those incentive schemes that lead to truthful reporting
(by the revelation principle). A second weaker definition of independence is given in
which the auditor will choose, amongst those equilibria that maximise his own
utility, the one preferred by the owner. With this definition of independence the
auditor's optimal contract depends only upon the ex-post financial indicator. This
would seem to be at odds with rules prohibiting the auditor from owning shares in
the company being audited. Antle also points out that a repeated game setting may
encourage collusion as it gives the manager and auditor a means of enforcing any
private agreements.
3.3 Models ofMajor Directional Choice
Wilson [38] gives perhaps the first suggestion that the usefulness of game theoretic
modelling extends beyond the principal agent model. In this paper, based on a
presentation to the 1982 AAA annual meeting, Wilson speculates on directions for
research in accounting theory. He begins by discussing some of the pros and cons of
modelling auditing with game theory. The main drawback is the necessary
assumption of super-rationality (that all players are perfectly rational and furthermore
know that all the other players know that they are rational and so on .... and that no
amount of evidence to the contrary during the game will change this). Also that the
players are assumed to have almost unlimited powers of calculation. On the other
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hand, the players are considered to have limited foresight and it is recognised that
some things may never be observable.
The principal-agent models of auditing have established a need for an auditor
from purely informational requirements. Wilson suggests that game theory could also
be used to investigate the influence of financial reporting requirements. For
example, increasing the level of mandatory information disclosure may reduce the
level of voluntary disclosure, with the result that the public becomes less informed
under stricter reporting requirements. Such disclosure effects were later discussed
in, for example, Dye [15]. Another suggested area of great potential interest is that of
reputation, in which auditors may play sub-optimally in the short term to reap future
benefits. Any model considering these reputation effects must be a multi-period
model. Such models are either difficult to analyse or a trivial repetition of the single
period game. To date no repeated game auditing model has been developed. Wilson
also suggests that payoffs, rather than being set by the principal, could be jointly
determined by the strategic interaction of the players. Such an approach lends itself
to the analysis of strategic interaction between the auditor and manager.
Fellingham and Newman [16] develop the first model for analysing the
strategic interaction between the manager (henceforth auditee) and the auditor during
the audit. They mention the two existing methods of assessing audit risk. These are
risk analysis, (such as the audit risk model) and modelling the audit using decision
theory so that risk is only one element in the model. The former is often criticised for
being incomplete and ad hoc whereas the latter suffers from implementation
problems, although it is often considered better than risk analysis. One of the main
flaws in decision theory is it's inability to take account of the auditee's behaviour,
even though the behavioural influences of an audit (such as preventative sampling)
have long been recognised. Because of this Fellingham and Newman suggest using
game-theoretic models. They mention however that although conceptually more
compelling, game theory is likely to prove just as intransigent in application as
decision theory.
The model developed is a simple one, focusing on the auditor's ability to
influence the auditee through the potential to observe his effort level before
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qualifying. The auditee first chooses an effort level to put into maintaining the
internal controls. The auditor has a choice between observing the auditee's effort
level (A,) or not (A2) before deciding whether to qualify. This gives six strategies for
the auditor {A2Q, A2NQ, A,Q/Q, A,Q/NQ, A,NQ/Q, A[NQ/NQ} three of which are
dominated (All of the A, test strategies apart from A,NQ/Q ). The auditee's effort
level influences the chance of errors occurring and each player's costs are described
as the expectation of the costs of 4 outcomes over the chance of errors occurring.
They assume that for the auditor the cost of a correct audit opinion is zero. The
auditee's cost is assumed to be zero if no error occurs and the auditor does not
qualify (they point out that the estimation of these parameters is a major problem
made worse by game theory since there are more costs to consider).
For some numerical examples the optimal solution involves mixed strategies
whereas in decision theory a mixed strategy is never preferred. They mention that
the only pure strategy that never occurs in equilibrium is A,NQ/Q. In fact this can be
proved if there is a positive cost associated with A,. The next section of the paper
investigates audit risk. It shows that the risk of type I / type II reporting errors
depends critically upon both players' strategies. Decision theory is incapable of
accommodating this observation. Fellingham and Newman point out that even this
simple model captures the strategic interaction of an audit, is consistent with
behavioural hypotheses regarding the influence of an audit and is consistent with
observed audit phenomena. As areas for future work they suggest games of
incomplete information and the development of optimal sampling strategies
(although this is very difficult).
Nadeau [29] develops the model of Fellingham and Newman by considering a
stage of substantive testing. The auditor therefore has three stages to his strategy.
Firstly he chooses whether to observe the auditee's effort level (A,) or not (A2).
Then, based on the results of the "A-test" he chooses a high (B,) or low (B2) level of
substantive testing to actively search for errors. Finally he chooses whether or not to
qualify his report based on the findings of his substantive testing.
The equilibrium behaviour of this model is used to consider various policy
implications. By varying the cost of the outcome when an error goes undetected,
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Nadeau investigates the implications of raising (or lowering) each parties
responsibility for limiting undetected errors. This can be used to consider the
potential influence of a supervisory body setting these costs to encourage socially
desirable behaviour. A second mechanism for encouraging desirable behaviour is a
factor that can reduce the auditor's costs for failing to detect an error if he can show
due diligence. This encourages the auditor to work hard to earn a discount factor in
the event of subsequent litigation. In this model the discount is awarded if the auditor
observes the auditee's effort level (the A-test).
Any regulatory influence to encourage certain behaviour will depend upon
what is deemed "socially desirable". This in turn depends upon society's view of the
auditing function. The most obvious desirable outcome is for both parties to work
hard; the auditee reducing errors and the auditor detecting those that do occur. An
interesting alternative is considered where the auditor does not have to work hard. He
is considered to have fulfilled his obligation if his presence influences the auditee to
work hard. The model is considered as both a cooperative and a non-cooperative
game. It is shown that for some levels of costs the optimal behaviour is the same in
both the cooperative and non-cooperative frameworks.
3.4 Auditing in a Cooperative Framework
Demski and Swieiringa [11] argue that the interaction between the auditee and
auditor should be viewed in a cooperative setting. They put forward two observations
to support this argument; Firstly the audit fee structure is cooperatively agreed upon
(which effectively allows side payments between the players). In fact the
negotiations over the fee structure can also be regarded as a mechanism for pre-play
communication and commitment. Secondly, the legal responsibility for failing to
detect errors will be shared between both parties. The player's motivations will
therefore be similar since each wishes to limit the risk of errors going undetected.
The authors develop a model where some monetary outcome is the
consequence of both the auditee's private action and some unobserved chance event.
The auditee is required to issue a report of this monetary value. There are a choice of
reporting methods, each ofwhich introduce errors into the reported level. The auditee
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is obliged to use an acceptable reporting system and to provide a report with a
tolerable level of errors. The auditor's responsibility is to provide independent
certification that the auditee has fulfilled these two obligations. The auditor therefore
chooses a final reporting scheme dependent upon the level of errors, the monetary
value and the auditee's report and reporting method. It is then shown that if both
players have similar utility functions and risk preferences and given a Pareto optimal
fee structure, the players can be regarded as a single individual. This reduces the
audit problem to a single-person Bayesian decision problem.
Hatherly, Nadeau and Thomas [24] consider a model of major directional
choice in a cooperative setting. The model analysed is taken from Nadeau [29] where
the auditee has a choice between high and low effort and the auditor can observe this
effort, conduct substantive testing and subsequently qualify his report. The audit fee
is the motivation for using a cooperative framework as it provides the necessary
means for negotiation and pre-commitment. The model is used to consider the
implications of setting costs to encourage certain behaviour. The penalties for failing
to detect a material error are therefore not set with compensation in mind. The
players' optimal behaviour as these penalties vary is then considered. The idea of
using the fee schedule to enforce agreed behaviour has some interesting implications
for the auditor/manager relationship. If, for example, the auditor can commit to a
certain audit opinion before any testing is carried out his independence is called into
question
In a cooperative setting the costly observation of the auditee's effort level is
never optimal. If the auditee makes a binding commitment to put in high effort then
any additional expenditure to "check up" on this action is wasted.. A second version
of the model is analysed in which there is concern that the auditee might shirk after
committing to a high effort level. It is therefore considered socially desirable for the
auditor to observe the auditee's effort level. To encourage this Nadeau's [29]
discount factor is introduced. This reduces the auditor's responsibility for undetected
errors if he has shown due diligence, in this case the use of the A-test. This means
that, in effect, the auditor can "buy" the discount by using the A-test which has no
influence on the audit outcome in a cooperative setting.
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3.5 Hypothesis Testing Models
Newman and Noel [30] develop a model in which the auditor's testing is considered
to generate a noisy signal of the account balance. They consider the impact of
changes in policy variables (cost of outcomes) on a range of results such as the
probability of errors going undetected. This involves finding the equilibrium of the
model and seeing how it changes as the payoff functions change. The auditee's
strategy is to choose the level of material errors in a reported account (90 = NM , 0j =
M [where 9, > 90 . This choice reflects the situation where there is a material error in
the account and the auditee must decide whether or not to go to the trouble of
eliminating it. The auditor observes an imperfect signal from a normal distribution
with mean 9;. The auditor's choice is between accepting or rejecting this reported
balance of the account which will be influenced by the auditee's action. It is assumed
that the actual account balance is probabilistically revealed in a subsequent period (a
similar assumption to the ex-post public information variable in Baiman, Evans and
Noel ). This gives 4 payoffs depending upon accept / reject and M / NM for each
player.
A partial ordering is imposed on the player's payoffs to reflect their
preferences. The auditor prefers to qualify if a material error is present whilst if there
is not an error the auditor would prefer to not qualify. The auditee has the opposite
preferences - so he benefits if an error goes unqualified and (unusually) if there is not
an error he would prefer the report to be qualified. Furthermore it is assumed that if
the audit report is to remain unqualified the auditee would prefer not to go to the
trouble of removing the error, which means that the auditee doesn't have a dominant
strategy. With these orderings the players' interests are clearly at odds. A critical
value is developed for the reported balance - if this report is above a certain value the
auditor rejects it. This value depends upon two factors. Firstly, the critical value
depends on the auditor's prior beliefs about the auditee's strategy. Secondly the value
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depends on the ratio, L, of the benefits of not qualifying when there is no error over
the benefits of qualifying when there is an error:
L = ( NQ(NM) - Q(NM)) / (Q(M) - NQ(M))
The game is shown to have a mixed strategy equilibrium. The effects of changes in
the payoffs on a range of results, such as the probability of a material error going
unnoticed, are considered. These results are then compared with the predictions of a
decision theoretic model. The two theories predict different reactions to an increase
in L on the overall chance of rejection. Game theory says that there should be a
positive relation, whereas decision theory predicts a negative effect. The authors
suggest an empirical method could be used to determine which paradigm is more
accurate. Newman and Noel mention several limitations of the model; The auditee is
limited to two strategies, the auditor cannot issue a report without gathering evidence
(although he is highly unlikely to do so in practice) and, more importantly, cannot
vary the amount of testing done.
Fellingham, Newman and Patterson [17] overcome some of the limitations of
the model developed by Newman and Noel by investigating sampling in a game
theoretic setting. Classical Bayesian statistical techniques depend crucially on the
idea that the environment is unconcerned with the outcome of the sampling. This is
clearly not the case in auditing. The authors mention several ways in which the
strategic effects of sampling have long been considered. For example, it was
recognised as early as 1933 that sampling plans cannot be too rigidly systematic
since a dishonest auditee could use this to his advantage. Also mentioned is the
technique of preventative sampling, in which the impression is given that no area will
be audit free (similar to a randomised sampling strategy).
A basic model is developed with similar assumptions to the previous paper
about the relative sizes of the players' payoffs. The auditee chooses an error rate or
"amount to divert" from a range of values (which improves on the situation where
the auditee has only 2 strategies). The auditor then decides to accept or reject the
accounting reports. Clearly since the auditee prefers a low error rate if rejected and a
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high error rate if accepted (whilst the auditor prefers the opposite) this game will
have a mixed strategy equilibrium. This basic model is augmented by the inclusion of
a signal observed by the auditor (as a result of substantive testing). The auditor's
strategy in this model becomes a partition of the set of possible signals into "accept"
and "reject" regions.
The authors consider four different signals covering perfect / imperfect and
costly / free signals. They show that if the signal is costless and perfect then the
auditor will always acquire information. If the signal is imperfect but costless then
the auditee will never play a pure strategy in equilibrium because, as far as the
auditee is concerned, the auditors response will randomise between accept and reject.
If the signal is perfect and costly it will only be used if it is not too costly. Finally
the case of costly imperfect information is considered. If the auditor decides to gather
more information (through attribute sampling) he can choose the sample size n and a
rejection strategy based upon the number of errors found. This leads to a huge
number of potential strategies so attention is restricted to trigger strategies of the
form "reject if the number of errors is greater than c* ". A numerical example is
given where the auditor's optimal strategy involves randomising between two sample
sizes. This suggests that such basic assumptions as the existence of an optimal
sample size may not hold in a strategic environment. The authors suggest several
avenues for future research including games of timing, of incomplete information
and the division of the auditors tests into tests of controls and substantive tests.
Shibano [34] uses game theory to develop the theory of audit risk with
imperfect audit technology. He identifies two types of risk; nonstrategic audit risk
(NSAR) involving errors and strategic audit risk (SAR) involving fraud or
irregularities. Recent statements on auditing standards from the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants increase the auditor's responsibility to include both
error and fraud detection. SAS 53 recognises that audit procedures that are effective
for detecting unintentional misstatements may be ineffective against those that are
intentional. Shibano argues that a new testing theory is needed to account for these
changes in the role of the auditor. He develops two models; one of testing for a
hidden action and the other of testing of a report of hidden information.
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In the first of these models the auditor is testing an exogenously determined
null hypothesis. The auditee has an unobserved action, which is considered to be
effort put into the internal control system in order to assess control risk. The auditor
then observes a signal generated by his testing and decides whether or not to accept
the null hypothesis. This evidence comes from a general distribution, rather than
assuming that the evidence is, say, normally distributed. Thus the models are robust
across a large range of populations. The solution concept used is Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium. In the second setting the true account balance is determined
probabilistically. The auditee observes this balance and chooses a balance to report to
the auditor. Thus the auditee effectively chooses the auditor's null hypothesis. The
auditor then observes a testing signal and decides whether or not to accept the null
(i.e. the auditee's reported balance). This formulation is an advancement on previous
models as it explicitly includes intentional misstatements. Since the actions occur in
a strict sequence the solution concept used is sequential equilibrium.
Shibano then uses the existing audit risk formulation, AR = IRxCRxDR
where the three terms are respectively inherent risk, control risk and detection risk.
This risk assessment is enriched by distinguishing between the two situations given
above. This gives expressions for both NSAR and SAR:
NSAR = IRexCRexDRe
SAR = IR'xCR'xDR'
There are therefore six risk components to consider, three for error audit risk and
three for irregularity audit risk. Shibano assesses each of these components in the
setting that he considers most appropriate. For example both CRe and CR' are
assessed using the hidden action model. However, in order to make these
assessments a number of simplifications are made. It is assumed that the internal
control system operates after the auditee generates an irregularity (and that this
system cannot be overridden by the auditee). In practice however any sufficiently
large fraud must be able to do exactly this. To deal with the possibility that accounts
may be affected by both errors and irregularities it is assumed that for irregularity-
prone accounts the auditee knows the true account balance. It is also assumed that
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evidence gathered during tests of controls is uninformative during substantive
testing.
As mentioned above, a particular interpretation of the hidden action model is
used to derive control risk for both SAR and NSAR. Both inherent risk and detection
risk for SAR are assessed using the hidden information setting. For NSAR inherent
and detection risk are assessed using decision theory. This presents the auditor with
two means of assessing audit risk. The choice of which to use will depend upon the
auditor's judgement - if he believes that intentional misstatements are possible he
should use the SAR model. However, this could lead to a further component of audit
risk, namely the risk of incorrectly assessing the audit situation.
3.6 Models of Fraud Detection
Matsumara and Tucker [27] develop a model that is motivated by increases in the
auditor's responsibility for detecting and reporting irregularities (including fraud) and
illegal acts. Their approach is unique for two reasons. Firstly in this model the
auditor designs an audit strategy to explicitly test for fraud. Secondly the analysis of
the model uses both game theory and economic experimentation. The effects of 4
variables on the model are investigated - the auditors penalty for failing to qualify
fraud, the requirements of auditing standards, the structure of quality control and the
audit fee.
In this model unintentional errors are normally distributed with mean p and
variance a2, a distribution which is known to both players. The auditee's only choice
is whether or not to commit fraud. If he chooses to do so this introduces more errors,
t, into the population. Thus after a fraud the errors are normally distributed with
mean p + t. The auditor has two tests. Test 1 is a test of transactions which can verify
the percentage of errors in the population, after fraud has (or has not) occurred. Test
2, detailed tests of balances, can detect fraud. Two levels of this test, corresponding
to large / small sample size, are available. Test 2 cannot give a false positive as it is
assumed that the cost of avoiding such false accusations is included in the cost of the
test. The auditor has three potentially optimal strategies {no test 1/large test2, no
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testl/small test2, testl(if high % errors then large test2 / if low % errors then small
test 2)}.
The auditee has a pure equilibrium strategy if the auditor doesn't use test 1 :-
NF against a small test 2 sample size or F against a large test 2. If the auditor uses
test 1 and a rationally conditional test 2 then the auditee is fraudulent with a
probability that maximises his expected return. The solution concept used is
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Where there are two equilibria the authors assume that
the auditee plays to the equilibrium he prefers. From a numerical example the authors
note that increasing the auditors penalty for failing to find fraud decreases the
incidence of fraud. This is presumed to be because the auditee anticipates an increase
in fraud detection on behalf of the auditor. An increase in the minimum testing
requirements for test 2 effectively reduces the difference between large and small
sampling sizes. This in turn means that test 1 is less important. If test 1 is used, the
threshold value for large test 2 sample sizes increases and so the minimum level of
testing occurs more often.
The model represents internal control as the percentage of clerical errors. The
influence of the internal control system in the model is examined by considering 2
cases. For a high level of internal controls, test 1 is more effective as fraud is more
likely to be noticed if there are few random errors. There are therefore more
equilibria involving the use of test 1. Conversely with a poor level of internal
controls test 1 becomes less effective and the auditor resorts to the more detailed
(large sample) test 2. The effect of the size of the audit fee is also considered
although this should make no difference to risk neutral players with complete
information about utility functions in a game theoretic setting. However, it is
considered because the model was also analysed through a multi-period experiment
(and it is well known that the assumptions of rationality can lead to some
unsatisfactory predictions in repeated games). In the experiment, an increase in the
audit fee led to an increase in sampling and the percentage of fraud detected in the
early games of a sequence, but towards the end of the repeated game the players did
the opposite. This is perhaps due to end-game effects (a reputation for being "tough"
is more valuable with more periods left to play) although the players were uncertain
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about exactly how many periods would be played. The differences between actual
behaviour and that predicted by theory suggest that this could be an interesting area
of future research.
In Patterson [33], Shibano's [34] "hidden-action" model is extended to
include the auditor's sample size choice. For tractability it is assumed that the
evidence is normally distributed. This assumption was also made in Newman and
Noel [30], although Shibano mentions that this assumption may not be reasonable
when taking a small sample from a skewed population. Also in contrast to Shibano,
the control risk in this model is assessed to be 1, in other words the auditee can
override the internal control system.
The hidden action in this model is assumed to be a choice of intentional
material error arising from defalcation (an action that reduces asset value). The
auditee chooses the mean of the sample evidence where {wj immaterial error,
w2=large error arising from defalcation}. A mixed strategy for the auditee is
identified by a defalcation rate, the probability of choosing w2. The auditor cannot
distinguish between intentional and unintentional errors (an assumption that is
supported by anecdotal evidence). He suspects fraud if the sampling error is large
enough. Thus the auditor can be thought of as using variables sampling rather than
discovery sampling. The auditor's strategy is a reporting decision rule similar to
Newman and Noel [30] - reject if the sample error is greater than a critical value.
However, in this model the auditor also chooses the sample size n. Having decided
on the sample size n, the auditor is committed to performing all n samples, rather
than using a more realistic but much less tractable Bayesian stopping rule. The game
is equivalent to a simultaneous move game and thus the Nash equilibrium concept is
used.
The players' payoffs are ordered in a similar way to previous models. In
particular, the auditee prefers a material error if the auditor accepts and prefers no
material error if the auditor rejects, whereas the auditor prefers to reject a material
error and accept when there is no material error. These conditions are sufficient to
ensure that neither "accept" nor "reject" can form a pure strategy equilibrium. Two
conditions need to be satisfied for sampling to be worthwhile. Firstly, the cost of
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sampling must be low enough that the benefit from sampling outweighs the
additional cost. Secondly the auditee's behaviour must be suitably unpredictable (a
mixed strategy). Upper and lower bounds for the auditee's defalcation rate can be
determined for sampling to be worthwhile. Assuming these conditions are met one of
three equilibria will occur.
(1) The auditor randomises between sampling as in (2) and accepting
without sampling. The auditee has a low defalcation rate.
(2) The auditor always samples and chooses his sample size and reporting
rule to maximise his payoff. The auditee's defalcation rate lies
between that in (1) and that in (3).
(3) The auditor randomises between sampling as in (2) and rejecting
without sampling. The auditee has a high defalcation rate.
Patterson considers how changing the players' payoffs can affect the auditor's
optimal sample plan, the auditee's defalcation rate and audit risk. As one would
expect, increasing the auditee's payoffs for a material error increases the defalcation
rate whereas increasing the payoffs for no material error decreases the defalcation
rate. The sample size is effected by uncertainty - if a low defalcation rate gets lower
the sample size decreases whereas if a high defalcation rate decreases the sample size
increases. However since the defalcation rate lies strictly between 0 and 1 the audit
risk cannot be eliminated. There is an increased interaction between the players in
this game, it is pointed out, since a change in either players' payoffs results in a
change in both equilibrium strategies.
Hansen [22] uses a different approach to motivate his model of the audit. He
examines a more specific area (accounts receivable) so that he can analyse the
"micro" characteristics of the items being tested, such as the size of the account or
the error distribution. He assumes that the testing is being conducted by an internal
auditor so that the incentives of the management and auditor are equivalent. He thus
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focuses attention on the strategic use of testing to deter employee fraud. He considers
the auditor's optimal sampling strategy in three different settings.
Firstly, a decision theoretic model of non-strategic error detection is
developed. The model considers a firm trying to prevent billing errors in N items (of
differing value) of accounts receivable. There is a probability for each item that an
error will occur in processing the bill - which can result in either over or under-
billing the customer. It is shown that there may be no consistent link between the
likelihood of testing and item value if the error is unrelated to the item value. If
however there is such a relation (if for example the size of the error is a percentage of
the value) then the firm will always test the higher value items.
The second setting includes the potential for employee fraud. Each item is
processed by a different employee who has a non-zero chance of being dishonest.
After any unobserved random billing error has occurred, a dishonest employee can
introduce further reductions into the bill (for which he receives a percentage
"kickback" from the customer). The auditor must therefore conduct testing to prevent
both random and deliberate billing errors. If the auditor uses a mixed testing strategy
this can look like Stratified Physical Units Attribute Sampling (in which the items are
grouped according to value and each item in a group has the same chance of being
tested).
The third setting considers a second mechanism for employee fraud. In this
case the employee awards unearned discounts to his confederates (and subsequently
gains a share of the profits). This differs from the previous setting as the amount
stolen is a percentage of the bill's value. In this case the auditor's testing strategy
resembles Dollar Unit Cell Width Sampling. The firm never tests small items, always
tests large items and tests medium items with a probability proportionate to their
size. The dishonest employee's strategy is similar - he always steals from the lowest
value items because he will not get caught, he always steals from the highest value
items because of the potential profit and he steals from intermediate value items with
a probability that decreases in the value of the item.
Although the auditor's optimal strategy can resemble recognised sampling
plans, the randomisation serves a different purpose in the model. In practice firms use
44
statistical sampling in response to limited time and resources. In the model a mixed
strategy is the least-cost way of limiting employee fraud. The auditor chooses a
mixed strategy without any budget constraints. Furthermore, in practice statistical
sampling is only used in large populations. In the model randomisation may take
place even with a single item to be tested. This suggests that randomisation could be
used in practice to deter theft.
3.7 Discussion
This work develops and analyses two models of the audit. The audit is considered to
have a fundamental information asymmetry in so far as the auditor cannot know the
auditee's motivations exactly. The audit risk model includes this in the inherent risk
term which recognises that the basic chances of errors occurring (or the risk of
fraudulent activity) differs between companies. This uncertainty can be modelled in a
multi-person decision setting by regarding the audit as a game of incomplete
information. In particular, since the auditor may infer the auditee's motives from his
actions the audit will be modelled as a signalling game, described in section 2.5.
Chapter 4 develops a signalling game model of the audit as a means of error
detection. The model is then used to consider the possible policy implications of
varying the cost of some of the outcomes. Chapter 5 extends the analysis of the
model to include mixed strategies and Pareto dominated equilibrium pairs. The
model is also considered in a cooperative setting and a situation of proportionate
liability. Chapter 6 develops a second, similar model that considers the occurrence of
both unintentional and deliberate irregularities. The equilibrium set is characterised
by considering the cost of the players' actions to be variables. This also has potential
policy implications if the cost of actions are influenced by an external regulatory
body.
The models to be developed below differ from the hypothesis testing models
of auditing as they take a view of the audit, first suggested by Fellingham and
Newman[16] , in which the players have major directional choices. One reason for
this is that the strategic interaction between the players can be more clearly
demonstrated with simple choices of actions. Returning to simple strategic choices
45
may appear to be less realistic than regarding the auditor's actions as a hypothesis
test. However, Duke et.al [12] argue that hypothesis testing may not be suitable for
audit sampling because accounting populations tend to have low error rates and a
highly skewed distribution. In a model of the audit where the auditor uses hypothesis
testing, assumptions must be made either about the distribution of errors, or about the
distribution of the testing report. By considering the audit in a more stylised setting
we need only assume that the expected chance of a material error occurring
(regardless of the distribution) is known.
The idea of inherent risk is included in the models through the auditor's
uncertainty about the basic chance of errors occurring. This uncertainty is modelled
by a probability distribution which determines, before play begins, the likelihood of
errors (or irregularities) occurring. The error detection model developed in chapter 4
is the first of the simple directional choice models to have costly pure strategy
information gathering strategies in equilibrium. It can be shown that in a game of
perfect information, costly acquisition of information cannot form part of a pure
strategy equilibrium. In a signalling game however, the auditor's beliefs about the
other player's actions must be considered as part of the equilibrium and information
acquiring strategies can form a pure strategy equilibrium.
A signalling game can be distinguished from a game with an observed signal
such as the "hidden action" hypothesis testing models. Both models have imperfect
information since an event occurs which is not observed by the auditor. In the
hypothesis testing models however the auditor's testing generates a signal which is,
in part, determined by the hidden chance event. In a signalling game the auditor has
no direct means of assessing the result of this unobserved event. He must instead
consider how the outcome of this unobserved event will influence the actions of the
auditee and by observing these actions infer the outcome.
The model developed in chapter 6 considers the audit to be a means of
detecting and preventing both intentional and unintentional errors. This provides an
insight into the strategic interaction between a potentially dishonest auditee and the
auditor against a background of random errors. This allows an increased interaction
between the types of error and the auditor's opinion. For example, the auditor may
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incorrectly classify the results of fraud as merely a random error. The model also
provides an alternative approach to the auditee's ability to override the internal
control system. The auditee can do so (and must to conceal fraud) but there is a cost
associated with such an action. This cost will depend on the level of internal controls
in use. It is also assumed to differ between companies and the auditor will not know
the level of this cost when planning the audit.
This model differs from previous work in the assumptions made about the
players' motives. Patterson [33] , for example, assumes that the auditee successfully
conceals the fact that an irregularity was intentional. In such a setting the only
deterrent is that introducing further errors into the system increases the risk that the
auditor will qualify his report. The model developed here gives the auditor a choice
between qualifying for material error or qualifying with evidence of fraud. In such a
setting the auditee can actually be "caught" having committed fraud. Matsumara and
Tucker [27] consider a setting in which the auditee can be caught, although they
assume that the auditor is rewarded for successfully detecting fraud (the auditor's
"best" outcome is qualified fraud). In the model developed in chapter 6, successful
fraud detection can be costly as it may lose the auditor future custom. The auditor's
motivation for fraud detection is that, given fraud has occurred, non-detection may be
even more costly.
Previous models in a fraud setting have been based on a "variables-
sampling" approach in which the auditor's qualification decision is the result of
hypothesis testing and his substantive testing is considered to generate a signal about
the account balance. In such models the occurrence of random errors is modelled by
considering a distribution (often normal) of errors which is known to both players.
The occurrence of fraud creates additional errors which effectively shift the mean of
this distribution. However, neither player's payoffs are affected by the occurrence of
these errors. The model developed here is the first to recognise that the auditor has a
responsibility to detect both kinds of error, and that these two requirements may
sometimes be at odds. The auditor must therefore strike a compromise between fraud
and error detection.
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4 A MODEL OF ERROR DETECTION
4.1 Introduction
This chapter develops and analyses a signalling game model of the auditing process.
The audit is considered here to be a report on whether or not the financial statements
contain an unintentional material error. The issue of strategic interaction when the
auditee has the ability to commit fraud is considered in chapter six. The sensitivity of
the model's equilibrium pairs to changes in some of the payoffs is considered by
regarding some of the costs to be variables. This permits a categorisation of the set of
potential equilibrium pairs as these costs vary. In a similar approach to Nadeau [29]
this can then be used to consider the policy implications of externally setting these
costs to encourage certain behaviour.
The next section outlines a model of the auditing process. This describes the
actions available to the participants and the sequence in which they occur. It also
details how these actions interact to lead to one of four outcomes. The players'
utilities from these outcomes are ordered (in terms of costs) to reflect the preferences
of the auditor and manager. Section 4.3 takes the framework developed in 4.2 and
expands it into a game theoretic model. This involves considering the information
available to the players during the game and how they deal with any uncertainty. A
number of the auditor's strategies are shown to be sub-optimal and can therefore be
removed from any equilibrium considerations.
Section 4.4 analyses the auditor's cost structure in more detail. This leads to a
classification of the auditor's optimal actions as his variable cost increases. Formulae
are given that can generate all the necessary inequalities for categorising the
equilibrium set. Section 4.5 then outlines a method for determining all the pure
strategy equilibria as the two costs vary. A numerical example is considered to
illustrate the characterisation of the equilibrium set. The example is used to consider
how the changes in costs can influence the participants behaviour.
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4.2 A Model of the Auditing Process
The "inherent risk" term of the audit risk model recognises that the chance of errors
occurring varies from company to company. However, the assessment of this term
can prove difficult. Dunn [13] for example states that: "The evaluation of inherent
risk is the most demanding aspect of audit planning". Some of the factors that
influence the inherent risk, such as the nature of the business and the levels of
safeguards to prevent errors, can be observed by the auditor but others, such as the
management's influence over the occurrence of errors, cannot. This is recognised in a
research study into the extent of audit testing by the Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants [10] which states: "The assessment of the system must take into
consideration the degree of management influence, to the extent that this is
determinable". The game theoretic papers to date do not consider the strategic effects
of inherent risk in their models of the audit. This model incorporates inherent risk by
considering the audit as a signalling game.
The two parties that have a primary interest in the outcome of the audit as
well as the ability to directly influence it, are the auditors and the directors of the
company. For this model each of these parties will be regarded as a single player
since we cannot distinguish the motivations of individual members of each of these
groups. For this analysis we will refer to the players as the auditor and the auditee.
In an attempt to reduce the frequency of errors in the financial statements
measures are taken to prevent them as well as to catch them if they do occur. All
such measures taken by a company are collectively referred to as internal controls.
Clearly, the standards of internal controls in a company is of great interest to the
auditor when planning an audit. The auditor's degree of certainty that he has not
missed an error will depend on these internal controls and the amount of testing he
carries out. If the internal controls are effective then the auditor needs to do less
testing to achieve the same level of certainty. However, more effort is required by the
auditee to instigate and maintain high levels of internal controls. This is the seed of
the strategic interaction; Both players have incentives to detect or prevent any
random errors but each player would prefer the other to do the necessary work.
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The chance of errors occurring varies between companies. Some of the
factors that influence the rate of errors occurring, such as management influence,
cannot be seen by the auditor. The auditor will therefore have some uncertainty about
the inherent chance of errors occurring. This uncertainty is modelled by a probability
(known to both players) which determines the basic chance of errors occurring before
play begins. In this model the auditee will be categorised into two types, where type
2 has a greater basic chance of errors occurring. The auditor's uncertainty about the
risk of errors occurring is equivalent to an uncertainty about which type he is facing.
The assumption that both parties know the probability of a type 2 auditee occurring
means effectively that both parties know the percentage of businesses which are
error-prone.
The auditee chooses how much effort to put into maintaining the internal
control system. The auditor may regard this effort level as a signal and attempt to
infer the auditee's type from it. The auditor's actions during the audit can be divided
into three sections - observation, testing and qualification. Firstly, the auditor can
choose to observe the standards of internal controls in the company, an action first
considered in Fellingham and Newman [16]. To determine this will require some
effort on the auditor's behalf. This decision is equivalent to a choice of tests
(henceforth A-tests) which can reveal the auditee's effort level. Having considered
the effectiveness of the internal controls the auditor can resort to substantive testing
of accounts, that is to say searching for errors himself. The auditor's strategic
decision here can be represented by a choice of tests (B-tests) of differing
effectiveness.
Finally, the auditor will issue a report to the shareholders detailing his
findings. The shareholders main concern here is whether the auditee's financial
statements have been prepared in accordance with standard accounting procedures.
If the auditor finds evidence of errors he may choose to qualify his report, a choice
of accept/reject in Newman and Noel [30]. A qualified report is considered by the
shareholders to be a refusal to issue an "all-clear" report. The sequence of events and
actions can be summarised as:
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1) Nature determines the auditee's type
2) The auditee chooses the effort to put in to maintaining the internal controls
3) The effort level influences whether an error occurs or not
4) The auditor can observe the effort level chosen in (2)
5) The auditor conducts substantive testing to detect errors
6) The auditor issues a report, which may contain a qualification, based on the results
of his testing.
The strategic interaction can be seen clearly when each of the players has simple
choices. The model developed here has the same strategy sets as Nadeau [29]
although the informational structure is different. For the auditee this means a choice
between high and low effort or w e {H, L}. For the auditor there are choices between
A, (observe effort level) or A2 (don't observe) followed by a choice of tests B,
(extensive substantive testing) or B2 (limited testing). The auditor's decision to
qualify can be based upon the results of the B-test in four ways:
Q - qualify all the time
R - reasonably qualify (qualify if the B-test finds an error, don't qualify if no errors
are found)
NQ - never qualify
UR - unreasonably qualify (qualify if the B-test finds no error, don't qualify if errors
are detected)
There are two chance events during the course of the game, the chance of an error
occurring and the chance of it being detected by the auditor. These are modelled by
the following probabilities:
pjw = P(Error | Effort level w, auditee type i)
rk = P(B-test reports an error | Error, test Bk)
tk = P(B-test reports an error | No Error, test Bk)
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Here tk represents the risk of a type I sampling error (false positive) and (l-rk)
represents the risk of a type II sampling error (false negative). As B, represents a
more extensive test we will assume that r, > r2 and t, < t2. The probability piw
represents a combination of both inherent risk and control risk, as it is the probability
that an error will occur and go undetected by the internal control system. This
approach is supported by Holstrum and Kirtland [25] when discussing potential
interdependence in measuring components of audit risk:
"[I]t does not seem feasible, in most practical audit situations, to assess
inherent risk separately from control risk. Rather, ifwe desire to recognise the
different levels of inherent risk in different audit situations, we likely would
find it more practical to estimate the probability that material errors would
exist after being processed through the internal accounting control system".
With two auditee types and two effort levels there are four values for pjw For each
type i, piH < piL if there is to be any benefit in the auditee putting in high effort. If we
assume that the auditee's effort has more effect on the error rate than his type we
have the ordering p1H < p2H< Pil < P2L- We would expect that the effect of high effort
is dependent upon the basic error rate. To include this consideration it will be
assumed that (pIL-p1H) > (P2l"P2h) so that high effort makes more of a reduction in
error rate in a low error environment.
There are four basic outcomes to this game (NQ(NE), Q(NE), NQ(E), Q(E)}.
These outcomes depend on the existence of an error in the accounts and whether or
not the auditor chooses to qualify his report. Both players will have a cost associated
with each of these results denoted by C for the auditor and D for the auditee. These
costs include the loss of reputation concerned with the outcome as well as any
financial losses. As in Newman and Noel [30], it is assumed that the actual state of
affairs is brought to light at some subsequent period. Thus NQ(E) is the expected
future cost to each player of the error being brought to light. An ordering can be
imposed on each player's costs to reflect the preferences of each of the players.
52
(1) Both players prefer an outcome where there are no errors and no qualification.
(2) The auditee's reputation is damaged by a wrong qualification; DQ(NE) > Dnq(NE)
(3) This reputation is further damaged by a true qualification; DQ(E) > DQ(NE)
(4) An incorrectly qualified report may result in litigation; CQ(NE) > CQ(E)
(5) The auditor's reputation is damaged if his opinion is found to be wrong;
Relations (1), (2) and (5) are equivalent to those used in Newman and Noel [30].
There are also costs associated with working hard for either player. Since each
players' choices are between a high effort level and a low effort level we can without
any loss of generality assume that the cost of low effort is zero. There are three
actions that require effort:
Dh - Cost to the auditee of putting high effort into the internal controls
CA - Cost to the auditor of test A, CB - Cost to the auditor of test B,
The cost of a particular error level and substantive test for either player will be an
expectation over the four basic outcomes listed above and the chance events that an
error occurs and is detected. This structure is repeated for both auditee types i,
auditee effort levels w and B-test levels k. For the auditor this gives:
C(i,w,BkQ) = CBk + PlwCQ(E) + (l-pIW)CQ(NE)
C(i,w,BkUR) = CBk +Piw(rkCNQ(E)+( 1 -rk)CQ(E))+( 1 -piw)(tkCNQ(NE)+( 1 -tk)CQ(NE))
C(i,w,BkR) = CBk + PiW(rkCQ(E)+( 1 -rk)CNQ(E)) + (l-piw)(tkCQ(NE)+(l-tk)CNQ(NE))
C(i,w,BkNQ) = CBk + PiwCNQ(E) + (l-piw)CNQ(NE)
Cq(NE) > Cnq(NE) Cnq(E) > Cq(E)
auditor: C°(NE) > CQ(E) > Cnq(NE)




4.3 A Game Theoretic Analysis
The auditor is uncertain about the basic likelihood of errors occurring in the
accounts. Thus the model is one of (asymmetric) incomplete information. The
actions of the two parties occur sequentially, giving a dynamic game. The auditor can
choose not to observe the effort level. In this case he must choose an action without
knowing his opponents action. There are also "chance moves" such as whether or not
the B-test finds an error which neither player can observe. The model is a dynamic
game of one-sided incomplete information where the informed player moves first - a
signalling game.
The solution concept for signalling games, discussed in section 2.5, is Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. At first attention in the analysis will be restricted to pure
strategy equilibria. In equilibrium, both players strategies must be a best response to
the other's strategy. To find such mutually stable pairs we can separately consider
how each player can act optimally for each strategy which their opponent might use.
Firstly let us consider the auditees' strategies. Each auditee type has 2
strategies H or L. Equivalently we can consider the auditee strategies before
classification into types. Clearly in this case the strategy may be contingent upon
type. Using the notation typel / type2 action this gives four strategies; {L / L, L / H,
H/L, H/H }
If the auditor does not observe the auditee's action (A2) he has 8 tests of the
form{B, or B2} followed by {NQ, UR, R, Q}. If the auditor does observe the effort
level his subsequent actions can be contingent upon this observation giving 64 tests
of the form A,(X / Y) where X is one of the 8 tests above to be played after observing
H and Y is similar after observing L. If the auditor uses A2 and hence does not
observe the auditee's action he can only be in a single information set. Alternatively,
if the auditor does observe the auditee's action the auditor will be at one of two
information sets. Thus the tests A2X and A,(X / Y) described above satisfy the
criteria for a strategy outlined in chapter 2. Many of the auditor strategies are
dominated.
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Lemma 4.1 If rk > 0.5 > tk Vk then with the above ordering of costs the UR
qualification strategy is dominated.
Proof Assume that rk > 0.5 > tk Vk (1.1)
From above CQ(NE) > CQ(E) > Cnq(NE) and CNQ(E) > CQ(E) (1.2)
Now consider C(i,w,BkUR) - C(i,w,BkR) for some i,w, k
= Piw(2rk-1 )(Cnq(E)-Cq(E))+( 1 -piw)( 1 -2tk)(CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE))
>0 by (1.1) and (1.2)
<=> C(i,w,BkUR) ^ C(i,w,BkR)
Therefore qualification UR is dominated.
The condition rk > 0.5 restricts our attention to B-test with at least a 50% chance of
finding an error if one occurs. Similarly tk < 0.5 gives tests with at least a 50%
chance of reporting "No error" when none occurs. Clearly if these 2 conditions are
not satisfied we can improve on the B-test by regarding each of its reports as the
opposite (which is exactly what happens in the UR qualification strategy). We will
therefore assume that for each test Bk rk > 0.5 > tk.
Lemma 4.2 It is only worth using test Bx with qualification strategy R.
Proof Lemma 4.1 shows that the UR qualification strategy is never optimal. It
remains to show that B,Q and B,NQ cannot be optimal actions. For any
auditee type i and effort level w:
C(i,w,B,Q)-C(i,w,B2Q) = CB>0.
So B,Q always costs the auditor more than B2Q.
Similarly, C(i,w,B,NQ) - C(i,w,B2NQ) = CB > 0.
So B,NQ always costs the auditor more than B2NQ.
If the auditor has decided to ignore the results of his testing (Q or NQ) there is no
point in using the more expensive test. To find the equilibrium pairs of this game we
will need to compare strategies to determine which are optimal. This task is
simplified if the cost of each outcome is expressed in a standardised form. This can
be done by considering the auditor's substantive testing and subsequent qualification
as one test using the following observations:
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(a) The Q strategy (always qualify) is equivalent to a B-test with
100% risk of a type I (false positive) error
0% risk of a type II (false negative) error
(b) The NQ strategy (never qualify) is equivalent to a B-test with
0% risk of a type I (false positive) error
100% risk of a type II (false negative) error
(c) The R qualification strategy does not change the risks of type I or type II error
for either B-test
Thus the probabilities r and t can be thought of as functions of the auditor's
substantive testing and qualification strategy. The definitions of section 4.2 can be
extended to give:
rk*(BkQn) = P(Audit report qualified | Error, test Bk and qualification strategy Qn)
tk*(BkQn) = P(Audit report qualified | No Error, test Bk and qualification strategy Qn)
r*(B2Q) = 1 r*(B2R) = r2 r*(B,R) = r, r*(B2NQ) = 0
t*(B2Q) = 1 t*(B2R) = t2 t*(B,R) = t, t*(B2NQ) = 0
The auditor's cost function can now be expressed as:
C(i,w,K)=CBk+piw(r*(K)CQ(E)+(l-r*(K))CNQ(E)) (4.3.1)
+(1 "Piw)(t* (K)CQ(NE)+( 1 -t* (K))Cnq(NE))
where K e { B2NQ, B2R, B,R, B,Q }
Lemma 4.3 An auditor strategy A, (K/K) is dominated ifCj > 0.
Proof Strategy A,(K / K) costs CA + C(i,w, K) for each effort level w whereas
strategy A2K costs C(i,w, K). Clearly if CA > 0 strategy A,(K / K) will cost
more after either effort level. Therefore A2K dominates A,(K / K).
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In other words, there is no point in spending time and effort to learn the auditee's
action if you are not going to use the information. The auditor therefore has 4 tests of
the form A2K and 12 tests of the form A,(KH / KL) where KH * KL and K, KH, KL e {
b2nq, b2r,b,r, b2q }.
The auditor's choice of optimal action will depend on his beliefs about the
auditee's type and action since he does not know which type he is facing and he may
choose not to observe the effort level. These beliefs are modelled as probability
distributions over each of the auditor's information sets. The auditor's expected cost
for a given strategy will depend on these beliefs. With 2 auditee types each with 2
identical actions the auditor's information set will have four nodes {1H, 1L, 2H, 2L}
where 1H refers to a type 1 auditee playing H. If we draw the decision tree, the
auditor is at one of four sub-trees, but he doesn't know which one. This information
set will be referred to as the primary set since this is the state that the auditor finds
himself in initially.
As the game progresses, the auditor may gather information (he may observe
the auditee's action). Any subsequent information sets that are reached will be
subsets of the primary information set. The beliefs for these secondary information
sets can therefore be developed from the primary belief system. Whenever the
auditor learns new information he finds himself, in extensive form terms, at a smaller
information set. Initially the auditor does not know which of 4 possible states
represents the actual state of play. If he observes the auditee's action he can rule out
two of these states, that correspond to the auditee's other action. Thus the probability
that he is at either of the remaining nodes will increase accordingly. This can be done
using Bayes' rule :
P(A | B) = P(AnB)/ P(B)
Bayes' rule satisfies the two basic criteria which we would expect of any method that
we use to update beliefs. These are that the sum of the updated beliefs should be 1,
and that the updated beliefs maintain the relative magnitudes which they had before
the updating. So once the auditor has seen a particular action he allocates zero
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probability to the other action having been carried out instead. If the auditor feels that
a type 1 auditee is twice as likely to put in high effort than type 2, then after
observing high effort he feels it is twice as likely that the auditee will be of type 1.
There are two methods of describing the primary belief system. Firstly we can simply
assign a probability to each node in the information set. This would mean having 4
probabilities where for example:
Pj = P( type ft H effort) p2 = P( type ft L effort)
4
p3 = P( type t2 H effort) p4 = P( type t2 L effort) and ^ p( = 1.
i = 1
However, the primary information set is caused by uncertainty about two separate
"events" that occur in sequence; the determination of the auditee's type followed by
the auditee's action. Rearranging Bayes' rule gives:
P(type and action) = P(action|type)xP(type)
This suggests a second belief system concerned with each event separately. The
advantage of this belief system is that it emphasises the difference between the
auditor's belief about the auditee's type and his action. Define the following
probabilities:
P =P(auditee is type 1) S,=P(H | type 1) S2=P(H | type 2)
The following expressions will enable us to update P if the auditor chooses to
observe the auditee's action:
P(tyPe ft |H) = PS, / (PS, + (1-P)S2)
P(type t2 |H) = (1-P)S2 / (PS, + (1-P)S2)
P(tyPe ft |L) = P(l-S,) / (P(l-S,) + (1-P)(1-S2))
P(type t2 |L) = (1-P)(1-S2) / (P(l-S,) + (1-P)(1-S2))
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There is a recursive element to any beliefs about the other player's actions. Let us
suppose that the auditor can in fact predict precisely the auditee's strategy and
weights his beliefs accordingly. If the auditee knows this then he may wish to change
his strategy, in which case the auditor will change his beliefs and so on. Any
equilibrium of this game needs to consider beliefs as well as strategies - in an
equilibrium the auditor will know the auditee's strategy and thus will have "correct"
beliefs but neither player will have an incentive to change.
Extending the equilibrium concept to beliefs offers a solution to the problems
caused by imperfect information. In games of perfect information, we do not predict
how the game will be played. Instead we look for mutually stable strategy pairs -
where each player's strategy is a best response to his opponents. These stable pairs
act as convenient focal points for rational players. Similarly, for signalling games we
look for stable triplets of strategies and beliefs. We do not develop a method for
choosing the subjective beliefs, rather we consider which beliefs would support a
particular equilibrium. Thus we effectively create an "optimal strategy" function
from belief systems to subjectively optimal strategies. This enables us to find
equilibria for the game without specifying an optimal belief system. The auditor's
expected cost for a given strategy can now be expressed as an expectation over these
beliefs. Instead of comparing costs to find the optimal strategy, the auditor will
compare these subjective expectations:
E(C(Kh/ Kl)) = P (SjC( 1 ,H,Kh)+( 1 -S,)C( 1 ,L,Kl)) (4.3.2)
+ (1-P)( S2C(2,H,Kh)+( 1 -S2)C(2,L,Kl))
With the reduction of the number of strategies the extensive form is now more
tractable. In figure 4.1 the sequence of play starts in the middle (the move by nature)
and proceeds towards the edges. The auditor's beliefs cover those actions which take
place earlier in the sequence of play. The information sets are shown by dotted lines











































figure 4.1 - reduced extensive form
4.4 Equilibrium Pairs of the Signalling Game
Equilibria in signalling games are categorised by the sender's behaviour which can
be considered by his opponent to be a signal of his type. An equilibrium in which
both types send the same message is a pooling equilibrium. An equilibrium where
each type sends a different message is a separating equilibrium. The auditor's initial
belief about type, P = Prob(type 1), may be updated (to P' say) during the game
through observation. However, if the auditor updates his belief using Bayes' rule, the
values that P' can take are limited in the pure strategy case. Clearly, in a pooling
equilibrium (where both types send the same signal) the auditor learns nothing from
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the signal and cannot therefore update his beliefs. Similarly, if the auditor chooses
not to observe the signal he learns nothing and his belief remains unchanged.
Lemma 4.4 In a separating equilibrium P' = 0, P or 1
Proof If the auditor chooses A2 he cannot update his belief and so P' = P. If the
auditor uses A, there are 2 cases:
(1) H / L - t, plays H and t2 plays L
If the auditor observes H then:
P' = P(t, | H )
= P(t, n H) / P(H)
= P(H|t,)*P(t,)/P(H)
= 1 * P/P =1
If the auditor observes L then:
P' = P(t, | L )
= P(t, n L) / P(L)
= P(L | t,)*P(tl) / P(L)
= 0 * P/(1-P) = 0
(2) L / H - tj plays L and t2 plays H
As above after H P' = P(t, | H ) = 0
and after L P' = P(t, | L ) = 1
Both players' optimal behaviour will clearly depend upon the values of the costs
associated with each of the four basic outcomes. There is the potential for some of
the penalties to be set by an external body. If this were the case, the natural question
to ask is "How should the penalties be arranged to encourage both parties to work
hard?". We can consider one of the costs for each player as a variable when finding
equilibria. We are then analysing a family of models, and the sensitivity of the
equilibria to changes in this cost can be found. This will allow us to find penalty
policies to encourage certain types of behaviour in the model as well as reducing the
risk of equilibria being highly cost-specific.
Some of the outcomes correspond to one or both of the players doing their job
correctly, for example NQ(NE) where neither player is in the wrong. The cost that
varies in practice is associated with the result NQ(E). Here the auditee has failed to
prevent an error and the auditor has failed to detect it. At present this penalty is
determined through litigation or through out of court settlements as the shareholders'
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feel that both the auditor and auditee have failed in their duties. We will therefore
consider the costs CNQ(E) and DNQ(E) to be variables in this model.
Each player's strategic choice can be summarised by one or more decision
rules which describe how the players' actions change as CNQ(E) and DNQ(E) increase.
The auditee's only decision is whether to play H or not. Against a general auditor
strategy (KH /KL) this becomes: Play H ifD(i, H, KH) < D(i, L, KL) <=>
Dnq(E) > (DH+(piHr*(KH)-piLr*(KL))DQ(E)+(fl-piH)t*(KH)-(l-piL)t*(KL))DQ(NE)
+((1 -Pm)0-t*(KH))-( 1 -piL)(l-t*(KL)))DNQ(NE))/(p,L(l-r*(KL))-piH(l-r»(KH))) (4.4.1)
This will enable us to find a condition on DNQ(E) for an auditee type i to play H
against any auditor strategy. However we need only consider those auditor strategies
which can be optimal. Since the auditor has imperfect information his cost for a
given strategy will be an expectation over his beliefs. For a general strategy Aj(Kh /
Kl) this expected cost is given by expression (4.3.2). These subjective expectations
can be compared to determine which is optimal. This can be done in a similar way to
the auditee's decision rule, by comparing actions pairwise. If the auditor has a set of
n potentially optimal actions then for B2NQ, say, to be optimal there are (n-1)
inequalities that must be satisfied, B2NQ < for each of the other actions. In
general
E(Aj(W / X)) < E(Ak(Y / Z)) <=>
CN0(E) > CQ(E)+((CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE))((t*(W)-t*(Y))(PS,(l-P1H) (4.4.2)
+(1 -P)S2( 1 -P2H))+(t*(X)-t*(Z))(P( 1 -S,)(1 -P 1L)+( 1 -P)( 1 -S2)( 1 -P2L)))
+Caj -CAk+(PS,+(l -P)S2)(CBW-CBY)+(P(1 -S,)+(l -P)( 1 -S2))(CBX -CBZ))
/ (r*(W)-r*(Y))(PS,P1H+(l-P)S2P2H)+(r*(X)-r*(Z))(P(l-S1)P,L+(1-P)(1-S2)P2L)
where W, X, Y, Ze (B2NQ, B2R, B,R, B2Q}
Looking at this decision rule shows that the absolute values of the four outcome costs
does not influence the equilibria. What matters is the difference between qualifying
and not qualifying, i.e. the expressions (Cq(NE)-Cnq(NE)) and (CNQ(E)-CQ(E)).
Similarly, the auditee's action is influenced by the difference in the occurrence of
errors between high and low effort rather than their absolute values.
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These comparisons must take place before play starts since the auditor is
deciding, amongst other things, whether to observe the auditee's action or not. Thus
the beliefs P, S, and S2 in the above expression are the auditor's initial beliefs. The
auditors beliefs about the auditee's action will be either 0 or 1 in a pure strategy
equilibrium. For each auditee strategy we need to find where each of the functions is
a minimum in the PxCNQ(E) plane, where P is limited to [0, 1].
The auditor's strategic decision can be divided into two distinct parts. Firstly,
the auditor's belief P, and his beliefs Sj that a type i auditee will put in high effort,
tell him what he expects the auditee's action (and type) to have been. If the auditor
decides to observe the auditee's action he can adjust his beliefs Sj about the auditee's
action to reflect the fact that he now knows what that action was. This observation
may also alter his belief P about which type he is facing. If, for example, the auditor
feels that only a type 1 auditee will put in Low effort then after observing Low effort
the auditor is certain (P = 1) that he is facing a type 1 auditee. Secondly, given what
he now believes about the auditee, the auditor must decide what actions he should
take during substantive testing and qualification. This decision process will occur no
matter what the auditor's beliefs are (the reduced extensive form has 4 identical sub¬
trees for the auditor's actions).
The sole influence that the auditee's type and action have over the outcome of
the audit is through the basic chance of errors occurring piw. As the cost CNQ(E)
increases the auditor's optimal behaviour will change. This can be represented by a
sequence of actions for increasing CNQ(E). Each of the cost functions C(i,w,K) is
linear and non-decreasing in CNQ(E). Therefore each cost function can be minimal
(the action would be optimal) for at most one interval of CNQ(E). If we differentiate
each of these cost functions with respect to CNQ(E) we get the following:
(i) d C (i,w, B2NQ) = piw
d CNQ(E)
(ii) d C(i,w, B2R) = p^d-rA
d Cnq(E)
(iii) d C(i,w, B1R) =piw(l-r,)
d CNQ(E)
(iv) d C(i.w, B2Q) =0
5 CNQ(E)
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Lemma 4.5 There are 4 action sequences as C^Q(E) increases:
B2NQ -> B2R -» B,R B2Q B2NQ -» B2R -> B2Q
b2nq->b,r^b2q b2nq-+b2q
Proof We have 1 > r, > r2 > 0
<=> 0 < 1 -r, < 1- r2 < 1 <=> (i) > (ii) > (iii) > (iv) = 0
So each of the cost functions is linear in CNQ(E) and increasing at a unique
rate. This can be used to find intervals of CNQ(E) for which each action can be
optimal. As CNQ(E) increases, the cost functions will be minimal in decreasing
order of gradient. Of course one or more of these cost functions may never be
minimal in which case they need not be considered. Since B2Q is constant in
Cnq(E), whereas the other costs are all increasing, it will always be optimal
for sufficiently large CNQ(E). If we consider the case CNQ(E) = 0 as a lower
bound we find:
C(i,E,B2R) = Piw r2CQ(E)+( 1 -piw)(t2CQ(NE)+( 1 -t2)CNQ(NE))
C(i,E,B,R) = CBk+piw r,CQ(E)+( 1 -piw)(t,C°(NE)+( 1 -t, )Cnq(NE))
C(i,E,B2NQ) = (l-piw)CNQ(NE)
Cq(NE) > CNQ(NE) and CQ(E) > 0 => C(i,w,B2NQ) is minimal for CNQ(E)=0.
So B2NQ is optimal for sufficiently small CNQ(E). This gives the first and last
optimal actions as CNQ(E) increases. Also if both B,R and B2R occur then B2R
must occur before B,R. This gives the following optimal strategy sequences:
B2NQ -> B,R -► B,R -> B2Q B2NQ -» B2R -» B2Q
B2NQ -> B,R -> B2Q B2NQ -> B2Q
We can also consider the values of CNQ(E) at which these changes of optimal actions
occur. These conditions are found by comparing costs. For example, B2R is a cheaper
action than B2NQ if C(i,w,B2NQ) > C(i,w,B2R)
« CNQ(E) > CQ(E) + f(piw)x t2 / r2
Where f(piw) = ((1-pJ(Cq(NE)-Cnq(NE)) / piw piw e(0, 1)
The function f is decreasing in piw since C°(NE) > Cnq(NE). We can develop similar
expressions for the other potential changes in the optimal action sequences.
b2nq -> b2r <=> CNQ(E) > CQ(E) + f(Piw)x t2 / r2 (1)
b2nq -> b,r <=> CNQ(E) > CQ(E) + CB/r,piw + fCpJxt./r, (2)
b2nq -> b2q <=> CNQ(E) > CQ(E) + f(piw) (3)
b2r —> bjr CNQ(E) > CQ(E) + CB/(r,-r2)piw + f(piw)x(trt2)/(rrr2) (4)
b2r —> b2q o CNQ(E) > CQ(E) + f(piw)x(l-t2)/(l-r2) (5)
b,r b2q CNQ(E) > Cq(E) - CB/(l-r,)piw + fCpJxCl-tO/Cl-r,) (6)
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These inequalities can be used to investigate which changeovers in optimal action
sequences can occur. For example, for B2NQ to be optimal none of the inequalities
(1), (2) and (3) must hold. The first of these inequalities to be satisfied as CNQ(E)
increases tells us which action will replace B2NQ as the optimal one.
Definition let A and B be inequalities involving the same variable y. There is an
interval of y for which each of these inequalities holds; (AL, AH) and (BL, BH) say.
Then A is weaker than B (B is stronger than A) if (BL,BH) is a subset of (AL,AH).
We do not need to consider (6) since if B,R is optimal it can only be replaced by
B2Q. Since the function f(piw) is decreasing in piw the inequalities (1) to (5) become
weaker as piw increases. These inequalities can be used to rule out one of the action
sequences:
Lemma 4.6 The optimal action sequence B2NQ —> B2Q does not occur.
Proof Consider inequalities (1) and (3). Now rk > 0.5 > tk
and 1 > r, > r2 > t2 > t, > 0 since the B, test has a lower risk of both type I and
type II errors than the less extensive alternative B2.
r2 > t2 <=>\> (t2/r2) « CQ(E) + f(piw)x t2 / r2 < CQ(E) + f(piw)
<» RHS of (1) < RHS of (3) « (1) is weaker than (3)
So the conditions for B2R to replace B2NQ as the optimal action will always
be satisfied for lower CNQ(E) than for B2Q to replace B2NQ. The optimal
action sequence B2NQ —> B2Q does not therefore occur.
We know that each sequence must begin with B2NQ and end with B2Q. We also
know that there must be at least one other action in between these two. As CNQ(E)
increases the auditor's choice of B-test will optimise the balance between the savings
made by a more effective test against the additional cost of this test. There will come
a point where the savings outweigh the cost CB in which case the auditor will prefer
B, to B2. This gives the following:
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Lemma 4.7 One of three auditor action sequences occurs as C^Q(E) increases.
Which occurs is determined by the cost Cg in the following way:
B2NQ -» B,R —> B2Q if Cb<L
B2NQ-> B2R-> B,R-> B2Q if U>Cb>L
B2NQ -» B2R -► B2Q ~ if CB >U
where L = (l-piw)x(CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE))x(t2r1-t,r2)/ r2
and U = (1 -Piw)x(CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE))x(( 1 -t2)(r,-1)+(1 -t,)(1 -r2))/ (l-r2)
Proof Consider the following 3 cases:
(i) CB is very low. In this case the increased efficiency of the B,-test will be
worth using for even low CN0(E). B,R may become a cheaper option than
B2R whilst B2NQ is the optimal action.
(ii) CB is very high. In this case B,R may not become a cheaper option than
B2R until after B2Q is the optimal action (i.e. for high CNQ(E))
(iii) If CB lies between these levels then B2R will replace B2NQ as the optimal
action. For higher CNQ(E) B,R will replace B2R and for very high CNQ(E) B2Q
will replace B,R as the optimal action.
Case (i) occurs when B,R replaces B2NQ as the optimal action - when (1) is
stronger than (2). Similarly case (ii) occurs when (4) is stronger than (5).
Case (iii) occurs when (2) is stronger than (1) and (5) is stronger than (4).
Now, (1) is stronger than (2) if RHS of (1) > RHS of (2)
«■ Cq(E) + f(piw)x t2 / r2 > Cq(E) + CB/r,piw + f(piw)xt, /r,
<=> cb < Piwx f(Piw)x (t2xr,/r2 -1,)
» CB< (l-Piw)x(CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE))x(t2r1- t,r2)/ r2 =L
(4) is stronger than (5) if RHS of (4) > RHS of (5)
o Cq(E) + CB/(r,-r2)piw + f(piw)x(t,-t2)/(r,-r2) > CQ(E) + f(piw)x(l-t2)/(l-r2)
« CB > (1 -Pivv)x(CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE))x(( 1 -t2)(r,-r2)-(t, -t2)( 1 -r2))/(1 -r2)
«. CB > (1 -Pjw)x(Cq(NE)-Cnq(NE))x((1 -t2)(r,-1)+(1 -tt)( 1 -r2))/(1 -r2) = U
This gives conditions on CB for cases (i) and (ii). For case (iii) consider U - L
= (1 -piw)x(CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE))x(((1 -t2)(r,-1)+(1 -t,)(1 -r2))/(1 -r2) -(t2r,- t,r2)/r2 )
Now (l-piw)x(CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE)) > 0 . The remaining term can be simplified:
= ((1 "t2)(ri-1 )r2+( 1 -t,)(1 -r2)r2 - t2r,(l-r2) + t,r2(l-r2))/ r2(l-r2)
= (rir2"r2"rir2t2+t2r2+r2-r2r2-r2t,+t1r2r2-t2r1+t2r1r2+t1r2-tIr2r2)/r2(l-r2)
= (rir2+t2r2-r2r2-t2r1)/r2(l-r2)
= (i"i -r2)(r2-t2)/r2( 1 -r2) > 0 since 1 > r, > r2 > t2 > 0
Hence U > L and the interval for case (iii) is well defined.
We can categorise which of the three optimal action sequences occurs for a given
auditee type and effort level in terms of the auditor's B-test cost CB. Furthermore, we
have shown that five of the inequalities that prompt a change in the auditor's optimal
action are decreasing in piw. In other words, the change will occur for lower CNQ(E) if
the auditee plays low effort (leading to a higher piw). Some of the twelve remaining
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observation (A,-test) strategies can therefore be shown to be sub-optimal. Some of
these strategies specify an action against H which is further along the optimal action
sequence than for L, for example A,(B2Q / B2NQ). These strategies cannot be
optimal since if CNQ(E) satisfies the conditions for B2Q to be optimal vs. H then
clearly the weaker condition for B2Q to be optimal against L will also be satisfied.
This reduces the number of potential A,-test strategies to six. The number of
potentially optimal auditor strategies has been reduced from 72 to 10.
Lemma 4.7 classifies the auditor's optimal action for a given type and effort
level. A strategy for the auditor must cover each eventuality - an optimal action after
observing H and an optimal action after observing L. A strategy therefore can be
determined by considering two optimal action sequences as CNQ(E) increases, one
sequence for actions after observing H and another after observing L. The way in
which these two sequences can change is limited by comparisons between U and L
and the ordering of piw .
Lemma 4.8 U and L are decreasing functions of piw
Proof L = (l-piw)x(CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE))x(t2r,-t1r2)/ r2
We have CQ(NE) > Cnq(NE) and t„ t2, r„ r2e (0, 1). The increased efficiency
of the B,-test over B2 gives r, >r2 and t,<t2
=> t2r, > t,r2
=> t2r,-t,r2 > 0
=> L is a decreasing function of piw.
U = (1 -Piw)x(CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE))x(( 1 -t2)(r,-1)+(1 -t,)( 1 -r2))/ (l-r2)
r, > r2 and t, < t2 <=> (1-t,) > (l-t2) and (1-r,) < (l-r2)
=> (l-t,)(l-r2) > (l-t2)(r,-l)
=>(l-t1)(l-r2)-(l-t2)(r1-l)>0
=> U is a decreasing function of pivv
Since the occurrence of each sequence is determined by the cost CB the optimal
action set can also be classified by CB. For example, in table 4.1, optimal action set i
occurs if CB < L(p2L). In this case B2R is not optimal for either type or either effort
level. So in category i we can rule out 4 of the 10 tests that are candidates for
optimality as CNQ(E) increases, namely those involving B2R. As CB is increased the
optimal action set changes from i to v.
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Auditor's potentially optimal strategies for some CNQ(E)
CB Category A2 test A, test
inc B2NQ B2R B,R BjQ NQ/2R NQ/1R NQ/Q 2R/1R 2R/Q 1R/Q
1 I V V V V V V
ii V V V V V V V V
iiia or -T ^ 1 1 7 7 ^ V V
iiib V V V V V V V
1 iv ■T 1 "7 1 "7 ? ? V
1 V V V V V V V
table 4.1 - categorisation of the potentially optimal action set
The only actions that can occur regardless of the cost CB are B2NQ, B2Q and
A,(B2NQ /B2Q) These "core" tests are the undominated strategies in the simpler
model of Fellingham and Newman [16]. Clearly, for small enough CNQ(E) B2NQ will
always be the cheapest option, and similarly for large enough CNQ(E) B2Q will
become optimal. Each of these categories is quite complex. To illustrate how the
optimal strategies are affected by varying CNQ(E) we will consider an example.
4.5 A Numerical Example
Any set of costs and probabilities that satisfies the payoff restrictions will reflect
some of the motivations for the players. Many of these motivations will be in terms
of comparisons between 2 costs or penalties. For example the benefit from using the
Bj test is the difference between r, and r2 (and t, and t2). If there is very little
difference between the two tests then clearly the auditor will usually prefer the
cheaper one.The auditor's optimal testing strategy depends fundamentally upon piw.
The optimal action sequences have been analysed as functions of piw in the previous
section. If the difference between pIH and p1L is negligible then as CNQ(E) increases
the auditor's optimal actions will for the most part be the same against both H and L.
The example chosen is from category iv. This gives a representative case, whilst at
the same time avoiding any similarities between types, effort levels or B-tests:
Pih = 0.05 PiL = 0.35 p2H = 0.3 p2L = 0.5
r, = 0.95 t, = 0.1 r2 = 0.8 t2 = 0.25
Cq(NE) = 100 Cq(E) = 60 Cnq(NE) = 10
Dq(NE) =120 Dq(E) = 220 DNQ(NE) = 10
CA = 5 CB = 60 DH = 55
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Auditee's optimal strategy for a given test
For this example the auditee's best response to each potentially optimal auditor test
are described below. These inequalities were generated by condition (4.4.1) in
section 4.4. For completeness, all ten of the auditor's tests have been considered even
though two of the A,-tests cannot be optimal in category iv
auditor's High Effort High Effort
test By type 1 By type 2
a2b2nq Dnq(E)> 193 Dnq(E) > 285
a2b2r Dnq(E) > 224 Dnq(E) > 683
a2b,r Always DNQ(E)> 1740
a2b2q Never Never
a,b2nq/b2r Always Dnq(E) < 224
a,b2nq/b,r Dnq(E) < 686 DNQ(E)< 193
a,b2nq/b2q Dnq(E)< 1810 Dno(E) <360
a,b2r/b,r DNQ(E)> 1683 Never
a,b2r/b2q Dnq(E) < 5558 Dnq(E) < 599
a,b,r/b2q Dnq(E) < 27840 Dnq(E) < 2507
table 4.2 - auditee's optimal response to each auditor test
The decision rule derived above can also be used to analyse the sensitivity of the
equilibrium to the cost DH. Since DNQ(E) is considered as a variable and all the other
costs are fixed these conditions are of the form DH < fj(DNQ(E)) for auditee type i.
Furthermore each of these functions will be linear. The four types of pure strategy
equilibrium are associated with these conditions as follows:
Pooling on H DH < Min{f, ,f2} Signalling with t, playing El f, > DH > f2
Pooling on L DH > Max {f, ,f2} Signalling with t, playing L f2 > DH > f.
So for L / H we require f2 > DH > f,. Condition 4.4.1 gives an inequality on DH as a
function of DNQ(E) for each optimal auditor strategy. For a particular example the
inequalities for each auditee type can compared as DNQ(E) varies. The ten potentially
optimal auditor strategies are considered in appendix A. Three of these can
encourage a L / H separating equilibrium:
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A type i auditee will put in high effort against AiB2NQ/B2R
o D„ < P, L rjDQ(E) + (P, L( 1 ■-r>P, „)D«(E) + (1 -P| Jt^fNE) +
((l-P,L)(l-t!)-<l-Pi„))DN,}(NE)
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400 f2 600 800 1000
figure 4.2 auditee effort against A,B2NQ/B2R
Dnq(E)
A type i auditee will put in high effort against A,B2NQ/B,R
«. Dh < Pi Lr,DQ(E) + (Pi L( 1 -r,)-Pi H)DNQ(E) + (l-piL)t,DQ(NE) +
((1 "Pi l)( 1 "tiH 1 "Pi h))Dnq(NE)
400 2 600
127
figure 4.3 auditee effort against A1B2NQ/B,R
A type i auditee will put in high effort against A,B2NQ/B2Q
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figure 4.4 auditee effort against A,B2NQ/B1R
The three strategies that can encourage a L/H separating equilibrium are
A,(B2NQ/B2R), A,(B2NQ/B|R) and A](B2NQ/B2Q). This can give upper and lower
bounds on DH for the L/H separating equilibrium to occur. With auditor optimal
strategy set (iv) this gives DH e(76.675, 160). For DH = 55 therefore, L/H does not
occur.
Auditor's optimal strategy for a given auditee strategy
In category (iv) there are eight potentially optimal strategies {A2B2NQ, A2B2R,
A2B,R, A2B2Q, A,(B2NQ/B2R), A,(B2NQ/B2Q), A,(B2R/B2Q), A,(B,R/B2Q)}. For
the values chosen in this example the case where tt plays L and t2 plays H does not
occur. The inequalities for the three remaining cases are given in the following
tables. If both auditee types put in the same effort (a pooling equilibrium) then
lemma 4.4 tells us that the A, test cannot form part of an equilibrium pair. In these
situations the auditor has only 4 potentially optimal tests. If both auditee types play H
then (4.4.2) simplifies to E(A2W) < E(A,Y) <=>
Cnq(E) > CQ(E)+((CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE))((t*(W)-t*(Y))(P( 1 -p,H)+( 1 -P)( 1 -p2H)))
+(CBw-CBY)) / (r*(W)-r*(Y))(PpIH+(l-P)p2H)
where W, Ye{B2NQ, B2R, B,R, B2Q}
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POOLING ON H => S, = 1 & S2 = 1
TEST COMPARISON INEQUALITY
E(A2B2NQ) < E(A2B2R) CNQ(E) < (30.15-6.375P) / (0.24-0.2P)
E(A2B2NQ) < E(A2B,R) Cnq(E) < (83.4-12P) / (0.285-0.2375P)
E(A2B2NQ) < E(A2B2NQ) CNQ(E) < (81+7.5P) / (0.3-0.25P)
E(A2B2R)<E(A,B,R) CNQ(E) < (53.25-5.625P) / (0.045-0.0375P)
E(A2B2R) < E(A2B2Q) CNQ(E) < (50.85+13.875P) / (0.06-0.05P)
E(A2B,R) < E(A2B2Q) CNQ(E) < (-2.4+19.5P) / (0.015-0.0125P)
table 4.3 auditor's test comparisons if both auditee types play H
CNQ(E
0 02 0.4
p 0.6 0.8 1
figure 4.5 optimal response to H/H
Figure 4.5 shows that not all of the inequalities given in table 4.3 are needed. In table
4.4 below, only the first and fifth comparisons are actually needed for this example.
If both types play L then (4.4.2) gives E(Aj(W / X)) < E(Ak(Y / Z)) <=>
CNQ(E) > CQ(E)+((CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE))((t*(X)-t*(Z))((l-p2L)+P(p2L-p1L)))
+(CBx-CBz)) / (r*(X)-r*(Z))(p2L+P(p1L-p2L))
where W, X, Y, Ze{B2NQ, B2R, B,R, B:Q}
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POOLING ON L => S, = 0 & S2 = 0
TEST COMPARISON INEQUALITY
E(A2B2NQ) < E(A2B2R) CNQ(E) < (35.25-3.825P) / (0.4-0.12P)
E(A2B2NQ) < E(A2B,R) CNQ(E) < (93-7.2P) / (0.475-0.14252P)
E(A2B2NQ) < E(A2B2Q) CNQ(E) < (75+4.5P) / (0.5-0.15P)
E(A2B2R) < E(A2B,R) Cnq(E) < (770-45P) / (1-0.3P)
E(A2B2R)<E(A2B2Q) Cnq(E) < (39.75+8.325P) / (0.1-0.03P)
E(A2B,R) < E(A2B2Q) CNQ(E) < (-18+11,7P) / (0.025-0.0075P)
table 4.4 auditor's test comparisons if both auditee types play L
figure 4.6 optimal response to L/L
In a separating equilibrium the auditor must also consider A,-test strategies.
However, after observing the auditee's effort level the auditor will have an optimal
action. The auditor therefore will never need to compare two A,-test strategies. In the
following table, the symbol >< is used where the RHS of the inequality has an
asymptote for P € (0, 1). However, we know that for sufficiently large CNQ(E) B2Q
will always be optimal (it is the end of every optimal action sequence). Thus whilst
the boundaries may tend to the asymptote the discontinuity will never form part of a
boundary. In this equilibrium the auditor's strategy comparison simplifies to the
following:
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E(Aj(W / X)) < E(Ak(Y / Z)) «
CNQ(E) > CQ(E)+((CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE))((t*(W)-t*(Y))P( 1 -PlH)+(t*(X)-t*(Z))( 1 -P)( 1 -p2H))
+Caj-CAk+P(CBW-CBY)+(l-P)(CBX-CBZ)) / (r*(W)-r*(Y))(Pp1H)+(r*(X)-r*(Z))((l-P)p2L)
where W, X, Y, Ze {B2NQ, B2R, B,R, B2Q}
SEPARATING WITH TYPE t, PLAYING H => S, = 1 & S2 = 0
TEST COMPARISON INEQUALITY
E(A2B2NQ) < E(A2B2R) Cnq(E) < (35.25-11.475P) / (0.4-0.36P)
E(A2B2NQ)<E(A2B,R) CNQ(E) < (93-26.1P) / (0.475-0.4275P)
E(A2B2NQ) < E(A2B2Q) Cnq(E) < (75+13.5P) / (0.5-0.45P)
E(A2B2R)<E(A2B,R) Cnq(E) < (770-130P) / (1-0.9P)
E(A2B2R) < E(A2B2Q) Cnq(E) < (39.75+24.975P) / (0.1-0.09P)
E(A2B,R) < E(A2B2Q) Cnq(E) < (-18+35.IP) / (0.025-0.0225P)
E(A,B2NQ/B2R) < E(A2B2NQ) Cnq(E) > (40.25-35.25P) / 0.4(1-P)
E(A,B2NQ/B2R) < E(A2B2R) Cno(E) < (-5+23.775P) / 0.04P
E(A,B2NQ/B2R) < E(A2B,R) Cnq(E) < (52.75+13.65P)/(0.075-0.0275P)
E(A,B2NQ/B2R) < E(A2B2Q) Cnq(E) < (34.75+48.75P) / (0.1-0.05P)
E(A,B2NQ/B2Q) < E(A2B,NQ) Cnq(E) > (80-75P) / 0.5(1-P)
E(A,B2NQ/B2Q) < E(A2B2R) Cnq(E) >< (44.75-63.525P) / (0.1-0.14P)
E(A,B2NQ/B2Q) < E(A2B,R) Cnq(E) >< (-13-53.4P) / (0.025-0.0725P)
E(A,B2NQ/B2Q) < E(A2B2Q) Cnq(E) < (-5+88.5P) / 0.05P
E(A,B2R/B2Q) < E(A2B2NQ) CNQ(E) > (80-51.225P) / (0.5-0.46P)
E(A,B2R/B2Q) < E(A2B2R) Cnq(E) > (447.5-397.5P) / (1-P)
E(A,B2R/B2Q) < E(A2B,R) Cnq(E) >< (-13-29.625P)/ (0.025-0.0325P)
E(A,B2R/B2Q) < E(A2B2Q) CNQ(E) < (-5+64.725P) / 0.0IP
E(A,B,R/B2Q) < E(A2B2NQ) CNQ(E) > (80-3.6P) / (0.5-0.4525P)
E(A,B,R/B2Q) < E(A2B2R) CNQ(E) > (44.75+7.875P) / (0.1-0.0925P)
E(A,B,R/B2Q)<E(A2B,R) Cnq(E) >(-13+18P) / 0.025( 1 -P)
E(A,B,R/B2Q)<E(A2B2Q) CN°(E) < (-5+17.IP) / 0.0025P
table 4.5 auditor's test comparisons if type 1 plays H and 2 plays L
For this case there are two areas of interest. Figure 4.7b shows the regions for low
Cnq(E). The border between B2Q and A,(B2R/B2Q) will curve across so that for all
sufficiently high CNQ(E), B2Q is always optimal. However there is a small region of
interest for high costs given in figure 4.7a
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The optimal A, test strategy can be found by considering the two extremes P=0 or
P=1 in figure 4.7b. This also shows clearly that observation is only optimal when the
auditor is uncertain about which auditee type he is facing.
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The equilibrium set
The equilibrium set can be seen more clearly for a particular starting probability P.
Figures 4.5 to 4.7 then reduce to inequalities on CNQ(E). For each region of CNQ(E)
this will give us the auditor's optimal response to each of the three cases of auditee
behaviour. An equilibrium pair will occur if the the auditee's optimal behaviour to
one of these strategies does not change the auditor's optimal strategy. For example, if
P=0.9 then B2NQ is an optimal response to EEH if CNQ(E) < 407 and H/H is optimal
against B2NQ if DNQ(E) > 285. Thus (B2NQ, H/H) is an equilibrium pair if both
CNQ(E) < 407 and DNQ(E) > 285. The equilibrium regions for each of the three cases
are illustrated below for P = 0.9:
DNQ(E)
CNQ(E)
10 9 213 398 407 478 647 898 4223 5917
figure 4.8 pooling on H equilibrium
As we might expect, the auditee's best response to a testing strategy tends to be high
effort for all sufficiently large penalties DNQ(E). The values of DNQ(E) for which high
effort is optimal are given above in table 4.2. The levels of CNQ(E) which prompt a
change in strategy depend on the auditor's belief P. These are illustrated above in
figure 4.5. For CNQ(E) > 4223 the auditors optimal response to H / H is B2Q.
However (B2Q, H/H) is never in equilibrium since each auditee type prefers to put in














109 213 398 407 478 647 898 4223 5917
figure 4.9 pooling on L equilibrium
In contrast, both auditee types tend to play low effort if the cost DNQ(E) is sufficiently
low. The boundaries of these equilibrium regions are therefore determined by two
factors. As CNQ(E) increases the auditor's optimal response to L/L changes (shown in
figure 4.6). These changes are one of the optimal action sequences described in
section 4.4. There is also an upper limit on DNQ(E) for each auditor strategy. Above
this level, the size of the penalty for an unqualified error makes it worthwhile for one
auditee type to put in high effort. There is no upper limit for B2Q since low effort is

















4223 591710 9 213 398 407 478 647 898
figure 4.10 separating H / L equilibrium
CNQ(E)
The regions of separating equilibria are a little more complex for two reasons. Firstly,
the auditor's choice of optimal strategy must consider whether to observe the
auditee's effort level or not. This depends critically on the value of P, as shown in
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figure 4.7. If the auditor is fairly sure which type of auditor he is facing (i.e. P close
to 1 or 0) then there is less perceived benefit in becoming certain of the auditee's
type by observing his effort level. The benefit from observation also depends on the
conditional actions used after the effort level is observed. For CNQ(E) e (478, 898)
the auditor stops using the A-test. This is because B2R is the best response to H and a
"nearly best" response to L. Ideally, the auditor would prefer B2Q after low effort.
However the extra cost of using the A-test outweighs the savings made in the event
(with a 10% chance) that the auditee is type 2. As CNQ(E) increases the difference
between B2R and B2Q after L increases until it is worth using the A-test so that the
subsequent tests are optimal after either effort level. Hence for CNQ(E) > 898 the
auditor uses A,(B2R/B2Q).
Secondly, there are two limits on the levels of DNQ(E) that support a
separating equilibrium. A minimum level of DNQ(E) is required to encourage a type 1
auditee to put in high effort. At the same time if DNQ(E) is too high then a type 2
auditee will also put in high effort. These considerations give both a minimum and
maximum level of DNQ(E) for each region. An exception to this is the region
(A,(B2NQ/B2R), H/L). If a type 1 auditee puts in high effort he can reduce the chance
of errors occurring to a low level (5%). In the worst case, where the auditor never
qualifies, this leads to a 5% risk of an unqualified error (and correspondingly no risk
of a qualified error or a false-positive). If the auditee puts in low effort then, even
with a reasonable qualification strategy, the risk of an unqualified error is 7% (with a
28% risk of a qualified error and a 16% risk of a false positive). Therefore a type 1
auditee will play H against A,(B2NQ/B2R) for all DNQ(E).
Figures 4.8 to 4.10 describe the equilibrium regions for each of the three
combinations of effort level that can occur in this example - L/L, H/L and H/H. To
develop the full equilibrium set we must consider all three of these. The boundaries
of the full equilibrium set for this example can be constructed by considering the
boundaries of each of the three equilibrium regions simultaneously. We effectively
overlay the three different effort level equilibrium regions. This idea of overlaying
intuitively leads to two important questions, "is there an area outside all of the
equilibrium sets?" and "what happens if two or more equilibrium regions overlap?".
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Both these situations occur and lead to a consideration ofmixed strategies and pareto
dominance of equilibria in the next chapter. For P = 0.9 (so 10% of businesses are






figure 4.11 equilibrium set for P = 0.9
I) (B2NQ, L / L) 2) (B2NQ, H / L)
3) (B2NQ, H / H) 4) (B2R, L / L)
5) (B2R, L / L) or (B2NQ, H / L) 6) (A,(B2NQ / B2R), H / L)
7) (A,(B2NQ/B2R), H / L) or (B2NQ, H / H) 8) No pure strategy equilibrium
9) (A,(B2NQ/B2Q), H / L) or (B2NQ, H / H) 10) No pure strategy equilibrium
II) (A,(B2NQ / B2Q), H / L) 12) (A,(B2NQ/B2Q),H / L)or(B,R,H / H)
13) (B2R, H / H) 14) (B2R, H / L)
15) (B2Q, L / L) 16) (B2Q, L / L) or (B2R, H / L)
17) (B2Q, L / L) or (B2R, H / H) 18) (A,(B2R/B2Q), H / L) or (B2Q, L / L)
19) (A,(B2R / B2Q), H / L) or (B2R, H / H) or (B2Q, L / L)
It can be seen from figure 4.11 that if one of the players' costs is very low there tends
to be a single equilibrium. If CNQ(E) is low (regions 1-3) the auditor has no incentive
to work hard or qualify, regardless of the auditee's behaviour, and he therefore
chooses A2B2NQ. If Dnq(E) is low (regions 1,4 and 15), the auditee has no incentive
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to reduce the occurrence of errors and will put a low level of effort into the internal
control system. As DNQ(E) increases the auditee can reduce the risk of an error
occurring (and the subsequent risk of NQ(E)) by putting high effort into the internal
controls. The level of DNQ(E) when this option becomes cost effective will depend
upon the auditor's testing policy. If CNQ(E) <109 both auditee types put in high effort
if Dnq(E) > 285. Since the auditor never qualifies in these regions any errors that the
auditee fails to prevent will result in the NQ(E) outcome. In contrast if CNQ(E) is
between about 400 and 800 the auditor uses the reasonable qualification strategy. In
this case an unqualified error will only occur if both the auditee fails to prevent it and
the auditor fails to detect it. With both parties limiting unqualified errors the penalties
must be more extreme (DNQ(E) > 683) before high effort becomes worthwhile.
If Cnq(E) is too high the auditor stops working hard and always qualifies. In
this situation the threat of unqualified errors is large enough to overwhelm the other
penalties. The auditor wishes to avoid this penalty at any cost - and this can only be
done by always qualifying. Lemma 4.2 then tells us that there is no point in working
hard with a pre-determined "always qualify" reporting strategy. The auditee is
therefore facing a report which is qualified either correctly or incorrectly. By
choosing high effort the auditee increases the likelihood of an incorrect qualification,
which costs him less. However, for this example, this potential saving is smaller than
the cost of putting in high effort. Thus once the auditor ceases to work hard the
auditee ceases to work hard as well. If both players' costs are high the only
equilibrium is (A2B2Q, L / L). With this equilibrium the audit can be regarded as a
failiure - the auditor does as little work as possible, ignores the results of this work
and always issues the same audit report. Furthermore, the auditors presence has no
beneficial effect on the effort levels of either auditee type.
In many regions, it seems that hard work by one of the players sufficiently
reduces the occurrence of unqualified errors. However each player would prefer the
other to put in the necessary hard work. The hard worker will be the most concerned
player (corresponding to a higher NQ(E) penalty). Thus in the top left of figure 4.11
the auditee puts in high effort whilst the auditor does nothing, and in the bottom right
the auditee puts in low effort and the auditor does his best to limit the NQ(E)
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outcome. Regions of coordinated hard work, where both players contribute to the
prevention of unqualified errors, arise when both players costs are fairly high (but not
high enough to force the "no work / always qualify" equilibrium). This can be seen in
regions 13,14 and 16-18.
Regions 8 and 10 in figure 4.11 have no pure strategy equilibrium. The
following chapter extends the equilibrium analysis to mixed strategies to find the
equilibria of these regions. Mixed equilibria tend to occur when the players interests
are at odds. In these regions both players again have penalties of a similar size.
However these regions fall into the area where hard work by one player suitably
reduces the risk of an unqualified error. Since both player's costs are similar neither
player will assume full responsibility for this level of work. The only compromise
involves randomised strategies for both parties - so that each works hard with some
probability.
There are two factors at work in determining the type of equilibrium that
occurrs. If one player is considerably more concerned with the outcome NQ(E) he
will work hard to reduce the chance of its occurrence whilst the other, relatively
unconcerned player does not. To prevent this "shirking" both players must have
similar penalties. In the case of very low penalties neither player will work hard,
since neither party is particularly concerned by the outcome of the audit. With
moderate penalties the players are unable to coordinate their hard work, since work
by one of them is sufficient and each prefers the other to do the necessary work, so a
mixed strategy "compromise" equilibrium ensues. For fairly high costs the players
are driven to coordinate as both players work hard to prevent an unqualified error.
For very high costs the players sole concern is preventing unqualified errors which
leads to a "no work/always qualify" equilibrium.
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5 EXTENSIONS TO THE MODEL
5.1 Introduction
This chapter considers in more detail the example developed in section 4.5. The
equilibrium set of this example can be refined in two ways. Firstly, the analysis so far
has been restricted to the pure strategy case. There are values of CNQ(E) and DNQ(E)
for which there are no pure strategy equilibrium (regions 8 and 10 in figure 4.11). For
these areas the equilibrium strategy must involve randomisation. There are also
regions that have two or three pure strategy equilibria. In these cases further mixed
strategies also exist. Ideally, we would like to be able to choose a single equilibrium
for each value of CNQ(E) and DNQ(E) as the solution to the model. By considering the
players' preferences over the potential equilibria the equilibrium set can be reduced.
A similar approach can be used to determine when a mixed strategy equilibrium will
be preferred to a pure strategy one.
It is shown that a consideration of the players' preferences will not always
lead to a unique equilibrium. The nature of the game can range from non-cooperative
(where the players prefer different equilibria) to implicitly cooperative (where they
prefer the same outcome) as the outcome costs change. This motivates the analysis of
section 5.4 where the model is considered as a cooperative game. In such a setting
the player's incentives are identical and, if side payments and interpersonal
comparisons of utility are permitted, the decision problem reduces to a single party
utility maximisation. The cooperative game solution set can be compared to the non-
cooperative set to consider when the players self interested behaviour resembles the
group interest behaviour of the cooperative game.
Considering the players' outcome costs as independent variables reflects the
current legal responsibility of the auditing profession. A change in policy in the US
to proportionate liability suggests a move to more balanced penalties for the auditor
and auditee. This would allocate a portion of the total penalty for failing to find an
error to each party. The likely consequences of such a shift in policy are considered
in section 5.5
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5.2 Mixed Strategies in the Model
Parthasarathy and Raghavan [32] describe one of the algorithms which have been
developed to find all the equilibrium pairs of a two person nonzero-sum non-
cooperative game. However, the example of section 4.5 considered a family of games
as two of the costs varied. The limited number of potential auditee strategies means
that the assessment of mixed strategies can be carried out in a different fashion. We
also wish to reduce the equilibrium set by pareto dominance. Both these aims can be
achieved if we rank each potential outcome according to each player's preference
(whilst taking into account how each player acts optimally) as the costs vary.
In a signalling game a mixed strategy equilibrium can be a less convincing
equilibrium concept than a pure strategy one. Any mixed strategy equilibrium
requires a certain amount of collaboration. Each player randomises to make the other
players indifferent between some of their actions. Each player is willing to randomise
in this way because he expects the others to randomise to make him indifferent. Thus
the equilibrium depends upon the "willingness" of each player to randomise to obtain
indifference. A player who is indifferent between some of his strategies has a
continuum of mixed strategies - all of which, by definition, have the same expected
cost. Since each player must actively collaborate in a mixed strategy equilibrium, we
can consider the circumstances under which each player will choose the one mixed
strategy that makes the other player indifferent and thus supports the mixed strategy
equilibrium.
If there are no pure strategy equilibria then a mixed equilibrium is the only
mutually stable prediction of how the game might be played. In these circumstances,
the players might well be expected to randomise for the mixed strategy as the
equilibrium becomes a focal point. If however, there are both pure and mixed
strategies the players will be able to compare the benefits of each. If a mixed strategy
costs a player more than any pure strategy equilibrium, he has no incentive to
randomise. Even, if he knows that the other players are randomising, he loses nothing
by choosing a different randomisation. Under these conditions it seems unreasonable
that the other players should randomise in the hope that this player will also
randomise. This motivates the following definition; An equilibrium is motivationally
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unstable if a player has no incentive to play the equilibrium strategy. A player will
not participate in a mixed equilibrium if this represents his "worst" equilibrium
outcome. A mixed strategy will therefore be motivationally unstable if it is pareto
dominated by every pure equilibrium for some player i. For a signalling game this
gives:
Definition Let G be a 2-player game with 2 equilibrium pairs (R,, C,), (R2, C2)
and a mixed strategy equilibrium (R*, C*). Then the mixed strategy is
motivationally unstable if (for utility in terms of cost):
Ui(R,,C,)>Ui(R„C1)
Uj(R\C*) > Uj(R2, C2) for some player i
The models developed in chapters four and six lend themselves to the
analysis of mixed strategies since the auditor's costs explicitly include beliefs S, and
S2 about the chances of each auditee type playing H. In an equilibrium these beliefs
represent the auditee's randomisation. The auditor's choice about whether to observe
the auditee's action or not means that the model can exhibit both simultaneous move
and sequential move behaviour. With the inclusion of mixed strategies the auditor
can also choose to observe with a certain probability. The auditor's decision about
whether to observe must be determined before play begins (using the auditor's ex-
ante beliefs). If he chooses not to observe, then these ex-ante beliefs can be used to
compare the expected cost of testing actions. However, if the auditor does observe
the effort level this will change his belief about which type he is facing. These
updated beliefs then need to be used to consider the expected cost of testing actions.
There are two kinds of mixed strategies in this model; These can be identified
as mixed and observational strategies. In a mixed strategy the players randomise over
strategies which would involve the auditor randomising between testing actions.
Since the concept of a strategy effectively removes any player participation after the
game begins, mixed strategies can be regarded as randomisation which takes place
before play begins. In contrast, in an observational strategy the randomisation
depends upon the information set reached. Thus the frequency with which a strategy
occurs in equilibrium can depend on the outcome of previous actions. For example
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the auditor could decide to observe the effort level and then use a randomised testing
strategy contingent upon the effort level observed.
In the error detection model there is the potential for the auditee to choose S,
and S2 so that the auditor will choose to observe and, after observing, be indifferent
between testing actions for each effort level. After observing the effort level the only
remaining uncertainty is about the auditee's type. Since this is represented by a single
variable, P', the auditor can randomise over at most two best response actions. The
auditor can then randomise between these two tests so that both auditee types are
indifferent between high and low effort. Since the auditor is not indifferent until after
observation he can have a different randomisation scheme for each effort level.
However, we have the following result:
Lemma 5.1 There are no motivationally stable observational strategy equilibria
in the model oferror detection.
Proof For an observational strategy equilibrium to be motivationally stable the
auditor must be indifferent between high and low effort. If for example the
auditor's costs are greater in a low effort environment then the auditor could
benefit if he can encourage either auditee type to put in high effort more
frequently than in the observational equilibrium. This can be achieved by
altering the randomisation after low effort to force a pooling on H
equilibrium. In this case the observational strategy equilibrium is
motivationally unstable.
There are therefore two requirements for an observational strategy
equilibrium to exist and be motivationally stable. The auditor's expected costs
must be the same for two actions after observing the effort level if he is to
randomise between them, and before observation the expected cost from each
randomisation must be the same if the auditor is to participate in the
equilibrium. From above, after observing the effort level the auditor can be
indifferent between at most two of his testing actions. The auditor can
randomise after one effort level or both. If he randomises after both effort
levels then either at least one action occurs in support of both mixed tests, or
the auditor has 4 distinct actions. This gives three cases to consider:
(i) the auditor only randomises after one effort level.
Suppose the auditor randomises between actions W and X after observing
high effort and uses Y after low effort. So the auditor is effectively
randomising between the strategies A,(W/Y) and A,(X/Y). There are three
cases to consider:
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1) The auditor's costs for both A,(W/Y) and A,(X/Y) are increasing in Sj.
Then the auditor prefers Y and low effort to either testing action after H.
The mixed strategy is therefore motivationally unstable.
2) The auditor's costs for both A,(W/Y) and A,(X/Y) are decreasing in Sj.
Then the auditor prefers either testing action after H to Y and low effort.
The mixed strategy is therefore motivationally unstable.
3) If one strategy is increasing and the other decreasing, then the point at
which the auditor's payoff functions intersect is at S, = 0. Thus the auditee
does not have a mixed strategy.
(ii) One action is in the support of both mixed testing strategies
The auditor's actions in this case are of the form (W,X) after H and (X,Y) after
L. Now, the auditor's expected cost of an observational strategy equilibrium
will be of the form:
CA + P(S.C(1,H,X)+(1-S1)C(1,L,X))
+ (1-P)( S2C(2,H,X)+( 1 -S2)C(2,L,X))
S, and S2 are chosen so that
PS,C(1,H,X)+(1-P)S2C(2,H,X) = PS,C(1,H,W)+(1-P)S2C(2,H,W) and
P( 1 -S,)C( 1 ,L,X)+( 1 -P)( 1 -S2)C(2,L,X)=P( 1 -S ,)C( 1 ,L,Y)+( 1 -P)(l -S2)C(2,L,Y)
Thus the expected cost of the auditor's observational strategy is greater than
the expected cost of A2X. So the only possible observational strategy
equilibrium will involve randomising between two actions (W,X) after
observing H and two distinct actions (Y, Z) after observing low effort.
(iii) The auditor has 4 distinct actions
The auditor's expected cost (in terms of his updated belief P') can be
expressed in terms of an expected error rate. Expected cost of test K after
observing effort level w is (from 4.3.1) P'C(l,w,K)+(l-P')C(2,w,K)
= CBk + (t* (K)Cq(NE)+( 1 -t* (K))Cnq(NE)) + (P'plw+(1-P')p2w)x
(r*(K)CQ(E)+(l-r*(K))CNQ(E))-t*(K)CQ(NE)-( 1 -t*(K))CNQ(NE))
=CBk+Pw'(r*(K)CQ(E)+(l-r*(K))CNQ(E))
+(1 "Pw')(t*(K)Cq(NE)+( 1 -t*(K))Cnq(NE)) where pw' = P'plw+(1-P') p2w
Notice that pH' e (p1H, p2H) and pL' e (p1L, p2L) so p2H < p1L => pH' < pL'
Thus the analysis of section 4.3 can be used to consider an optimal action
sequence after observing each effort level. Firstly, the proof of lemma 4.5
considers when changes in optimal action can occur. The first three
conditions are repeated below:
B2NQ ^B2R Cnq(E) > CQ(E) + f(piw)x t2 / r2
B2NQ-> B,R Cnq(E) > CQ(E) + CB/rlPiw + f(piw)xtl/r,
B2NQ -> B2Q Cnq(E) > CQ(E) + f(pjw)
Where f(plw) = ((1 -piw)(CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE)) / piw piwe(0, 1)
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These show that B2NQ is always optimal for CNQ(E) < CQ(E). The ordering of
the auditor's outcome costs in section 4.2 gives:
Cq(NE) > Cnq(NE) Cnq(E) > Cnq(NE) Cq(NE)>Cq(E) (1)
lemma 4.7 described the three potential action sequences:
B2NQ->B,R->B2Q if Cb<L
B2NQ-»B2R->B,R->B2Q if U>Cb>L
B2NQ -> B2R -> B2Q if CB >U
where L = (1-pJx(CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE))x(t2rrt,r2)/ r2
and U - (1 -piw)x(CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE))x(( 1 -t2)(r,-1 )+(l -t,)( 1 -r2))/ (l-r2)
Furthermore, lemma 4.8 showed that both U and L are decreasing functions
of piw whilst lemma 4.5 showed that the value of CNQ(E) that prompts a
change in action is decreasing in piw (except for B,R —> B2Q). Since pH' < pL'
we can consider the possible combinations of action sequences against El or
L. Because the sequence B2NQ -» B2Q does not occur the auditor cannot be
indifferent between B2Q and B2NQ for any expected error rate. Thus (since all
four testing actions are used) B2NQ must be part of a mixed strategy after one
effort level and B2Q part of the other mixed strategy. This leaves four possible
mixed strategies:
(B2R, B2Q) / (B2NQ, B,R) (B,R, B2Q) / (B2NQ, B2R)
(B2NQ, B,R) / (B2R, B2Q) (B2NQ, B2R) / (B,R, B2Q)
The auditor's cost function can be rearranged to find the values pH* and pL*
that make the auditor indifferent after observing the effort level for (W, X) /
(Y, Z):
Ph* = (CBX-CBW+(t(X)-t(W))(CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE))) /
((r(X)-r(W))(CNQ(E)-CQ(E))+(t(X)-t(W))(CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE)))
where Cq(NE)-Cnq(NE) > 0 and CNQ(E)-CQ(E) > 0 by (1) above. A similar
expression can be derived for pL* in terms of Y and Z. The terms (t(X)-t(W))
and (r(X)-r(W)) (or equivalently (t(Z)-t(Y)) etc. ) will also be positive since
either W is B2NQ or X is B2Q in each case and
r(B,NQ) < r(B2R) < r(B, R) < r(B,Q)
t(B2NQ)<t(B,R)<t(B2R)<t(B2Q)
Also, if (CBX-CBW) is negative and sufficiently large to make the entire
numerator negative then pH* < 0 and the auditee cannot make the auditor
indifferent between the two actions. If the numerator is positive however then
clearly pH* decreases as CNQ(E) increases. The same argument shows that if
the auditor can be made indifferent after observing low effort then pL* must
be decreasing in CNQ(E). So for auditor indifference both pH* and pL* must be
decreasing in CNQ(E)
It can be shown that the auditee is unable to satisfy the requirements
for the auditor to be indifferent after observing the effort level (for
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randomising) and make the auditor indifferent between his expected cost after
high and low effort as CNQ(E) changes. Assume that the auditor is indifferent
after high effort and low effort. Then both pH* and pL* must be decreasing in
Cnq(E). Consider the actions B2Q and B2NQ; from the above one of these
actions will be part of the mixed strategy after observing H and the other after
L. For the auditor's expected cost to be the same after both effort levels we
have 2 cases to consider:
(a) B2Q occurs after observing El and B2NQ after L
Then we require C(pH*,B2Q) = C(pL*,B2NQ)
<=> CQ(NE)-pH*(CQ(NE)-CQ(E)) = Cnq(NE)+Pl*(Cnq(E)-Cnq(NE))
Ph* = (Cq(NE)-Cnq(NE))-Pl*(Cnq(E)-Cnq(NE)) / (Cq(NE)-Cq(E))
so (1) => as pL* increases pH* decreases. Thus as CNQ(E) varies if an
observational equilibrium exists it cannot be motivationally stable
(b) B2Q occurs after observing L and B2NQ after H
Then we require C(pL*,B2Q) = C(pH*,B2NQ)
<=> CQ(NE)-pL*(CQ(NE)-CQ(E)) = CNQ(NE)+pH*(CNQ(E)-CNQ(NE))
pL* = (Cq(NE)-Cnq(NE))-Ph*(Cnq(E)-Cnq(NE)) / (Cq(NE)-Cq(E))
so (1) as pH* increases pL* decreases. Thus as CNQ(E) varies if an
observational equilibrium exists it cannot be motivationally stable
Attention can therefore be focused upon mixed strategies, where the auditor can be
considered to randomise before play begins. As a consequence of lemma 5.1 the
auditor's mixed strategy must contain at least one A2-test strategy as otherwise the
auditor is effectively randomising after observing the effort level. Suppose the
auditor randomises against a type i auditee using strategies S,, S2, ... , Sn with
probabilities q,', q2', ..., qn' respectively. Since the sum of these probabilities must be
1 (the auditor always chooses some strategy) we can re-write qn' = (l-qi'-q2'----qn-i' )•
To make a type i auditee indifferent these probabilities must satisfy:
q1iDjH(S1(H))+ q2'DiH(S2(H))+ + (l-q1i-q2i-...-qn.11)DiH(Sn(H)) =
q1iDiL(S,(L))+ q2fDiL(S2(L))+ + (l-q]i-q2i-...-qn,i)DlL(Sn(L)) (5.2.1)
Now, at least one of these strategies does not involve the A-test and hence uses the
same test against both high and low effort. We can assume without loss of generality
that this strategy is Sn (since the labelling of the strategies is unimportant).
Expression 5.2.1 can be rearranged to find q,'.
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q/ = (D,l(S„(L))- D,„(Sn(H)) / ((DiH(S|(H))-DiH(Sn(H))-DjL(S,(L)+DjH(Sn(L)) (5.2.2)
+Wi q/(DiH(Si(H))-Di„(Sn(H))-DiL(SJ(L)+D,L(S„(L)))
Where each Djw( -) is a function of the form x + yDNQ(E) for some constants x and y.
Since these are linear functions of DNQ(E), q," is of the form:
(a+bDNQ(E)) / (c+dDNQ(E))
We are interested in whether or not there can be an equilibrium in which both auditee
types randomise. For this to occur, the auditor's mixed strategy must be identical for
both types. In other words q,1 = q,2, q2' = q22 and so on. Since the equilibrium set is
being considered as the cost of the outcome NQ(E) varies we require qj1 = qj2 for each
strategy Sj as DNQ(E) varies. Now,
(a+bDNQ(E))/(c+dDNQ(E)) = (e+fDNQ(E))/(g+hDNQ(E)) as DNQ(E) varies (5.2.3)
<=> a/e = b/f = c/g = d /h = a for some constant a.
A necessary condition for the auditor's randomising to be the same for both types is
q,1 = q,2 for a mixed strategy over any number of pure strategies.
Lemma 5.2 qj 1 * q,2 as E^QfE) varies.
Proof q,1 and q,2 are of the form (a+bD)/(c+dD) and (e+fD)/(g+hD). From
expression 5.2.2 for q,' the numerator is DiL(Sn(L)) - DiH(Sn(H)) where strategy
Sn does not involve the A-test. Thus Sn specifies the same test Z for both high
and low effort levels where Z e {B2NQ, B2R, B,R, B2Q}. Now, since there
are only four testing actions, the denominator of the expression for q,' will
have a DNQ(E) term of the form:
(xl(B ,R)piL+xH(B,R)piH)( 1 -r,) + (xL(B2R)piL+xH(B2R)piH)( 1 -r2)
+ (xL(NQ)piL+xH(NQ)piH)
where xH(K) is the sum of those qj (except q,) where Sj(H) = strategy K.
Assume that the auditor's mixed strategy is the same for both types apart
from for S,. So q/ = q^ for j=2,....,n. Then
Pih < p2H and p1L < p2L the DNQ(E) term in the denominator of q,2 is greater
than the same term in q,1. i.e. h > d.
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if Z * B,Q then
b = (p1L-pIH)x(l-r(Z))DNQ(E)
f=(P2L-p2H)x(l-r(Z))DNQ(E)
(PlL "Pih) > (P2L "P2h) <=> b > f
Now q, 1=qt2 => b/f = d/h. But d/h < 1 < b/f
Therefore q,1 ^ q,2 and the auditor cannot make both auditee types indifferent.
if Z = B,Q then b = f = 0. q,1 = q,2 => a/e = d/h where
a = (Pil"PIH)(Cq(E)-Cq(NE))
e = (p2L-P2H)(CQ(E)-CQ(NE))
(PIL'Pih) :> (P2L "P2H) ^ a^e > 1
Now q, 1=q,2 => a/e = d/h. But d/h < 1 < a/e
So q/ ^ q,2 and the auditor cannot make both auditee types indifferent.
Therefore for mixed strategies over n pure strategies if one auditee type is indifferent
the other type will have a pure strategy best response. Geometrically this means that
we can restrict our attention to the edges of the S,xS2 unit square. When randomising
against one auditee type the auditor will never need to use more than two pure
strategies - one that the auditee prefers to play H against and one that he prefers to
play L against. We therefore need only consider mixed strategies with a support of
two pure strategies. One of the following cases will occur:
• There are no pure strategy equilibria. In this case a mixed strategy can be regarded
as the solution to the game.
• If there is one pure strategy equilibrium this will be considered the solution of the
game.
• There are two or more pure strategy equilibria. Firstly, the player's preferences
(which are needed to find mixed strategies) over the equilibria can be determined.
If both players prefer the same equilibrium then this can be regarded as the
solution to the game. Otherwise, the benefits of both pure and mixed equilibria
need to be compared.
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From lemma 5.2 we know that the only mixed strategies that need to be considered
have a support of two pure strategies. The auditor can make one auditee type
indifferent whilst the other type will have a pure strategy best response. The auditor
will not randomise between observation strategies unless he is indifferent after
observation of either effort level. Lemma 5.1 has shown that if Si and S2 are chosen
for this indifference then the auditor's expected cost will differ between effort levels
and the resulting observational strategy is motivationally unstable. The only mixed
strategies that can therefore occur will involve either two A2 test strategies or one A2
test and one A, test strategy. These mixed strategies will only be considered if there
are two or more pareto optimal pure strategy equilibria.
A mixed strategy only needs to be considered if it is motivationally stable -
the auditee will not choose a mixed signalling strategy if it costs him more than
either pure strategy signal. There are two ways that two pure strategy equilibria can
occur. Either one auditee puts in the same effort in both - for example (X, H/H) and
(Y, H/L) or there are two pure strategy pooling equilibria; (X, H/H) and (Y, L / L).
In a mixed strategy the auditee must consider the auditor's optimal responses as Sf
varies. If the only optimal tests are part of the pure equilibria we have the following:
Lemma 5.3 Any mixed strategy with a support ofpure equilibrium strategies of
the form A,(X / Y) and A2(X) is motivationally unstable
Proof Suppose, without loss of generality, that the two pure strategy equilibria are
(A,(X / Y), H/L) and (A2(X), H/H). Then since they are equilibria:
D2(A,(X/Y)) is increasing in S2 « D2L(A,(X/Y)) < D2H(A,(X/Y)) = D2H(X)
In a mixed strategy the auditee is indifferent between high and low effort
<=> xD2L(A,(X/Y))+(1-X)D2L(X) = XD2H(X)+( 1 -X)D2H(X)
<=> the mixed strategy costs the auditee D2H(X) > D2L(A,(X / Y)). Thus the
mixed strategy equilibrium costs the auditee the same as the pure strategy
equilibrium which he least prefers.
The same argument shows that a mixed strategy involving A,(X / Y) and A2(Y) is
motivationally unstable if both strategies a pure equilibrium strategies. Mixed
strategy equilibria will only be compared to pure strategy equilibria if the pure
strategy analysis does not lead to a unique pareto optimal equilibrium. The above
lemmas show that there are only two cases where a mixed strategy could improve
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upon the pure strategy equilibrium payoffs; If the two equilibria both involve pooling
then the auditee type that participates in a mixed strategy will depend on the auditor's
optimal strategy set. If the two equilibria involve one pooling equilibrium and a
separating equilibrium with a different testing strategy then the mixed strategy may
be a good compromise. If the auditor uses an A2 test strategy his expected cost can be
expressed in terms of an expected error rate:
Expected C(A2(K)) = CBk+pw"(r*(K)CQ(E)+( 1 -r*(K))CNQ(E)) (5.2.4)
+(1 -pw")(t* (K)Cq(NE)+( 1 -t* (K))Cnq(NE))
where pw" = PS1p1H+(l-P)S2p2H+P(l-S1)p,L+(l-P)(l-S2)p2L (5.2.5)
This can be used to classify the auditor's optimal strategy set as S, and S2 vary. The
auditor's A2-test strategies will form one of three sequences for increasing CNQ(E)
described in lemma 4.7. The points at which the optimal action changes are
decreasing in pw". For auditor indifference the auditee can choose S, to prompt such a
change. This approach can also determine which A,-test strategies can be optimal. If
the auditor observes the effort level this will change his expected error rates. By
Bayes' rule:
Ph' = (PS.P.h+ (l-P)S2p2H) / (PS, + (1-P)S2) (5.2.6)
pL' = (P(l-SI)p1H+ (l-P)(l-S2)p2H) / (P(l-Sj) + (1-P)(1-S2)) (5.2.7)
Where pH' e (p1H, p2H) and pL' e (pIL, p2L). p2H < p1L => pH' < pL'
Equation 5.2.5 can be expressed in terms of pH' and pL':
Pw" = ((PS,+(1-P)S2))Ph' +(P( 1 -S,)+(1 -P)( 1 -S2))pL' (5.2.8)
so pH' < pL' => pH' < pw" < pL'. Thus the auditor's expected error rate is decreased after
observing high effort and increased after observing low effort. Thus after observing
H the auditor's optimal action will be earlier in the sequence, whilst after observing L
it will be further on. The conditions U and L of lemma 4.7 can be used to determine
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all the auditor's optimal responses as S, and S2 vary. The optimal responses for the
example of section 4.5 are considered in the mixed strategy analysis of section 5.3
5.3 Refining the Equilibrium Set of the Example
Pareto dominance
The equilibrium set for the example of section 4.5 can be reduced by considering the
pareto optimality of the equilibrium strategy pairs in each region. This can be
achieved by considering the player's preferences. To compare the players'
preferences the cost of each potential pure strategy outcome can be considered as a
function of NQ(E). This can be done for a particular value of P. The discussion
below will develop the equilibrium sets shown in figure 4.11, where there is a 90%
chance that the auditee is type 1. Each outcome will be a linear function of the cost
associated with NQ(E). As NQ(E) increases the minimum cost outcome can be
found, which in the case of the auditor's outcome costs will be his optimal strategy.
If all of the outcome costs are ordered a table can be generated to illustrate how the
players' preferences change with the cost NQ(E). In the following tables 1 = best (the
least cost)
L/L 109| 126| 217| 230| 250| 264| 579| 647| 7161 908| 999| 1091J
a2b2nq 1 2 3 4 7 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
a2b2r 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 5 5 6 8
a2b,r 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 6 5 5
a2b2q 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1
b2nq/ b2r 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 6 6 7 9 9
b2nq/ b,r 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 8 7 6
b2nq/ b2q 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 2
b2r/ b,r 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 8 7 6
b2r/ b2q 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 2
b,r/b2q 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 2
table 5.1 auditor's action preference after L/L
Table 5.1 illustrates the auditor's optimal response to pooling on L. If CNQ(E) < 109
his optimal response is B2NQ, for CNQ(E) 6 (109, 647) B2R, and if CNQ(E) > 647
B2Q. The preferences for the remaining cases are given in appendix B. The auditor's
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best responses for each pure strategy effort level can also be compared to consider
the auditor's preferences between pure strategy equilibria. This gives the following:
cnq(e) < 1548 e(1548, 3449) g(3449, 4717) >4717
h/h 1 2 3 3
h/l 2 1 1 2
l/l 3 3 2 1
table 5.2 auditor's equilibrium preference
For all sufficiently large CNQ(E) the auditor chooses B2Q. In this case his preferred
auditee strategy is L/L - giving an equilibrium of (B2Q, L/L) since this reduces the
risk that the auditors qualification will be incorrect. The auditee's preferences over
auditor strategies can be considered in a similar way. However to consider the
auditee's preferences between equilibria we also need to take into account the
auditee's optimal action for each strategy. For this example this gives the following:
Type 1 193 | 224 | 440 | 873 | 1810| 5558 | 27840 |
a2b2nq L 1 H 1 H 1 H 3 H 5 H 7 H 7 H 7
a2b2r L 6 L 6 H 6 H 6 H 3 H 3 H 6 H 6
a2b,r H 4 H 4 H 4 H 1 H 1 H 1 H 1 H 5
a2b2q L 8 L 8 L 8 L 8 L 8 L 5 L 3 L 1
b2nq/ b2r H 2 H 1 H 1 H 3 H 5 H 7 H 7 H 7
b2nq/b2q H 2 H 1 H 1 H 3 H 5 L 5 L 3 L 1
b2r/ b2q H 7 H 7 H 6 H 6 H 3 H 3 L 3 L 1
b,r/ b2q H 4 H 4 H 4 H 1 H 1 H 1 H 1 L 1
table 5.3:- type 1 auditee preferences and optimal responses to tests
Type 2 110 | 193 224 1 231 1 247 | 254 | 262 1 285 1 300 | 302 |
a2b2nq L 1 L 1 L 1 L 1 L 2 L 2 L 4 L 5 H 5 H 6 H 6
a2b2r L 4 L 5 L 5 L 3 L 3 L 3 L 2 L 2 L 2 L 2 L 3
a2b,r L 5 L 4 L 2 L 2 L 1 L 1 L 1 L 1 L 1 L 1 L 1
a2b2q L 8 L 8 L 8 L 8 L 8 L 8 L 8 L 8 L 8 L 8 L 8
b2nq/ b2r H 2 H 2 H 3 L 3 L 3 L 3 L 2 L 2 L 2 L 2 L 3
b2nq/ b2q H 2 H 2 H 3 H 5 H 5 H 6 H 6 H 6 H 5 H 6 H 6
b2r/ b2q H 7 H 7 H 7 H 7 H 7 H 7 H 7 H 7 H 7 H 5 H 5
b,r/ b2q H 6 H 6 H 6 H 6 H 6 H 5 H 5 H 4 H 4 H 4 H 2
table 5.4:- type 2 auditee preferences and optimal responses to tests
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These tables can be used to reduce the equilibrium sets of figure 4.11 by pareto
domination of equilibria. Consider for example region 5 of figure 4.11 where CNQ(E)
e (109, 213) and DNQ(E) e (193, 224). There are two pure strategy equilibria in this
region; (B2NQ, H / L) and (B2R, L/L). However table 5.3 shows that a type 1 auditee
prefers (B2NQ, H) to (B2R, L) if DNQ(E) < 873 whilst a type 2 auditee prefers (B2NQ,
L) to B2R, L) if Dnq(E) < 285. Table 5.2 shows that the auditor prefers a separating
H/L equilibrium to pooling on L if CNQ(E) < 4717. Since both auditee types and the
auditor prefer (B2NQ, H/L) the other equilibrium (B2R L/L) is pareto dominated in
this region. Similar comparisons can be made in other regions. The reduced
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407 478 647 718 898 1548 3449 4717 5917
figure 5.1 - reduced equilibrium set for P = 0.9
1) (B2NQ, H / H) or (A,(B2NQ/B2R), H / L)
3) (B2NQ, H / H) or (A, (B2NQ/B,Q), H / L)
5) (B2R, H / H) or (A,(B2NQ/B2Q), H / L)
7) (A, (B2R/B2Q), H / L) or (B,R, H / H)
2) (A, (B2NQ/B2R), H / L)
4) RND[B2R / A,(B2NQ/B,Q), H / H, H / L]
6) (B2Q, L/L) or (B2R, H/H)
8) (A, (B2R/B2Q), H / L) or (B2Q, L / L)
If one of the players' costs is very small there tends to be a single equilibrium - for
example for low CNQ(E) the auditor will always play NQ regardless of the auditee's
behaviour. If CNQ(E) is too high, the auditor stops working hard and always qualifies.
95
In this situation the auditee also stops working since the report will be qualified
regardless of the effort put into the internal control system. In regions where there are
two equilibria, one of which involves the A,-test, one of the auditee types prefers to
signal his type to the auditor. This need not be the "low error rate" type 1 auditee. In
region 8 a type 1 auditee does prefer to show his type by putting high effort into the
internal control system, in which case the auditor will qualify reasonably. However
in region 1, where both players have low costs the auditor will prefer to never qualify
since there is a chance that this is a false positive. When CNQ(E) is low the auditor is
more concerned with avoiding incorrectly qualifying than failing to find errors.
Because type 2 has a higher error rate he would prefer to play L (since high effort
still leaves a fairly high chance of an error). This convinces the auditor that he is
facing a type 2 auditee in which case he should qualify if his testing finds an error.
In figure 5.1 the regions with more than one equilibrium are those where the
players prefer different outcomes. In this case, since the auditor can choose not to
observe the auditee's action, we might expect the mixed strategy equilibrium to be a
fair compromise.
Mixed strategies
Regions 1 and 3-8 in figure 5.1 have more than one pure strategy pareto optimal
equilibrium. We therefore need to determine whether a mixed strategy can be a
compromise equilibrium. With P = 0.9 the auditor's expected error rate pw" lies
between 0.075 (both types play H) and 0.365 (both types play L). CB > U(0.075) so
the optimal action sequence is NQ—»B2R—>Q and the optimal A, test strategies are
{A,(NQ/B2R), A,(NQ/Q) and A,(B2R/Q)}. We can also determine when each auditor
strategy has a decreasing cost as S; increases. This occurs when C(A,(i, H, KH/KL) <
C(A,(i, L, Kh/Kl)
» CNQ(E) > (CB(KH)-CB(KL)+(piH r*(KH)-piLr*(KL))CQ(E) (5.3.1)
+ ((1 ~PiH)t*(KHM 1 -piL)t* (Kl))Cq(NE)
+((1 -piH)( 1 -t*(KH))-( 1 -piL)( 1 -t*(KL)))CNQ(NE)} / (piL( 1 -r*(KL))-plH( 1 -r*(KH)))
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auditor's Decreasing in Decreasing in
strategy s, s2




a,b2nq/b2r Always CNQ(E)< 166
a,b2nq/b,r CNQ(E) < 2548 CNQ(E) <331
a,b2nq/b2q CNQ(E)< 1530 CNQ(E) < 243
A,B2R/bjr Always Cnq(E)< 1739
a,b2r/b2q CNQ(E) < 5273 CNQ(E) <714
a,b,r/b2q Cnq(E) < 2040 Always
table 5.5 - auditee's effort level influences auditor costs
The auditor's optimal strategies as S, and S2 vary can be found from his preference
tables given above and in appendix B. This can be used to find the points of







< 109 nq nq
(109,213) b2r -> nq nq
(213,367) b2r -> a,(nq/b2r) a,(nq/b2r)-»nq
(367, 398) b2r -> a,(nq/b2r) a,(nq/b2r)->b2r->nq
(398, 407) b2r -* a,(nq/b2r)->a,(nq/q) a,(nq/q)^b2r^nq
(407, 478) b2r -> a,(nq/b2r)->a,(nq/q) ai(nq/q)^b2r
(478, 647) b2r b2r
(647, 718) q-^b2r b2r
(718, 898) q->a,(b2r/q)->b2r b2r
(898, 4065) q^a,(b2r/q) a,(b2r/q)->b2r
(4065,4223) q^a,(b2r/q) a,(b,r/q)->q^b2r
(4223, 5917) q^a,(b2r/q) Ai(B2R/Q)—»q
>5917 Q Q
table 5.6 auditor's optimal action set for mixed effort levels
In region 1 of figure 5.1 CNQ(E) e (213, 398) and DNQ(E) > 285. If CNQ(E) < 367 the
auditor's optimal responses as S2 varies are A,(NQ/B2R)—>NQ. By lemma 5.4 this
mixed strategy will be motivationally unstable as it will cost the auditee as much as
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his "worst" pure strategy equilibrium. If CNQ(E) > 367 a third strategy, B2R, is
optimal for some S2. However for CNQ(E) in this range A,(NQ/B2R) is increasing in
S2 whilst B2NQ is decreasing. Hence both the vertices A,(NQ/B2R)—»B2R and
B2R—>NQ will cost the auditor more than either pure equilibrium. Any mixed
strategy in this region is therefore motivationally unstable since either one or both
players has no incentive to randomise.
In region 3 CNQ(E) e (398,407) and DNQ(E) e (360,1810). The auditor's
optimal responses as S2 varies are A,(NQ/Q)—>B2R—>NQ. Once again table 5.5
shows that for this interval of CNQ(E) A,(NQ/Q) is increasing and B2NQ is
decreasing. Any mixed strategy equilibrium will therefore cost the auditor more than
either pure strategy equilibrium. Region 4 has no pure strategy equilibria and
therefore a mixed strategy equilibrium is used. The auditor's responses to S, varying
are such that the auditor prefers a pure strategy to any mixed strategy. The auditor
will therefore randomise against type 2, where the mixed strategy minimises his
costs. If the auditor plays B2R with probability q2 and A,(B2NQ/B2Q) with
probability (l-q2) then:
q2 = (-108 + 0.3Dnq(E)) / (-135.3 + 0.34DNQ(E))
S2 = (Ca+39.75-0. 1Cnq(E)+P(-63.525+0. 14Cnq(E))) / (1-P)(69.9 - 0.34CNQ(E))
In region 5 CNQ(E) e(407,478) and DNQ(E) e (683, 1810). The auditor's optimal
responses as S2 varies are A,(NQ/Q)—»B2R, the same as in region 4. In region 4 the
auditee's cost from At(NQ/Q) was decreasing in S2 and the cost from B2R was
increasing, so that there were no pure strategy equilibrium. In region 5 the opposite is
true - A,(NQ/Q) has an increasing cost and B2R decreasing, giving two pure strategy
equilibria where type 2 prefers (A,(NQ/Q) H/L). However, D2H(A,(NQ/Q)) >
D2H(B2R) if Dnq(E) > 300. This means that in region 5 the intersection of these two
auditee cost functions (his expected return from the mixed strategy equilibrium) is
greater than either pure strategy equilibrium. The auditee therefore has no incentive
to randomise.
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In region 6 CNQ(E) e (647, 3449) and DNQ(E) > 5558. Both auditee types
prefer (B2Q, L/L) whilst the auditor prefers the equilibrium (B2R H/H). If CNQ(E) <
898 the auditor has a single best response, B2R, as S2 varies so any mixed strategy
must involve a type 1 auditee. However the auditor's optimal response as S, varies
begins with B2Q, which is increasing in S, and ends with B2R which is decreasing in
S,. Thus any mixed strategy equilibrium will cost the auditor more than either pure
equilibrium. If CNQ(E) > 898 the auditor's optimal strategy as S, varies is
Q—»A!(B2R/Q) and as S2 varies is A,(B2R/Q)—>B2R. Any mixed strategy involving
type 2 will cost the auditee the same as (B2R H/H), the least preferred equilibrium. A
type 2 auditee therefore has no incentive to randomise. Since B2Q is increasing in S,,
any mixed strategy involving B2Q and A,(B2R/Q) must cost the auditor more than
(B2Q, L/L), the auditor's worst equilibrium and hence more than (B2R, H/H). The
auditor therefore has no incentive to participate in a mixed strategy equilibrium.
In region 7 CNQ(E) e (898, 1548) and DNQ(E) e (683, 5558). The pure
equilibria are (A,(B2R/Q), H/L) and (B2R, H/H). The auditor's optimal responses as
S2 varies are the two pure equilibrium strategies and therefore by lemma 5.3 any
mixed strategy equilibrium is motivationally unstable. Similarly, in region 8 the two
pure strategy equilibria are (A,(B2R/B2Q), H/L) and (B2Q, L/L) and the auditor's
optimal responses as S, varies are the two equilibrium strategies. Lemma 5.3
therefore shows that this mixed strategy is unsatisfactory.
In this example the only mixed strategy equilibrium occurs when there are no
pure strategy equilibria. There are regions of costs which have two pure strategy
pareto optimal equilibrium pairs. In these regions mixed strategies are an
unsatisfactory compromise as it costs one of the players more than either pure
strategy equilibrium. In some regions therefore there is not a unique suggestion for
how the game should be played. This highlights the strategic interaction in the
model. In some cases it is impossible to determine the best action without knowing
what the other party intends to do. Now that the equilibrium set has been categorised,
this example can be used to consider how the assumptions of noncooperation and the
allocation of liability influence the equilibrium set.
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5.4 A Cooperative Version of the Game
The players' behaviour in a nonzero-sum game can vary between implicitly
cooperative (where both players prefer the same outcome) to non-cooperative where
the players' interests are at odds. It is interesting to see to what extent the players'
collusion approaches the extreme case of cooperative games. In these the players
make binding pre-play commitments and are able to compare utility and share out the
payoffs. For the audit model detailed above, we need to consider the combined
payoffs for both players and the actions that minimise this cost. This will enable us to
determine strategy pairs that give points on the pareto efficient boundary of the
cooperative payoff region. The Nash bargaining solution of the game is not
considered here since we only wish to contrast the occurrence of strategy pairs in a
cooperative and non-cooperative setting.
It will be assumed that once the game has started the players' actions are
restricted to those available within the game. In other words the players are free to
communicate before play begins but afterwards they can only communicate through
their actions, in particular the auditee effort level. If this were not the case then the
first step taken by the auditee would be to inform the auditor of his type. This would
reduce the game to a game of cooperative costly perfect information which has been
analysed in Hatherly, Nadeau and Thomas [24]
The costs and probabilities for the model will be the same as those considered
in section 4.5. In a similar manner we can consider a family of games for varying
CNQ(E) and DNQ(E). We can derive expressions for the expected costs of each of the
potential outcomes. Some of the results for the auditor's strategies will still hold - for
example it is in neither players interest for the auditor to use B, if he intends to
qualify regardless (Q). If the joint costs of failing to find an error are Q = CNQ(E) +
Dnq(E) then:
C(1,H,B2NQ)= 74 + 0.05Q
C(l, H, B2R) = 132.7 + 0.01Q
C(1,H, B,R)= 166.3 + 0.0025Q
C(l, H, B2Q) = 278
C(1,L,B2NQ)= 13 + 0.35Q
C(l, L, B2R) = 123.9 + 0.07Q
C(l, L, B,R) = 179.1 +0.0175Q
C(l, L, B2Q) = 241
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From these costs it can be seen that the action pairs (A2B2Q, H) and (A2B,R, L) are
dominated. By comparing these costs the optimal actions are found to be the
following:
B2NQ, L if Q < 203
B2NQ, H if Q g (203, 1468)
B2R, H if Q g (1468,4480)
B,R, H if Q g (4480, 29880)
B2Q, L if Q> 29880
Similar expressions can be derived for a type 2 auditee:
C(2, H, B2NQ) = 69 + 0.3Q
C(2, H, B2R) = 171.2+ 0.06Q
C(2, H, B,R) = 222.54+ 0.015Q
C(2, H, B2Q) = 293
C(2, L, B2NQ) = 11.5 + 0.5Q
C(2, L,B2R) = 147 + 0.1Q
C(2, L, B,R) = 213 + 0.025Q
C(2, L, B2Q) = 250
In this case only the action (B2Q, H) is dominated. This leads to the following
optimal strategies:
This tells us the solution for each auditee type, we now need to consider the costs in
terms of P, since the auditor will not know which type he is facing. In many cases the
separate optimal strategies are sufficient - for example if Q < 203 then the auditor's
best action is B2NQ and both auditee types will play L. There is the possibility that
for some P the optimal strategy will be neither of the separate optimal strategies.
However, since the players' interests are no longer at odds there is no advantage to be
gained by randomising. We can compare strategies pairwise to find regions of the
plane PxQ in the same way that was done for the auditor's non-cooperative
strategies. The relevant strategy comparisons are given below:
B2NQ, L if Q < 288
B2NQ, H if Q g (288, 390)
B2R, L if Q g (390, 605)
B2R, H if Q g (605, 1141)
B,R, H if O g (1141, 1831)
B2Q, L if Q> 1831
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COOPERATIVE VERSION OF THE GAME
STRATEGY COMPARISON INEQUALITY ON Q = CNQ(E)+ DNQ(E)
(B2NQ, H / H) < (B2R, H / L) Q < (78-19.3P) / (0.2-0.16P)
(B2NQ, H/H) < (B2NQ/B2R,H/ L) Q < (83-78P) / (0.2-0.2P)
(B2R, H / L) < (B2NQ/B2R, H / L) Q > (58.7P-5) / (0.04P)
(B2NQ, H / H) < (B2R, H / H) Q < (102.2-43.5P) / (0.24-0.2P)
(B2R, H / H) < (B2NQ/B2R, H/ L) Q < (19.2+34.5P) / (0.04)
(B2R, H / H) < (B,R, H / H) Q < (51.34-17.74P) / (0.045-0.0375P)
(B,R, H/ H) < (B2Q L/L) Q < (27.46+47.24P) / (0.015-0.0125P)
(B2R, H / H) < (B2R/B2Q, H / L) Q<(83.8-78.8P)/ (0.06(1-P))
(B,R, H / H) < (B2R/B2Q, H / L) Q >< (32.46-61.06P) / (0.015-0.0225P)
(B2Q, L / L) < (B2R/B2Q, H / L) Q> (-5+108.3P)/(0.01P)
(B,R, H / H) < (B,R/B2Q, H / L) Q < (32.46-27.46P) / (0.015(1- P))
(B2Q, L / L) < (B,R/B2Q, H / L) Q > (-5+74.7P) / (0.0025 P)
table 5.7 action comparisons for the cooperative game
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figure 5.2 optimal actions for the cooperative game
For very low Q, B2NQ is optimal. If Q < 203 then (B2NQ, L/L) is optimal, whilst if
Q is between 203 and 288 (B2NQ, H/L) is optimal. For very high values of Q the
boundary between (B2Q, L/L) and (B,R/Q H/L) curves across until for all sufficiently
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large Q (around 28,000) B2Q L/L is optimal for all P. For a specific starting
probability P = 0.9 the optimal strategies are the following:
B2NQ, L / L
B2NQ, H / L
B2NQ, H / H
if Q e (203, 288)
if Q e (288, 640)
if Q e (640, 1256)
if Q e (1256,2147)
if Q e (2147, 4285)
if Q e (4285, 5164)
if Q e (5164, 27658)
if Q > 27658
if Q < 203
A,(B2NQ/B2R), H / L





There are no optimal mixed strategies in the cooperative case. The costs must be
extremely high before (B2Q, L/L) becomes the solution (Q > 27658). In the non-
cooperative case this equilibrium can occur if CNQ(E) > 647. There are also a wide
range of costs with the solution (A!(B,R/B2Q), H / L) in which the auditor (against
type 1) and a type 1 auditee work hard and a type 2 auditee signals his type by
playing Low. This can be regarded as the best outcome for the shareholders as "work
hard" strategies will occur with probability P = 0.9. These payoff regions suggest that
the policy of raising costs to encourage hard work is much more effective in a
cooperative setting. There are also costs for which the equilibrium is the same in both
the cooperative and non-cooperative cases. For example the solution (A,(B2R/B2Q),
H/L) occurs in both cases if the following three conditions are met:
2147< Cnq(E) + Dnq(E) < 4285 CNQ(E) > 898 DNQ(E) > 599
5.5 Limiting Auditor Liability
In the previous chapter, the impact of increasing the cost of not qualifying a material
error on the equilibrium pairs of the model was considered. The level of this cost is
driven by the courts; either directly as the result of legal action by the shareholders or
indirectly through out of court settlements. A policy of joint and several liability has
in many cases resulted in very high penalties for the auditor and relatively low
penalties for the auditee. The example analysed suggests that setting these costs in
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this way may reduce the effectiveness of the audit since the auditor will be willing to
qualify whenever possible. A change in policy in the US to proportionate liability,
discussed in section 1.6, would suggest a move towards more balanced penalties for
the auditor and auditee. In this section the likely consequences of such a shift in
policy are explored.
To date the model of error detection has not considered as a constraint any
interdependence between the penalties imposed upon the auditor and the auditee. A
policy of proportionate liability will allocate responsibility for a proportion p of the
losses to the auditor. If the total penalty is Q this gives CNQ(E) = pQ and DNQ(E) =
(l-p)Q . The sets of equilibrium pairs for this game will be the same as in figure 5.1
above. Elowever, the boundaries of the regions will now be determined by P and Q.
For example for (B2NQ, L / L) to be in equilibrium we had the following conditions:
Cnq(E) < 109 and DNQ(E) < 193
These can be rearranged to give:
p < 109/Q and P > 1-193/Q these conditions intersect when Q = 302
Similar conditions can be derived for the other equilibrium regions of figure 5.1.
Each boundary is a condition on either CNQ(E) or DNQ(E). Every boundary condition
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figure 5.3 equilibrium pairs for low Q
In figure 5.4 the equilibrium pairs (B2NQ H/H), 1, (B2NQ H/H), (B2R H/H) still


















figure 5.4 equilibrium pairs for high Q
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The numbered regions in figures 5.3and 5.4 are regions where there is a choice of
equilibrium.
1) (B2NQ, H / H) or (A,(B2NQ/B2R), H / L)
3) (B2NQ, H / H) or (A, (B2NQ/B2Q), H / L)
5) (B2R, H / H) or (A,(B2NQ/B2Q), H / L)
7) (A, (B2R/B2Q), H / L) or (B,R, H / H)
2) (A, (B2NQ/B2R), H / L)
4) RND[B2R / A,(B2NQ/B2Q), H / H, H / L]
6) (B2Q, L/L) or (B2R, H/H)
8) (A, (B2R/B2Q), H / L) or (B2Q, L / L)
As we would expect from the analysis in the previous chapter, the two extremes do
not motivate both players. For example if (3 = 1 (the auditor is solely responsible)
then the auditee never uses high effort and the auditor acts to minimise his risk of
incurring the NQ(E) penalty (this involves always qualifying for Q > 647).This
reduces the usefulness of the audit. A qualified opinion from an auditor who will
always qualify his opinion effectively tells the shareholders nothing about the state of
the accounts. If P = 0 (the auditee is solely responsible) then the auditor never tests
and never qualifies and the auditee always uses high effort to reduce the occurrence
of errors. In this situation the auditor contributes nothing to the prevention and
detection of errors. For p > 0.91 the auditor never uses the A, test. Here any
considerations about auditee type are overwhelmed by the threat of NQ(E) and the
auditor will concentrate on minimising this risk.
The only mixed strategy equilibrium (region 4) occurs for p e (0.53, 0.63)
(see figure 5.3). This shows that even if the cost of not qualifying an error is shared
equally amongst the two players then their interests can still be at odds. A region of
particular interest is the "no work" equilibrium of (A2B2Q, L / L). This has been
shown to occur for all sufficiently large CNQ(E) in the previous chapter. If liability is
shared in this way the occurrence of the "no work" equilibrium depends upon both
the size of the penalty Q and the proportion p. It can be seen from figure 5.4 that if p
= 0.5 (so both players share the penalty equally) this "no work" equilibrium occurs
for very high penalties (Q > 10 000) whereas if the auditor is solely responsible this
equilibrium occurs for low penalties (Q > 647). This suggests that both high penalties
and a high p give the auditor the incentive to always qualify.
Even with an even division of the liability, P = 0.5, the equilibrium set in this
setting differs from the solution set of the cooperative game. In particular, in the
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cooperative game the auditor resorts to the "no work" equilibrium when the
combined costs Q are above 28000. This illustrates that in the setting of
proportionate liability the players are motivated by self interest, whereas in a
cooperative setting they are concerned with the welfare of the group. As Q increases,
the auditor can limit his expected costs by choosing to always qualify, at the expense
of the auditee. If both players are cooperating they are willing to work hard to reduce
the occurrence of errors for a much wider range of penalties.
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6 A SIGNALLING GAME COMBINING FRAUD AND ERROR
DETECTION
6.1 Introduction
Some of the more recent models of the auditing process focus upon the strategic
interaction between an auditor and a potentially fraudulent manager. There are two
important factors that need to be included in this strategic interaction. Firstly, fraud
and its detection do not occur in isolation. The auditor is also concerned with the
detection of unintentional errors and both parties payoffs will be influenced by
whether an error has occurred or not. Secondly, the auditee's willingness to commit
fraud will differ between companies and will not be known to the auditor. A model
of incomplete information is therefore developed in which the auditor must divide his
resources between error detection and fraud detection.
This chapter develops a signalling game model of the audit where the auditee
can be one of two "types" determined by his difficulty in committing a fraudulent
act. The auditee then has a choice over the level of effort to put into maintaining the
internal control system and whether or not to commit a fraudulent act. The auditor
chooses the level of substantive testing and subsequent in depth testing to carry out
before issuing an audit report. It is shown that no equilibrium exist where the
manager always reveals his type to the auditor. The equilibrium set is shown to be
dependent on the probability that the manager is the type who finds it easier to
commit fraud.
The equilibrium behaviour of the model can be used to assess the
components of the Audit risk model. This assessment of Audit Risk will depend
upon the modelling assumptions. In particular the components of inherent risk and
control risk will depend critically on the assumptions made about the nature of the
fraudulent activity. Shibano [34] assumes that a dishonest employee cannot act
outside the internal control system (as otherwise the control risk must be assessed as
1). Patterson [33] considers the alternative case where the auditee can override the
controls. These two approaches can be considered to deal with two potential sources
of fraud; management and employee. This ability to override the system permits
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serious fraud to go undetected and will therefore be of most concern to the
shareholders. Attention here will be focused on the strategic interaction between an
auditor and a manager with the potential to commit fraud that will go undetected by
the internal controls.
This model considers the players' interaction in a setting where the
occurrence of both random and intentional errors affect their outcomes. The term
fraud is used in this model to describe the intentional introduction of an irregularity
which will be of benefit to the auditee if undetected. The model developed requires
only that this action introduces irregularities into the accounting system that can be
detected by the auditor and that discovery of such an action will be to the detriment
of the auditee. These requirements are sufficiently broad that the "fraud" action can
be considered as either an intentional misstatement or a misappropriation of assets.
The auditee must decide how much effort to put into the control system and whether
to commit fraud. These two objectives can be at odds since a good internal control
system will reduce the risk of errors going undetected but will make it more difficult
to conceal irregularities. The auditor must divide his resources between substantive
testing and in-depth investigation of suspect accounts.
The next section outlines the actions available to each player in more detail
and considers the likelihood of each potential outcome. Section 3 then analyses this
model using a game theory to find the equilibrium behaviour. Section 4 categorises
the equilibrium set by considering the costs of the players' actions to be variables.
Section 5 considers a numerical example to illustrate the results of the previous
sections. The effects of varying the costs of actions on the equilibrium behaviour of
the example are considered. Whilst lowering the cost of the in-depth testing will
reduce the equilibrium fraud rate, a decrease in the cost of substantive testing may
have the opposite effect. The components of audit risk are assessed and it is shown
that measures to reduce the risk of errors going undetected may increase the risk of
fraud going undetected.
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6.2 A Model of the Audit with the Potential for Fraud
This model considers the interaction between two parties in an audit; the auditor and
the manager of a company who has the potential to commit fraud. In a model of fraud
detection the players' interests are clearly at odds. If fraud occurs then the auditor
would prefer this to be found whereas the auditee would prefer it to go unnoticed. It
is recognised that auditor tests that are designed to detect errors may be of little use
in detecting fraud whereas in depth investigations of suspect accounts are a very
costly means of searching for unintentional errors. The auditor therefore has to strike
a balance between error detection and fraud detection. To incorporate this into a
model we must consider both the occurrence of errors and the potential for fraud.
There will be some effort involved on the behalf of the auditee in concealing
fraudulent activity. The amount of effort required will depend on the difficulty in
over-riding the internal control system. The auditee can be classified into two types
by his difficulty in concealing this fraudulent activity. It is assumed that the two
types have the same internal control system (and thus the same chance of errors
occurring). Thus the extra difficulty experienced by, say, the type 1 auditee in
concealing fraud will be undetectable to the auditor; it represents either a "conscience
cost" or an "inexperience cost".
Inherent Risk in a fraudulent setting will be a function of the auditee's
willingness to commit fraud. This term can be assessed by considering the
probability that the auditee commits fraud in a mixed strategy equilibrium. The
auditee's tendency to commit fraud will differ between companies and will be
unobservable to the auditor. This uncertainty about the auditee's motivations will
also influence the auditor's testing strategy and the assessment of inherent risk. This
uncertainty is modelled here by considering the audit to be a game of incomplete
information.
There are five actions during the game. The auditee has two action choices to
consider. Firstly, a choice of effort level to put into maintaining the internal control
system {H or L}. Secondly, he must decide whether or not to commit fraud (F or
NF}. With two auditee types this gives 16 pure strategies. The effort level put in to
maintaining the internal control system will affect the cost of concealing fraud. It will
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also be observed by the auditor and will be regarded as a potential signal of type.
Thus it may be optimal to send a high effort signal when committing fraud, even
though this will require more effort to conceal, as the effort level may convince the
auditor of the auditee's honesty. In many cases fraud will only occur as part of a
mixed strategy. The fraud decision can best be described by the associated
probability of type i committing fraud fiH after effort level H. The auditee strategies
are contingent upon type and so will be expressed in the form (type 1 strategy / type
2 strategy). For example: H
The auditor has three action choices that occur in sequence. It is assumed that
the auditor can costlessly observe the auditee's effort level and so these actions can
be conditional on the observed effort level. Alternatively there may be a cost
associated with this observation, but the observation forms a mandatory part of the
audit. In which case, since the auditor will always incur this cost, it can be ignored.
The auditor's first decision involves the amount of broad substantive testing to use.
This can be represented by a choice of tests {B, or B2}, where B, is more effective
but also more time-consuming. These tests can detect irregularities (as a result of
fraud) with a reduced effectiveness
Secondly the auditor must decide whether to carry out an in depth
investigation for fraud {D,} or not {D2} based on the results of the B-test. We will
assume that the B-test cannot distinguish between fraud and an error. The D-test on
the other hand is only effective if it has some irregularity to focus upon so it is
assumed that the auditor only has the D-test option if the B-test has reported an error.
Thus the B-test can be regarded as "detection" whilst the D-test classifies into
random errors, fraud and false-positives.
Finally the auditor issues an audit report. This report can be qualified in two
ways. As in models of error detection such as Fellingham and Newman [16], the
auditor may qualify his report due to the existence of large unintentional errors {Q2}.
In this setting the auditor may also make the more serious accusation that he has
found evidence of fraudulent activity {Q,}. It is assumed that the auditor will make
this decision on the evidence available to him. In particular, the auditor is unable to
issue qualification Q, without evidence to support this claim. The qualification
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decision is therefore entirely determined by the evidence found by the tests. If neither
test finds any irregularity the audit report will not be qualified {NQ}.
With the qualification strategy determined from the results of the tests there
are four auditor tests contingent upon the effort level observed - giving 16 strategies
in all. The auditor's strategies can be expressed in the form (BaDb if H / BcDd if L).
None of these strategies are dominated in the general case as each strategy can be a
best response to some auditee fraud rate. There are also costs associated with effort
for each player. As each choice is between two levels of effort we can assume that
the lower level has a cost of zero. This gives the following:
Dh - the cost to the auditee of putting high effort into the internal control system
DiHF - the cost to auditee type i of concealing fraud
CB - the cost to the auditee of conducting test B,
CD - the cost to the auditor of conducting test D,
An ordering can be imposed upon the auditee's cost of committing fraud. This cost
will be higher in an environment with good internal controls so DiHF > D|lf-
emphasise the difference between the two auditee types we will assume that D1LF >
D2HF. Finally, it seems reasonable to assume that the additional difficulty experienced
by a type 1 auditee will be exascerbated in a high effort internal control environment.
This can be modelled by assuming that (D1HF-D2HF) > (D1LF-D2LF). The other action
costs can be considered as variables. A costly action will only be used if its cost can
be offset against potential savings in the outcomes. For example, it costs the auditor
time and effort to conduct a higher level of extensive tests B^ However, this level of
testing increases the chance of errors being found and thus reduces the chance of the
costly outcome NQ(E) in favour ofQ(E).
There is a clear link between the cost of productive actions and the
differences between the costs of outcomes. Test B, can be made a more attractive
option either by increasing the difference between the costs of outcomes or by
decreasing the cost of the test. Treating these action costs as variables will allow us
to consider how the optimal actions in the model are influenced by these costs.
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With two stages of testing there will be an interplay between "detection" and
"classification". For example the B-test may issue a false-positive report that
subsequent in depth testing would reveal. Since the B-test is unable to distinguish
between fraud and error occurrence it will be considered to report on the existence of
some material irregularity "M". If this report is positive then the auditor has some
area to focus his in-depth testing on. The D-test will then either confirm or disagree
with the B-test report. Test D2 (no in depth testing) will agree with the results of the
B-test by default. It will be assumed that the D, test has no risk of a false negative
since if the B-test has correctly found an error then subsequent investigation will not
reverse this opinion. Furthermore, it will be assumed that the D, test will always
detect a false positive since a spurious error will not stand up to detailed
investigation. To model this interaction between the stages of testing define an
"agreement" probability <f>j(A, B) e [0, 1] where:
<)>j(A, B) = Prob (test Dj reports A given B-test report A and actual state B)
These probabilities only need to be considered if the B-test finds an irregularity. The
above assumptions mean that:
<|>2(M, NE) = 1 (j)2(M, E) = 1
MM, NE) = 0 MM, E) = 1
There are a number of other chance events during the course of the game. The chance
of unintentional errors being undetected by the internal control system will depend
upon the level of internal controls. The B-test has a risk of both a false positive (ta)
and a false negative (l-ra). The B-test can also collect evidence of fraudulent activity,
although this cannot be identified as such without the D-test. However since some
effort is taken to conceal this evidence the B-test will have a reduced chance (ra') of
such detection. It will be assumed that test B2 is at least as affected by this as test B,.
Finally, even if the B-test finds evidence of fraud a subsequent more detailed
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investigation may fail to determine that the irregularity is intentional (l-vb). Define
the following probabilities for the auditor test BaDb after effort level w:
pw = P( Error | Effort level w )
ta = P(M|NE,Ba)
ra = P(M|E,Ba)
ra' = P( M | F , Ba)
vb = P( MF | F found by B-test, Db)
Using this we can now develop expressions for the likelihood of each auditee
qualification opinion for each of the four possible error-states. It will be assumed that
the occurrence (and detection) of irregularities from fraud and errors are independent
events. In other words the existence of an irregularity as a result of fraud will have no
influence on existence of irregularities caused by errors. It is also assumed that, once
a level of substantive testing is chosen, it is carried out in it's entirety. If this were
not the case the auditor may stop after detecting an irregularity and incur only part of
the cost of testing. Furthermore in situations where irregularities from both fraud and
errors exist we would need to consider which irregularity is discovered first.
Qi Q2 NQ
NE 0 tA(M,NE) l-tA(M,NE))
E 0 U 00
F ra'Vb U'O-Vb) 00
E&F r>b E'O-Vb) + OOF, 0000
table 6.1 probability of each audit opinion 'or a given error state







Since Q, can only occur when evidence of fraud has been found there are 10
outcomes for each of the players. However, if both fraud and error occur then both
players are more concerned with fraud. The auditee either gains more if the fraud is
unnoticed or loses more if noticed. Each of the qualification opinions will cost the
auditor more (or as much) if fraud occurs. The simplifying assumption will therefore
be made that the outcomes for both fraud and error are the same as those for fraud.
This leaves seven outcomes for each player:
Q2(NE), NQ(NE), Q2(E), NQ(E), Q1(F), Q2(F), NQ(F)
An ordering over these outcomes can be imposed to reflect the players' preferences.
• The auditee can benefit by successfully committing fraud; Dnq(NE) > DNQ(F)
• Fraud is partially successful if it is misclassified; Dnq(NE) > DQ2(F) > DNQ(F)
• The auditee's reputation is damaged by a wrong qualification; DQ2(NE) > Dnq(NE)
• The damage to reputation of a correct qualification outweighs the potential
damages of an error; DQ2(E) > DNQ(E)
• Damages are such that the auditee would prefer no errors; DNQ(E) > DQ2(NE)
• The auditee's costs are highest if fraud is detected; DQI(F) > DQ2(E)
• The auditor's best outcome is no error and no qualification.
• Correctly qualifying may lose future custom from this client and this is more
likely if fraud has been discovered; CQI(F) > CQ2(E) > Cnq(NE)
• The auditors reputation is damaged by incorrect qualification; CQ2(NE) > CQ1(F)
• Failing to find an error costs more than incorrectly qualifying; CNQ(E) > CQ2(NE)
• Incorrectly identifying fraud is worse than failing to find errors; CQ2(F) > CNQ(E)
• Detecting fraud but misclassifying it as an error is better than failing to notice
anything; CNQ(F) > CQ2(F)
These imply the following orderings:
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Auditor:
CNQ(F) > CQ2(F) > Cnq(E) > CQ2(NE) > CQ1(F) > CQ2(E) > Cnq(NE)
Auditee:
DQ1(F) > DQ2(E) > Dnq(E) > DQ2(NE) > Dnq(NE) > DQ2(F) > Dnq(F)
We can now express the type i auditee's expected cost of effort level H and fraud rate
f1H against a test BaDb
D, (H fj„ I B,Db) = D„ + f,HDiFH+ pH(l-fH)(rID'«(E)+(l-rI)D«(E))
+ (l-p„Xl-^XtAfM | M, NE)DQ2(NE)+(l-tA(M I M, NE))Dn0(NE))
+ (r,'v„DQI(F) + f(r,'(l-vb)+r,(l-r,')p„)D®(F) + ii(l-r.')(l-pHrJDw(F) (6.2.1)
We can impose some further restrictions on the costs to make the model more
representative of the audit setting. Firstly, if the auditee's payoff against the D,-test is
decreasing in fiH then the auditee never worries about getting caught. Either the
penalty for getting caught is small or the chance of the auditor finding the fraud is
negligible. In either case there is no strategic interaction between the players.
Similarly, if the auditee's costs are increasing in f,H even when the auditor doesn't
use D, then fraud will never occur.
A change in the level of substantive testing can effect a non fraudulent auditee's
payoffs in two ways. B, has a higher chance of successfully finding error (which will
increase the auditee's costs) and a lower chance of a false positive. Condition R3
ensures that the potential loss of reputation resulting from an incorrect qualification
(and the chance of a false positive from the B-test) are such that the risk of a false
positive is of the most concern to a non-fraudulent auditee. We would expect that
there would be a substantial penalty to the auditee if fraud is noticed. Condition R4





ensures that there is a difference in the auditee's payoff between unsuccessful and
partially successful fraud.
R3 Dq(NE) > Dnq(NE) + pw (rj -r2)(DQ(E)-DNQ(E))/(1 -pw)(t2-t,)
R4 Dqi(F) > DQ2(F) + ((1 -r2')( 1 -pwr2)-( 1 -r,')(1 -pwr,))(DQ2(F)-DNQ(F))/v,r2'
The auditor benefits from the D,-test in two ways; through the ability to classify an
irregularity as fraud and to re-classify false positive reports from the B-test. These
two benefits are at odds; if the chance of fraud occurring increases then the chance of
issuing a false positive decreases. If the ability to re-classify false positives is the
more useful to the auditor we will have a model where test D, is used when there is
no fraud. As the fraud rate increases the auditor will stop using the depth test.
Condition R5 ensures that fraud detection is the primary motivation behind using the
D-test.
R5 CQ2(F) > CQ1(F)+( 1 -pw)ta(ra'+( 1 -ra')pw ra)(CNQ(E)-CNQ(NE))
The timing of events in the model is illustrated by figure 6.1. The numbered nodes
represent the following actions: (1) a casting move determines whether the auditee is
type 1 (high conscience cost) or type 2. (2) the auditee (who knows his type) chooses
an effort level w e {H, L} to put into maintaining the internal controls. (3) the
auditee can act fraudulently {F} or honestly {NF}. (4) there is a chance that random
errors go unnoticed by the internal controls. (5) the auditor observes the auditee's
effort level w. He does not know the auditee's fraud rate or if there are random errors
present (the auditor does not know at which of the four points marked "5" he is at).
He chooses a level of substantive testing {B,, B2}which will report "M" if some
irregularity is detected. (6) the auditor can investigate matters further {D,} or base
his opinion on the results of the B-test. (7) if there are no intentional errors D, will
confirm an accurate finding of the B-test (7a) or highlight a false positive (7b). If
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fraud has occurred (and is detected by the B-test), D, may gather enough evidence to
















We can express the auditor's expected cost of test BaDb against auditee type i and
effort level H. The expected D-test cost to the auditor will depend on the results of
the B-test since the cost CD will be incurred only if the B-test finds a material
irregularity. The probability Ma that the B-test reports a material irregularity can be
derived from table 6.1.
Ma = pw ra( 1 -fiw ra') + f!w ra* + (1 -pw)( 1 -fiw )ta (6.2.2)
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The auditor's expected cost becomes:
C (BaDb, f; | H ) = CBa + MaCD+ pH(l-fi)(raCQ2(E)+(l-ra)CNQ(E))
+ (1 -pH)( 1 -f|)(ta<t)b(M | M, NE)CQ2(NE)+( 1 -ta<j)b(M | M, NE))Cnq(NE))
+ fira'vbCQ1(F) + fi(ra'( 1 -vb)+ra( 1 -ra')pH)CQ2(F) + f;(l-ra')(l-pHra)CNQ(F)
(6.2.3)
The auditor can compare these expected costs to find the optimal test. The auditor
will also need to consider what actions the auditee may have taken. Define the
following probabilities to express the auditor's beliefs about the auditee's actions;
P = Prob(type 1) S| = Prob(H | type 1) S2 = Prob(H | type 2)
Fiw = Prob(Fraud | effort level w, type i)
These are ex-ante beliefs that may change during the course of the game. In this
model the auditor always observes the auditee's effort level. He will adjust his beliefs
about the type of auditee he is facing after this observation. After observing the effort
level, the auditor's concern will be his uncertainty about the fraud rate. His costs can
therefore be described in terms of his expectation of the fraud rate F . If the auditor
updates his beliefs using Bayes' rule then this expected fraud rate is given by:
Eh - Eh + (f,h-f2H)(PS, / (PS,+(1-P)S2) (6.2.4)
El = f2L + (f1L-f2L)(P(l-S,) / (P(l-S,)+(1-P)(l-S2)) (6.2.5)
6.3 A Game Theoretic Analysis
The model described in the previous section is a sequential two-player non-zerosum
non-cooperative game. The auditor's information is both incomplete (he does not
know the auditee's motivations) and imperfect (events occur during the game that are
unobserved). The auditee's information is complete but imperfect giving a signalling
game. In this model the auditee is classified into two types, where type 1 finds it
harder to conceal fraud. The auditor's uncertainty about the auditee's cost of
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concealing fraud is then equivalent to an uncertainty about the type of auditee he is
facing. The auditor observes one of the auditee's actions and can try to infer the
auditee's type from this.
Since the auditor always observes the auditee's action the mixed strategies in
this model are Myersons [28] "behavioural strategies". The solution concept used is
Perfect-Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBE). A PBE of a signalling game is defined by
Fudenberg and Tirole [19] as a strategy profile (s,*, s2*) and posterior beliefs P( • |
a,) such that:
V t,, s,*( • | tj) e ARGMAX sl e S1 u,(s„ s2*, t;)
V a,, s2*( • | a,) 6 ARGMAX s2 s S2 Zti P(t; | a,)u2(a„ s2, t()
P(t{ I a,) = P(ti)Sl(a, | tj) / Z t'eT P(t')si*(a, I f) if It>eTP(f)Sl*(a, | f) > 0
and P(tj | a,) is any probability distribution if£ t' sT P(t')Si*(aI 11') = 0
Consider first the auditee's optimal strategies. Each type has two decisions to
make; whether or not to put a high level of effort into maintaining the internal
controls and whether or not to commit fraud. As mentioned above, the conflicting
interests of the players will often lead to a randomisation between fraud and no fraud.
This fraud rate will depend upon the effort level chosen. The auditor may have
different optimal responses if H is observed rather than L, with a correspondingly
different optimal fraud rate for the auditee. For a given effort level the auditee can
choose fiH to minimise his costs (this will involve considering the auditor's optimal
responses as fiH varies). The auditee can then compare the costs (using the optimal
fraud rates) of high or low effort.
The auditor's costs can be considered as functions of CB , CD and F. For a
particular F the CBxCD plane will be divided into four regions of optimal test; B,D, if
both CB and CD are small, B,D2 if CB is small and CD is large, B2Dj if CB is large and
CD is small and B2D2 if both costs are large. The boundaries of these regions can be
found by comparing testing strategies pairwise to derive inequalities on CB and CD .
These inequalities will also depend on the value of F. We can consider the behaviour
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of these inequalities (the boundaries) as F varies. This will enable us to partition the
plane into regions of optimal test sets where each test that occurs in the set is an
optimal action for some values of F . These boundaries are determined by comparing
the auditors costs for the two strategies. C(BaDb)<C(BcDd) when
C^Ba'Ced <(Mb"Ma)Co (6.3.1)
+(1 "E)(pH(rc"ra)(CQ(E)-CNQ(E))+( 1 -pH)(tc<t)d-ta(t>b)(CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE)))
+ F((rc'vd-raVb)(CQ1 (F)-CQ2(F))+(( 1 -rc')( 1 -pHrc)-( 1 <)( 1 -pHra))(CNQ(F)-CQ2(F)))
If Ba=Bc this condition can be rearranged to give
CD< F(ra'v,)(CQ2(F)-CQI(F)) + (l-pH)(l-F)ta(CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE)) (6.3.2)
(E(PH(ta-l"al"a')+ra,-ta}+ PeCVO + O
Condition (6.3.2) can be considered in three parts; the expected reduction in costs of
being able to correctly classify fraud with the D, test, the reduced risk of a false
positive when there are no errors, and the expected cost of using test D, Condition
(6.3.1) is more complex due to the interaction between the two stages of testing. For
example changing from B2 to B, will change the likelihood of the B-test reporting a
material irregularity and thus the likelihood of using the D-test. In a similar vein
changing from playing D2 to D, after a B-test report "M" will reduce the risk of a
false positive from the B-test whilst increasing the chance of detecting fraud. This
improvement may mean that it is no longer worthwhile using test B, and changing
from B, to B2 will change the likelihood of "M" occurring.
These optimal test sets can then be used to determine the auditee's optimal
fraud rate. For a fraud rate 6 (0,1) to be optimal it must make the auditor indifferent
between two of his actions. With at most four testing actions this means that the
auditee has at most five fraud rates to consider. With restriction R5 the auditor starts
using the D, test if the occurrence of fraud is above a certain level. The auditee's
optimal mixed strategy must occur when the auditor switches from a test which has a
decreasing auditee cost to one that is increasing. R1 and R2 therefore restrict the
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auditee's potential fraud rates to 0,1 or the critical point at which the auditor starts
using the D,-test. Consider 6.2.1, the cost Dj(.) to auditee type i of a test BaDb.
D, (H fj„ | B,D„) = D„ + fi„DlFH + pH(l-f;H)(r,DQ!(E)+(l-rJDNQ(E))
+ (l-p„)(l-?al(t,K(M | M, NE)DQ2(NE)+(l-t>b(M | M, NE))Dn°(NE))
+ fjra'vbDQI(F) + «r,,(l-vb)+r,(l-r;)pH)D®(F) + «l-r.')(l-pHr.)D»(F)
It can be seen from this expression that the most obvious measure to deter fraud -
namely increasing the penalty of getting caught, will not necessarily prevent fraud. If
the auditor uses test D2 in a pure strategy equilibrium then the "getting caught"
outcome Q,(F) occurs with zero probability. Thus, if there is some incentive to
commit fraud the auditee's best action if test D2 is used is to commit fraud with
certainty irrespective of the size of the penalty DQ'(F). If, on the other hand, there is a
mixed strategy equilibrium then there must always be a positive chance of fraud
occurring.
Lemma 6.1 d/df (xD,(Hf | BaDb ) + (l-x)D,(Hf |BcDd)) >
d/df (xD2(Hf | BaDb) + (l-x)D2(Hf | BcDd))
for any auditor tests (BaD}j, BcDd) and effort level H
Proof Consider d/dfDAM^Hf | BaDb) for some effort level H.
= D« - p„(raDQ2(E)+( 1 -ra)DN0(E)) - (I-pa)( lA,D"2(NE)+( 1 -tAP"°(NE)) +
ra,vbDQI(F) + (ra'(l -vb)+ra( 1 -ra')pH)DQ2(F)+ (l-0(l-pHr.)DN<)(F)
Where only the first term depends upon the auditee's type i. Since type 1
finds it more difficult to commit fraud we have DIHF > D2HF and D1LF > D2LF.
Hence
d/dfDAM,(Hf | BaDb) > d/df DAM2(Hf | BaDb) (1.1)
for any test BaDb. Thus the same inequality will hold for BcDd giving
d/dfDAM,(Hf | BcDd) > d/df DAM2(Hf | BcDd) (1.2)
Both inequalities are unchanged by the multiplication of a positive constant
so
x LHS(l.l) > x RHS (1.1) and (l-x)LHS(1.2) > (l-x)RHS(1.2) for x e [0,1]
=> x LHS(l.l) + (l-x)LHS(1.2) > x RHS (1.1) + (l-x)RHS(1.2)
i.e. (x5/5fDAM,(Hf | BaDb) + (1-x) 5/afDAM,(Hf |BcDd)) >
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(x3/3fDAM2(Hf | BaDb) + (l-x)3/3fDAM2(Hf | BcDd))
=> d/df (xDAM,(Hf | BaDb) + (l-x)DAM,(Hf |BcDd)) >
d/df (xDAM2(Hf | BaDb) + (l-x)DAM2(Hf | BcDd)) (1.3)
Lemma 6.1 considers how the auditee costs change as f] changes. This can be used to
consider mixed strategies. For an auditee mixed strategy to be optimal, the auditor
must be using a randomisation that makes the auditee indifferent between F and NF.
In other words the gradient of the auditee cost (with respect to f) must be zero. Since
lemma 6.1 shows that the gradient of type l's cost function is greater than the
gradient of type 2's cost only one type can be indifferent to any mixed auditor
strategy. This is used in section 6.4 to characterise the equilibrium set.
Consider the auditor's part of a mixed strategy. Lemma 6.1 shows that there
will be two potentially optimal auditor mixed strategies for each effort level. The
auditor will randomise between two strategies to make one auditee type indifferent.
One of these strategies must have an auditee cost that is decreasing in f, whilst the
other is increasing (if both are increasing, for example, then so is any positive linear
combination of the two). We can therefore classify a mixed strategy for the auditor in
terms of x, the probability that the auditor plays the test with a decreasing auditee
cost. There will therefore be 4 values of x depending upon the effort level w and the
auditee type i, xiw say. Suppose the auditor randomises between BaD2 (which is
decreasing in fi for the auditee) and BbD, (which is increasing). Then the
requirement of auditee indifference gives:
XjH = (DiHF + D,(Hf=l |BbD.) - Dj(Hf=0 |BbD,)) (6.3.3)
(Dj(Hf=0 |BaD2)- Dj(Hf=0 |BbD,)- DflP]BaD2j+ Di(Hf= 1 B..D,))
The denominator > 0 by R3 and R4. D1HF > D2HF => x1H > x2H and DILF > D2LF => x1L
> x2L Thus a lower occurrence of a deterrent (a test whose cost to the auditee is
increasing in Q will limit type 1 auditee fraud. This expression can also be used to
consider the impact of changing these costs DiHF on the equilibrium fraud rates.
Increasing DiHF will reduce the occurrence of deterrent testing strategies in
equilibrium. The equilibrium fraud rates are determined by both players costs. The
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set of potentially optimal fraud rates are determined solely by the auditor's costs.
However, the costs DjHF affect the gradient of the auditee cost functions. There will
be critical points for each DiHF where these cost gradients change from negative to
positive. For example if the cost of committing fraud is sufficiently high all auditor
strategies will have a cost to the auditee which is increasing in ff. In this case the
optimal fraud rate is fj=0. So although a change in DiHF can influence the choice of
optimal fraud rate it does not directly influence the rate itself.
6.4 Categorisation of the Equilibrium Set
Equilibrium pairs in signalling games can be categorised by the senders behaviour. If
different types send different signals (effort level) the auditor can infer which type he
is facing. Such equilibria are therefore referred to as separating equilibria. If both
types send the same signal, a pooling equilibrium, the auditor can infer nothing.
There are also hybrid equilibria where the sender randomises between signals. If only
one sender type randomises then the equilibrium will be referred to as partially
hybrid. There can be several types of equilibrium as CD increases. Firstly, for all
sufficiently small (or large) CD the auditor will have a single optimal test regardless
of either the fraud rate or effort level. If this is the case after both high and low effort
there will only be pooling equilibria. If the auditor has a mixed test after some effort
level then partially hybrid equilibria can exist.
The auditor's part of a mixed strategy equilibrium must make the auditee
indifferent between H and L effort whilst limiting the occurrence of fraud. This will
involve a randomisation xH* (or xL*). If xH* > xIH then both types will play fraud
with certainty after H (which is not in equilibrium). Similarly if xH*< x2H then neither
type will play fraud after H, in which case a high level of depth testing is not optimal.
These observations mean that
X1H ^ XH* ^ X2H and X1L ^ XL* ^ X2L
This in turn means that the auditees will tend to have pure fraud actions if they have
mixed signalling actions, For example if S, and S2 are such that the auditor plays xH*
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after observing H then the above inequalities and lemma 6.1 show that type l's costs
are increasing in f (an optimal rate of 0) whilst type 2's are decreasing (an optimal
rate of 1). However, if the auditor has a mixed response after either effort level in a
partially hybrid equilibrium then the randomising auditee must have a mixed fraud
rate after one effort level.
Pooling equilibrium
If neither auditee type commits fraud then their costs are identical and thus only
pooling equilibria can occur. There are two classes of pooling equilibria involving
mixed fraud strategies. The auditor randomises to minimise either type l's or type
2's fraud rate. Suppose the optimal fraud rate after some effort level H is FH*. Then
the auditees' optimal fraud rates can be found using equations 6.2.4 or 6.2.5. In a
pooling equilibrium these expressions simplify to:
Eh = Eh + (fih-EH)P or El ~ El + (El'El)P
The auditor has two mixed strategy rates in a pooling equilibrium. x2H will deter type
1 fraud and make type 2 indifferent. x1H will limit type 1 fraud but encourage type 2.
For a mixed strategy to be in equilibrium the auditor's expected fraud rate must be
Fh*. There are two cases to consider:
If the auditor randomises to limit type 2 fraud after observing some effort level H
then
f,H=0 and f2H = FH* / (1-P) (6.4.1)
If the auditor randomises to limit type 1 fraud after observing some effort level H
then
Eh=(Fh*-(1-P))/P and f2H = 1 (6.4.2)
We can also determine which class of mixed pooling equilibrium will occur.
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Lemma 6. 2 In apooling equilibrium there are two types of mixed strategy;
(a) ifFfj* <(1-P) the auditor randomises to minimise type 2's fraud
rate and type I never commits fraud.
(b) ifFh* > (FP) the auditor randomises to minimise type 1 's fraud
rate and type 2 always commits fraud
Proof Lemma 6.1 shows that the gradient with respect to f of type 1 's payoff for any
auditor randomised test (BaDb,BcDd) and effort level H is greater than the
gradient for type 2. Since auditee indifference to F requires a gradient of zero
a particular randomisation x can only make one type indifferent. This gives
two cases
(a) The auditor randomisation makes type 2 indifferent
=> RHS of (1.3) = 0 =>LHS of (1.3) > 0. so type l's cost function is
increasing in f for this randomisation and thus type 1 can minimise his costs
by choosing f]H = 0
(b) The auditor randomisation makes type 1 indifferent
=> LHS of (1.3) = 0 => RHS of (1.3) < 0. So type 2's cost function is
decreasing in f for this randomisation and thus type 2 can minimise his costs
by choosing f2H = 1
IfFH* < (1-P)
Auditor uses x,H Then type 2 can minimise his costs with f2H = 1
Thus F = f2H + (f,H-f2H)P ^ (1-P) > Fh* This is not in equilibrium
Auditor uses x-,H Then type 1 can minimise his costs with f1H = 0
This gives F = f2H(l-P). Type 2 can minimise his costs by choosing f2H so that
F = Fh*. Hence f2H = FH*/(1-P) < 1 since FH* < (1-P). This is in equilibrium
If Fh* > (1-P)
Auditor uses x,H Then type 2 can minimise his costs with f2H = 1
If type 1 plays NF this gives F = (1-P) < FH* so > 0 for equilibrium
Since type 1 is indifferent between F and NF he can choose
P))/P
giving F = Fh*. This is in equilibrium
Auditor uses x-,u Then type 1 can minimise his costs with f,H = 0
This gives F = f2H(l-P). Now type 2 can minimise his costs by choosing f2H so
that F = Fh*. However f2H < 1 so F < (1-P) < FH*. This is not in equilibrium
Therefore if FH* <(1-P) the only equilibrium pooling strategy is for the
auditor to use x2H, in which case the auditee will behave as in (a). The auditor
uses x1H in equilibrium if FH* > (1-P) and the auditee will behave as in (b).
The auditee's willingness to put in the pooling equilibrium effort level will depend
on the auditor's testing action against the other effort level. In this model the auditor
always observes the effort level before testing, and his strategy must therefore
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specify an action in response to both effort levels. Thus although low effort is a zero
probability event in a pooling on H equilibrium (and vice-versa) the auditor's
strategy must specify how he would respond to such an event, and this will influence
the range of DH for which the equilibrium holds. The equilibrium concept does not
specify what the auditor may infer from observing a zero probability event - so the
auditor will have a number of feasible responses. It will be assumed that the auditor's
mixed strategy x in response to a zero probability event, by the argument above, will
lie between x, and x2. For each pooling equilibrium, a range of values for the zero
probability response x that support the equilibrium will be given.
Separating equilibrium
The auditee's decision on whether or not to play H will depend upon the cost of
doing so Dh. As Dh increases the auditee's optimal actions will change from H to L
effort. However, the choice of effort level will also determine the level of testing that
the auditor uses. If both types play H, for example, the auditor may test to deter fraud
by a type 2 auditee. However, if a type 2 auditee prefers to play low effort the
auditor will recognise H as a signal of type 1. In this case the auditor will randomise
to deter fraud by type 1.
The auditee's cost function can be rearranged to give inequalities on DH that
prompt changes of effort level. To consider these inequalities in more detail it is
convenient to refer to the auditee's cost against a randomised sampling scheme
without the cost DH. For example
D, (H, f, | BaDb ) = D„ + F,Dihf+ pH(l-Fj)(r,DQ!(E)+(l-r1)D'«3(E))
+ (l-p„)( 1 -Fi)(tADQ!(NE)+(l-t>b)D"Q(NE))
+ Fjra'vbDQl(F) + Fi(raXl-vb)+r,(l-r/)pH)D«(F) + Fi(l-ra')(l-pHra)DN<)(F)
Then piH(x) = xD(H,F, | BaD2 ) +(l-x)D(H,Fi | BCD, ) - D„
These costs can then be ordered by comparing the two types' payoffs in a mixed
strategy equilibrium. If the auditor uses xIL then type 1 is indifferent whilst type 2
plays f=l. If the auditor uses x2L then type 2 is indifferent and type 1 plays f=0 so in
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both cases we can consider f.H = 0 and ^2H 1. Consider two functions BaD2 and
BbD,. Then by payoff restrictions R3 and R4 Di(H,0 | BaD2 ) > D|(H,0 | BbDj ) and
D;(H,1 | BaD2 ) < Dj(H,l | BbD, )
p1H(x) = D,(H,0 | BbD, )+x (D,(H,0 | BaD2 )- D,(H,0 | BbD, ))
(D,(H,0 | BaD2 )- D,(H,0 | BbD, )) > 0 so p1H(x) is increasing in x (6.4.1)
p2H(x) = D2(H,1 | BbD, )+x (D2(H,1 | BaD2 )- D2(H,1 | BbD, ))
(D2(H,1 | BaD2 )- D2(H,1 | BbD, )) < 0 so p2H(x) is decreasing in x (6.4.2)
Now, both types payoffs are identical when the auditor randomises against type 2
since 2 is indifferent between F and NF while 1 plays NF
Pil(x2l) P2l(x2l) Pih(x2h) P2h(x2h)
x1h > x2h (6.4.1) => Pih(x1h) > Pih(x2h)
x1h x2h (6.4.2) => P2h(x1h) P2h(x2h)
The same argument holds for low effort level giving
Pih(xih) > Pih(x2h) = P2h(x2h) >P2h(xih) (6.4.3)
Pil(xil) > Pil(x2l) = P2l(x2l) >P2l(xil) (6.4.4)
These can be used to consider the occurrence of separating and pooling equilibrium.
Lemma 6.3 There are no pure strategy separating equilibrium
Proof The occurrence of separating equilibria can be considered in terms of the
auditee's cost of high effort DH . For example suppose the auditor randomises
against type 1 if both auditee's play H and against type 2 if both play L. For a
separating equilibrium where type 1 plays H and type 2 plays L we require:
dh Pil(x2l) " Pih(xih)
Dh > P2l(x2l) " P2h(xih)
There will be four such inequalities for each player. Let ay = PiL(xiL) - P1h(xjh)
with by defined similarly for player 2. These eight conditions on DH can then
be referred to as the following:
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(an) Pil(xil) " Pih(xih) Ohl) P2l(X1l) " P2h(xih)
(a2l) Pil(x2l) " Pih(X1h) oll) P2l(x2l) " P2h(x1h)
(ai2) Pil(x1l) " Pih(x2h) (^12) P2l(x1l) " P2h(x2h)
(a22) Pil(x2l) " Pih(x2h) (^22) P2l(x2l) " P2h(x2h)
These expressions can be partially ordered using (6.4.3) and (6.4.4) to give
an ^ { am a22} ^ a2i and b21 > { bu, b22} > b12 also a22 = b22
For a separating equilibrium to occur one type must prefer to play H whilst
the other plays L. This will occur for some range of DH in between pooling on
H and pooling on L. In a separating equilibrium the auditor will know the
auditee's type after observing the effort level and will randomise accordingly.
This will give the limits on the interval for which separating can occur. There
are two cases to consider:
H/L in which case we have (H / L x1H / x2L). However for this to be a pure
strategy equilibrium the following must also hold.
Type 1 must prefer D1H(x1H) to D1L(x2L) <=> DH < a21
Type 2 must prefer D2L(x2L) to D2H(x1H) <=> DH > b21
So (H/L, x1H/ x2L) is a pure equilibrium for b21 < DH < a21.
However b2I > b22 = a22 > a2I so there is no such interval.
L/H in which case we have (L / H x2H / x1L). However for this to be a pure
strategy equilibrium the following must also hold.
Type 1 must prefer D1L(x1L) to D1H(x2H) <=> DH > a12
Type 2 must prefer D2H(x2H) to D2L(x1L) <=> DH < b12
So (H/L, x,H/ x2L) is a pure equilibrium for a12 < DH < b12.
However a12 > a22 = b22 > b12 so there is no such interval.
The non-occurrence of pure strategy separating equilibrium pairs is a result of the
auditee's preferences. Each type prefers the auditor to test against the other type. The
"honest" auditee benefits if the auditor conducts extensive in-depth testing as this
reduces the risk of a false-positive result. On the other hand, the "fraudulent" auditee
type clearly benefits if the auditor tests only to detect errors as any fraud is therefore
unlikely to be found. These conflicting interests result in mimicking behaviour for
both types. In some circumstances type 1 mimics type 2 while in other situations type
2 can benefit by mimicking type 1.
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Partially hybrid equilibrium
These equilibria can occur if the auditor has a pure strategy response (and hence a
pure fraud action) for one effort level. For a mixed fraud equilibrium the auditor's
expected fraud rate F must make him indifferent between two of his strategies. Each
vertex of the auditor's payoff hull will have a fraud rate associated with it. The
auditee then chooses amongst the fraud rates to minimise his costs. Suppose the
expected fraud rate that minimises the auditee costs after effort level H is FH* and
after L is FL*. Then in a mixed strategy partially hybrid equilibrium the auditee types
must choose fraud rates f1H and signalling rates S, and S2 so that the auditor's
expected rate is FH*.
Lemma 6. 4 The only mixed strategypartially hybrid equilibrium is
(S,f1H=0,f1L=FH* / Hf2H=l, xH* / xIL ) and this occurs when Fqj* >
0-P)
Proof We have D1HF - D2HF > D1LF - D2LF . This can be used to compare the ay and by
defined in the proof of the lemma 6.3. Consider bn - an for some auditor
mixed strategies (W, X) / (Y, Z).
•hi " an ~~ P2l(xil) " P2h(xih) " Pil(xil) + Pih(xih)
Each of these costs can be considered at f=l since type 1 is indifferent
between f = 0 and f=l and type 2 plays f=l. Therefore:
t>ii" an ~~ D2lf+ x1lct(Y) + (l-x1L)a(Z) - D2HF- x1hg(W) - (l-x1H)o,(X)
- D1LF- x1lct(Y) - (l-x1L)c(Z) + DIHF+ x1Ha(W) + (l-x1H)a(X)
where
CT(W)= rwvwDQ1 (F)+(rw' (1 -vw)+rw( 1 -rw' )pe)DQ2(F)+( 1 -rw')( 1 -perw)DNQ(F)
—^ bu - a,, = D2LF - D2hf - D1LF + D1hf
D1hf-D2Hf " (D,lf - D2LF) > 0 by assumption
=> bn>au
In any hybrid equilibrium the auditor's randomisation xH after some effort
level H will lie between x1H and x2H. The auditee's decision of whether or not
to play H will be an inequality on DH similar to those developed above. These
conditions were referred to in the proof of lemma 6.3 as ay = p1L(xiL) - PiH(xjh)
for type 1 and by for type 2. This can be extended to consider any x by
defining a,* = p,L(xiL) - p,H(x*) for some x*. The inequalities (6.4.1) and
(6.4.2) show that p1H(x*) is increasing in x* and p2H(x*) is decreasing. Now
x1H> x* > x2H gives:
a,2 aj* ^ a^ a2-> ^ a2* — a->| ~ a*i — a^i ai2 ~ — ^22
b|2<b,*<bn b22<b2*<b21 bn^b*,^^, bl2<b*2<b22
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Since one type has a pure strategy effort level there are 4 potential partially
hybrid equilibria. If type 1 has a randomised effort level then type 2 plays
either H or L and vice versa.
1 Type 2 randomises and type 1 plays high auditor tests x* / x2L
type 2 indifferent if DH = b2* e (b22, b21)
type 1 plays high if DH < a2* e (a2,, a22)
b22 = a22 => there is no interval where both conditions hold.
2 Type 2 randomises and type 1 plays low auditor tests x2H / x*
type 2 indifferent if DH = b*2 e (b12, b22)
type 1 plays low if DH > a.2 e (a22, a12)
b22 = a22 => there is no interval where both conditions hold.
3 Type 1 randomises and type 2 plays low auditor tests x1H / x*
type 2 plays low if DH > b», e(bn,b21)
type 1 indifferent if DH = a*, e (a21, a,,)
bu > au => there is no interval where both conditions hold.
4 Type 1 randomises and type 2 plays high auditor tests x* / x1L
type 2 plays high if DH <b,» e (b12, b,,)
type 1 indifferent if DH = a,* e (an, a12)
bu > an => both conditions hold for some interval of DH
This corresponds to the equilibrium (S,f1H=0,fIL=FH* / Hf2H=l, xH* / x1L )
In a partially hybrid equilibrium type 1 chooses S, so that type 2 commiting fraud
with certainty leads to an expected fraud rate of FH*. If type 2 always plays H and
commits fraud then type 1 must choose S, so that
Fh* = f2H + (f.H-fmXPS, / (PS,+(1-P)S2) (from 6.2.4)
where f2H = 1, f|H= 0 an^ S2 = 1. This can be rearranged to give:
S, = (1-Fh*)(1-P)/PFh* (6.4.3)
If type 2 always plays L and commits fraud then type 1 must choose S, so that
Fl* = f2L + (f.AXPO-S,) / (P(l-S,)+(1-P)(l-S2)) (from 6.2.5)
where f2L = 1, f1L= 0 and S2 = 0. This can be rearranged to give:
S, = (FL*-(1-P))/PFl* (6.4.4)
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Hybrid equilibrium
In any hybrid equilibrium the optimal fraud rates will be fIH = f,L = 0 and f2H = f2L =
1. The conditions for auditor indifference involve choosing S,, S2 e (0,1) so that the
auditor's expected fraud rate after observing H is FH* and after L is FL*. These can be
used to derive expressions for S, and S2:
S, = (1-FH*)(FL*-(1-P)) S2 = Fh*(Fl*-(1-P)) (6.4.5)
P(FL*-FH*) ~~ (I-P)(FL*-FH*)
Lemma 6.5 A hybrid equilibrium can only exist ifFjq < (1-P) andFl > (1-P)
Proof (l-P)S2 / (PSj+(l-P)S2)= Fh* « S2 = (PFh*/(1-P)(1-Fh*))S, (5.1)
(1-P)(1-S2) / (P(l-S,)+(1-P)(l-S2))= Fl*
« (1-S2) = (PFl*/(1-P)(1-Fl*))(1-S,) (5.2)
These are of the form S2= g(FH*)S, and (l-S2) = g(F,*)(l-S,) where
g(x)=Px / (l-P)(l-x). So g(x) >\<=>x> (1-P).
If FH* > (1-P) and FL* > (1-P) then S2 > S, and (1-S2) > (1-S,) which is a
contradiction.
If Fh* < (1-P) and Fl* < (1-P) then S2 < S, and (1-S2) < (1-S,) which is a
contradiction.
(5.1) and (5.2) can be solved to find S, and S2:
S, = (1-Fh*)(Fl*-(1-P))/P(Fl*-Fh*)
S2 = Fh*(FL*-(1-P))/(1-P)(Fl*-Fh*)
If Fh > (1-P) and Fl < (1-P) then (FL*-FH*) < (FL*-(1-P)). S2 is given by;
S2 = FH*(FL*-(1-P))/(1-P)(FL*-FH*) = (Fh*/(1-P))x((Fl*-(1-P))/(Fl*-Fh*)) >1
a contradiction
If Fh < (1-P) and Fl > (1-P) then (FL*-FH*) > (FL*-(1-P)). S2 is given by;
S2 = (FH*/(l-P))x((FL*-(l-P))/(FL*-FH*)) which is > 0 and <1
FH<(1-P)^(1-FH)>P
Si = ((1-Fh*)/P)x((Fl*-(1-P))/(Fl*-Fh*)) which is > 0 and < l(since FL* < 1)
Classification Three kinds of mixed fraud rate equilibrium can occur as DH varies.
For sufficiently low DH both types will prefer to play H, giving a pooling
equilibrium. Similarly for all high DH both types will play L. For some intermediate
values of DH a mixed strategy separating equilibrium can also occur. In this case
either one or both auditee types may have mixed effort levels. Which type of
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randomising occurs is then determined by FH* and FL* (which in turn are influenced
by the costs CB and CD). This can be summarised as follows:
• The auditor has a single best response to both effort levels. In this case only pure
fraud choice pooling equilibria will occur.
• The auditor has a single best response to one effort level. In this case partially
hybrid equilibria can occur.
• The auditor's strategy involves randomisation for either effort level. The
occurrence of hybrid equilibria now depends on FH* and FL*:
if Fh* < (1-P) and FL* < (1-P) then only pooling equilibria exist,
if Fh* < (1-P) and FL* > (1-P) then hybrid equilibria can exist,
if Fh* > (1-P) then partially hybrid equilibria can occur in which type 1 never
commits fraud and randomises between H and L effort and type 2 always
commits fraud and always puts in effort level H.
6.5 A Numerical Example
The values below have been chosen to satisfy the payoff restrictions R1-R5 whilst
satisfying the orderings on the outcome costs. The difference in the occurrence of
error after high and low effort have been chosen so that there is a clear difference
between effort levels. Although these values give what is felt to be a representative
case, Fellingham and Newman [16] point out that an accurate estimation of these
costs would prove very difficult. This problem is alleviated to some extent by
considering the costs of actions to be variables - small changes in any of the outcome
costs would change the points at which the optimal behaviour changes without
altering the kinds of equilibrium behaviour that occur.
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PH = 0.05 PL = 0.35
DIFH=300 D1fl=150
D2FH=100 F*2FL=25
r, = 0.95 r,'=0.65
r2 = 0.8 r2' = 0.5


















The auditee's strategic decision invloves comparing the cost of high effort (and
optimal fraud rate FH*) with the cost of low effort (and FL*). Thus the first step is to
determine the optimal fraud rates for high and low effort. This can be found by
rearranging condition 6.3.1
C (BaDb | H Fh) = C (BcDd ] H FH) <=>
F = (Vta+Pw (rc"tc-ra+ta))CD-CBa+CBd+pH(rc-ra)(CQ(E)-CNQ(E))
+(1 "PH)(tc<t)d"ta(t>b)(CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE)) / (((1 -pH ra)ra'-( 1 -pH)ta-( 1 -pHrc)rc'+( 1 -pH)tc)CD
"F (rc'vd-ra'vb)(CQI(F)-CQ2(F))+(( 1 -rc')( 1 -pHrc)-( 1 -ra')( 1 -pHra))(CNQ(F)-CQ2(F))
"F PH(rc"rJ(Cq(E)-Cnq(E))+( 1 -pH)(tc<f>d-ta<j>b)(CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE))) (6.5.1)
This expression can be used to generate tables 6.2 and 6.3 below. Only comparisons
between a D, test and a D2 test are considered because the auditee wishes to minimise
his costs. Under the payoff restrictions R1-R5, this minimising point will either be
0,1 or the critical point at which the auditor starts using the D,-test.





(-21.375 + 0.2775Cd) / (122.625 - 0.2425CD)
(-23.175 + CB + 0.1425Cd) / (193.35 - 0.524125CD)
(-6.75 - CB +0.2775Cd) / (107.925 - 0.2425CD)
(-8.55 + 0.1425Cd) / (178.65 - 0.524125CD)
table 6.2 auditor's critical fraud rate after observing H





(-14.624 + 0.4425Cd) / (129.375 - 0.1975CD)
(-27.224 + CB + 0.3975Cd) / (185.25 - 0.368875CD)
(6.75 - CB +0.4425Cd) / (125.475 - 0.19275CD)
(-5.85 + 0.3975Cd)/(181.35 -0.368875Cd)
table 6.3 auditor's critical fraud rate after observing L
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The auditee's strategic decision is simplified in two extreme cases where the auditee
either always commits fraud or never commits fraud. For example if the auditee
never commits fraud against an auditor strategy BaDb / BcDd then he will put in high
effort if Dh < Dj(Lf=0 |BcDd)- D,(Hf=0 |BaDb)) = T(BaDb ,BcDd) say. By rearranging
expression 6.2.1 for the auditee's expected payoff. This gives:
r(B,D„ /B,Da) = (1 -pL)M>a-(l -p„)tA)DQ(NE) (6.5.2)
+ ((l-pL)(l-tc4.a)-(l-p„)(l-t,4,b))DN'3(NE))
+(PLrc"PHra)^Q(E) +
And similarly, if the auditee always commits fraud against an auditor strategy BaDb /
BcDd then he will put in high effort if DH < F;(BaDb ,BcDd) where
riF(BaDb /BcDd) = (DiFL-DiFH)+(rc'vd-ra'vb)DQ1(F) (6.5.3)
+((1<)( 1 -pLrc)-( 1 -ra')( 1 -pHra))DNQ(F)
+(rc'( 1 -vd)+rc( 1 -rc')pL-ra'( 1 -vb)-ra( 1 -ra')pH)DQ2(F)
Clearly the only difference between the cost to each auditee type when committing
fraud with certainty will be the first term of 6.5.3. For this example the conditions on
Dh given in table 6.4 are generated by expressions 6.5.2 and 6.5.3. T,F can be found
by subtracting 75 from T/
Play H if Dh < pNF r2F Play H if DH < pNF r2F
against against
(B2D2/B2D2) 50.55 -51 (B,D2/B2D2) 65.7 - 80.325
(B2D2 / B2D,) 32.675 399 (B,D2 / B2D,) 47.285 369.675
(B2D2/B,D2) 43.5 -25.725 (B,D2/B,D2) 58.65 - 55.05
(B2D2 / B,D, ) 36.35 559.275 (B,D2 / B,D, ) 51.5 529.95
(B2D,/B2D2) 76.675 - 501 (B,D, / B2D2) 76.15 - 665.325
(B2D, / B2D,) 58.8 - 51 (B,D,/B2D,) 58.275 -215.325
(B2D,/B,D2) 69.625 - 475.725 (B,D,/B,D2) 69.1 - 640.05
(B2D,/ B,D,) 62.475 109.275 (B,D,/ BjD,) 61.95 - 55.05
table 6.4 critical values for DH
In a mixed signalling equilibrium the auditee must be indifferent between FI and L
effort. The auditor chooses a mixed strategy to achieve this. The auditor mixed
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strategies therefore need to consider the difference in the auditee's costs between
high and low effort for a fraud rate of 0 or 1. The auditor's randomisation can
therefore best be described by considering the effort comparisons expressed in (6.5.2)
and (6.5.3). However we also need to consider the cost to the auditee (for a fraud rate
of 0 or 1) of different strategies after the same effort level. This can also been found
from (6.5.2) and (6.5.3) by the introduction of a dummy variable. To compare the
cost to the auditor of BaDb and BcDd after some effort level and a fraud rate of 0, for
example, consider the following for any test
t(badb / •)- t(bcdd/.) = dl(.)-dh(badb)-(dl(.)-dh(bcdd)) = dh(bcdd) - dh(badb)
r(. / badb)- t(. /bcdd) - Dl(baDb)-DH(.)-(Dl(bcDd)-DH(.)) = dl(badb) - dl(bcdd)
Thus any comparisons between the auditee's payoffs can be re-expressed in terms of
inequalities on DH given in table 6.4. If the auditor has a single best response to both
effort levels only pure fraud rate pooling equilibrium can occur. If there is no fraud
then the auditees motivations are identical, and their optimal behaviour as DH
increases is determined by TNF . If there is a pure fraud rate pooling equilibrium the
optimal behaviour will be determined by either r,F or r/. In a pooling equilibrium
with a mixed strategy fraud rate by type 2 both types play H against (W,X) / (Y,Z) if
DH+xHD(Hf=0|W)+(l-xH)D(Hf=0|X) < xLD(Lf=0|Y)+(l-xL)D(Lf=0|Z)
The costs can be considered at f = 0 since in equilibrium type 2 is indifferent between
F and NF whilst type 1 prefers NF. Since f = 0 both types costs are identical. This
condition can be rearranged to give DH <
DL(Lf=0|z)-DH(Hf=0|x)+xL(DL(Lf=0|y)-DL(Lf=0|z))-xH(DH(Hf=0|w)DH(HT=0|x))
dh < rNF(x / z)+xL(rNF(* / y)- rNF(* /z))+xH(rNF(w/.)- tnf(x /•)) (6.5.4)
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Similar expressions could be found for comparing payoffs when fraud occurs with
certainty after each effort level. However, for this example both types strictly prefer
low effort if they can always commit fraud. In a partially hybrid equilibrium the
bounds on DH can also be found by using (6.5.4). However in a mixed fraud rate
partially hybrid equilibrium (i.e. with a non zero fraud rate after both H and L) the
point at which both types prefer L must consider type 2's costs for always
committing fraud. The value of DH which prompts a change to L/L satisfies the
following two conditions:
Dh+ (1 -xH*)D1H(HfIH=0|X) + xH*(DIH(Hf1H=0|W) =
(1 -x!L)D,L(Lf,L=01Z)+x,L(D,L(Lf,L=0|Y)
D„ + (1 -x*H)D2H(Hf2H= 1 |X) + x*H(D2H(Hf2H=l |W) =
(1 ~x1L)D2L(Lf2L=l |Z)+x2L(D2L(Lf2l=T |Y)
These can be rearranged to give:
Dh = ((r(X/.)-T(W/.))(r2F(X/Z)+x1L(T2F(./Y)-r2F(./Z)))) (6.5.5)
-((T2F(X/*)r2f(W/*))(T(X/Z)+x, l(T(*/Y)-T(*/Z))))
(r(x/*)- r(w/*) - r2F(x/*)+r2F(w/*))
In a full hybrid equilibrium the conditions on DH can be found using (6.5.4) and
considering the limits of the auditor's optimal test. As discussed in section 6.4 in a
hybrid equilibrium the auditor's mixed strategy will be of the form xH* / xL* to make
both auditee types indifferent between high and low effort. Furthermore x1H > xH* >
x2H for each effort level H. Now xH* and xL* will vary as DH increases so that both
auditee types remain indifferent. Thus limits on DH can be found for which the
associated xH*, say, falls between x1H and x2H. Formally, the requirements for a fully
hybrid equilibrium become:
let D = (d e DH : xH* e [xIH , x2H ] n xL* e [x1L , x2L]}
then d < DH < d where d = MIN D and d = MAX D
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Auditor's optimal strategies
For a given effort level and rate of fraud occurrence the auditor will have 4 optimal
strategies as CB and CD vary. In other words the CBxCD plane can be divided into 4
regions of optimal test. The boundaries of these regions, which will vary as the rate
of fraud changes, can be generated from equations (6.3.1) and (6.3.2) above.
If Ba * Bc then C(BaDb) = C(BcDd) «
CBa-CBd = (Mb_Ma)CD+( 1 -FH)(pH(rc-rJ(Cq(E)-Cnq(E))
+(1 "PH)(tc(t)d"ta<))b)(CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE)))
+FH((rc'vd-ra'vb)(CQ1 (F)-CQ2(F))+(( 1 -rc')( 1 -pHrc)-( 1 -ra')( 1 -pHra))(CNQ(F)-CQ2(F)))
if Ba=Bc
CD = F(ra'v,)(CQ2(F)-CQ1(F)) + (l-pH)(l-F)ta(CQ(NE)-CNQ(NE))
(F(pH(ta-rara')+ra'-tj+ Pe(ra-ta) + tj
Auditor observes high effort level
b2d2 b2d, CD = (122.625F+21.375) / (0.2775 + 0.2425F) (1)
b2d2=b,d2 CB= 14.7F+ 14.625 (2)
B2d2=b,di CB = 193.35F+23.175-(0.1425+0.524 125F)Cd (3)
B2di=b1d2 CB = -107.925F-6.75+(0.2775+0.2425F)Cd (4)
b2d,=b,d, CB = 1.8+70.725F+(0.135-0.281625F)CD (5)
bid2=b,d, CD = (178.65F+8.55)/(0.1425+0.524125F) (6)
table 6.5 boundaries of the optimal test regions after H
These conditions can be used to consider the auditor's set of optimal tests as F
increases. We can determine the area of the CBxCD plane that is "swept" by each of
these boundaries as F increases. For example the point (CB = 40, CD = 100) falls into
the region where B2D2 is optimal if there is no fraud. As F increases condition (1)
moves past so that the point now falls into the region where B2D, is optimal. Finally,
condition (5) moves past so the point ends up in the region where B,D, is optimal.
Thus the auditor's optimal test set is {B2D2, B2D,, B,D,}.
To find the optimal test set for any point we also need to consider the
"corners" of the optimal test regions - where 2 of the boundaries intersect. The
decision to stop using test D, (conditions (1) and (6)) is strongly influenced by F. At
F = 0, the D-test ceases to be optimal at a lower level of CD if test B, is being used
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since B, has less risk of a false positive. At F = 1 the D-test ceases to be optimal at a
higher level of CD if B, is used since this test has a greater chance of picking up fraud
for the D-test to focus on. The behaviour of the intersections as F increases can be














Cb=1 4.625+14.7(-8.55+0. 1425Cd)/( 178.65-0.5241 25Cd)
(9)
(10)
table 6.6 points of boundary intersection after H
For this example the auditor's optimal test sets after observing H as F changes are
shown in figure 6.2
CD
figure 6.2 auditor's optimal test after observing H as F increases
A similar set of conditions will apply after the auditor observes low effort.
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CD = (129.375F+14.624) / (0.4425 + 0.1975F) (11)
CB = 3.9F +21.374 (12)
CB= 185.25F+27.224-(0.3975+0.368875F)Cd (13)
CB = -125.475F+6.75+(0.4425+0. 1975F)Cd (14)
CB = 12.6+55.875F+(0.045-0.171375F)Cd (15)
CD = (181.35F+5.85)/(0.3975+0.368875F) (16)
table 6.7 boundaries of the optimal test regions after L
















table 6.8 points of boundary intersection after L
CD
figure 6.3 auditor's optimal test after observing L as F increases
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These two sets of conditions can be combined to give optimal test sets after either
effort level. The auditee will choose the fraud rate that minimises his costs, which
will be one of the points where the auditor's test changes.
If the auditor has a mixed strategy to limit fraud in a pooling equilibrium he
must make one auditee type indifferent between F and NF. Suppose the auditor is
using (BaDb, BcDd) after observing some effort level H. Then to limit the occurrence
of fraud by auditee type i the should choose xiH so that:
X,„ =D„ + (- p„(r0D®(E)+(l-rc)DNQ(E)) - (l-p„)(tAD®<NE)+(l-tAD»(NE))
+ rc'vdDQI(F) + (rc'(l-vd)+rc(l-rc')pH)DQ2(F)+ (l-rc')(l-p„rc)DNQ(F))
(PH(Vrc)(DQ2(E)-Dw(E))+(l-pH)Mb-t>d)(D®(NE)-DN<!(NE))+(rc'vd-r;vb)D,JI(F)
+(rc,(l"Vd)+rc(l-rc,)pH-ra'(l-vb)-ra(l-ra,)pH)DQ2(F)
+((1<)( 1 -p„rc)-( l-ra'Xl-Pllra))D"rF) (6.5.6)
For this example this gives:
Strategies Pooling on H Pooling on L





















ta lie 6.9 auditor fraud limitation randomisation for pooling equilibria
The conditions (6.5.2) and (6.5.4) above can be used to develop an expression for xH*
so that a type 1 auditee is indifferent between high and low effort against some
auditor strategies (W,X) / (Y,Z) say. Similar expressions can be derived for type 2
indifference but the only mixed strategy hybrid equilibria involves type 1. If a type 2
auditee puts in high effort then:
XH* = (-Dh + x 1L(T(. / Y)-T(. / Z)) + r(X / Z)) / 0T(X / .)-r(W /.))
Or if a type 2 auditee puts in low effort then:
(6.5.7)
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xL* = (DH - r(x / z))+ (r(x / .)-r(w / .))xL) / (r(. / Y)-r(. / z)) (6.5.8)
In a hybrid equilibrium the auditor's randomisation is given by:
xH* = (DH-r/(x/z))(r(./Y)- r(./z»- (dh -r(x/z))( r/(./Y)-r2F(./z)) (6.5.9)
((r(x/.)-r(w/.))(r2F(./Y)-r2F(./z))-(r2F(x/.)-r2F(w/.))(r(./Y)-r(./z))
xL* = (r2F(x/z)-DH)(r(x/.)- r(w/*))-(r(x/z)-dh)( r2F(x/.)-r2F(w/.)) (6.5.10)
((r(./Y)-r(./z))(r2F(x/.)-r2F(w/.))-(r2"(./Y)-r2F(./z))(r(x/.)-r(w/.))
The equilibrium set
The type of equilibrium that occurs has been classified in terms of the optimal fraud
rates FH* and FL*. For a particular probability of type, P ~ 0.9 , the equilibrium set
can be seen more clearly:
figure 6.4 auditor's equilibrium strategy set for P=0.9
Each of these regions will have different equilibria as dh increases, changing the
auditee's optimal behaviour. However the auditor's optimal testing strategies for
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each region are given below. These strategies are optimal responses to the auditee
fraud rate. If the auditor has a sequence of strategies as F varies then, under payoff
restrictions R1 to R5, the auditor need only consider the two "critical point"
strategies where the optimal test changes from D2 to D,. The auditor's equilibrium
strategies are given below:
1) B,D, / B,D,
4) B,Di/(B1D2,B.D1)
7) B2D, / (B2D2, B2D,)
10) B2D] / (B,D2, B2D,)
13) (B,D2, B2D,)/(B,D2,B
15) (B2D2, B,D,) / (B,D2, B
17) (B2D2, B2D,)/(B2D2,B
19) (B,D2, BjD,) / (BJD2, B
21) (B2D2, B2D,)/(B,D2,B
23) (B2D2, B2D,) / (B2D2, B
25) {(B1D2,B1D,)or(B2D2,B
2) B2D, / B,D, 3) B2D,/B,D,
5) B2D, / (B,D2, B,D,) 6) B2D, / (B,D2, B2D,)
8) B,D, / (B,D2, B,D,) 9) B2D, / (B,D2, B2D,)
11) B2D, / (B2D2, B,D,) 12) B2D, / (B2D2, B2D,)
14) (B,D2, B,D,) / (BjD2, B,D,)
16) (B2D2, B2D,)/(B,D2, B,D,)
18) (B2D2, B2Dj) / (B2D2, B2D,)
20) (B2D2, B,D,) / (B,D2, B,D,)
22) (B2D2, B,D,) / (B2D2, B,D,)
24) (B2D2, B2D,)/(B2D2, B2D,)








Regions 25 and 26 each contain more than region, as the optimal response to high
effort varies. However, for this example, a strategy involving the D2 test after low
effort is always preferred to a randomised test after high effort. Thus, once D2
becomes a best response to low effort the auditor's testing after high effort becomes
irrelevant since both auditee types will always choose low effort. Figure 6.4 can be
divided into six areas representing different kinds of equilibrium set. An example of
each is given below:
Region 2 - Only pooling equilibria since the auditor always uses D,
a) Pooling on H if DH < 62.48 b) Pooling on L if DH > 62.48
b-id^bjd, b2d,/b,d,
S, = 1 f1H = 0 S, =0f1L = 0 "
S2 = l f2H = 0 S2 = 0f2L = 0
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Region 6 - Only pooling equilibria as type 1 mimics type 2
Fl* = (6.75-Cb+0.4425Cd) / (125.475 - 0.1975CD)
a) Pooling on H if DH < 59.41
B2D,/(B,D2, B2D,)
s, = 1 f,H = 0
S2=l f2H = 0
b) Pooling on L if DH > 59.41
B2D, / (B,D2, B2D,)
xL = 0.05602
S, = 0f1L = 0
S2 = o f2L = 10Fl*
Region 10 - D, optimal vs. H and FL* > (1-P). Partially Hybrid equilibria occur
Fl* = (6.75-Cb+0.4425Cd) / (125.475 - 0.1975CD)
Pooling on H if DH < 59.41
Auditor after H B2D, after L (B,D2 B2Dt)
xH = 0 xL e X
Type 1 s, = 1 f,H = 0
Type 2 S2= 1 f2H = 0




Partially Hybrid equilibrium if DH e (59.41, 62.51)
after H B2D, after L (B,D2 B2D,)
xL = (Dh-58.8)/1 0.825









Pooling on L if DH > 62.51




Region 16 - FH* < (1-P) FL* > (1-P) so hybrid equilibria occur
Fh* = (-21.375+0.2775Cd) / (122.625 - 0.2425CD)




Pooling on H if DH < 57.3






f = 1 OF *i2H lurH
X = (x2L, 0.40361 - 0.00171 Dh)
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Partially hybrid equilibrium if DH e (47.83, 51.95)
Auditor after H (B2D2 B2D,) after L (B,D2 B,D,)
xH = (36.36984-Dh)/26.125 xL = 0.516761
Type 1 S, = (0.1(1-Fh*))/0.9Fh* f1H = 0 f1L = FL«
Type 2 S2 = 1 f2H = 1
Hybrid equilibrium if DH e (51.95, 57.3)
Auditor after H (B2D2 B2D,) after L (B^ B,D,)
xH= 3.09385-0.04908Dh xl = 2.56668-0.03~946DH
Type 1 S, =(1-Fh*)(Fl*-0.1))/0.9(Fl*-Fh*) f1H = 0 f1L = 0
Type 2 S2 = FH*(FL*-(0.1))/0.1(FL*-FH*) f2H = l f2L = 1
Pooling on L if DH > 51.95
Auditor after H (B2D2 B2D,) after L (B,D2 B,D,)
xH e X xL = 0.516761
Type 1 S, = 0 f1L=(FL*-0.1)/0.9
Type 2 S2 = 0 f2L = 1
X = (MAX(x2h, 2.53282 - 0.03828DH), MIN(x1H, 0.42896 + 0.00222DH))
Region 19 - FH* > (1-P) FL* > (1-P) so partially hybrid equilibria occur
Fh* = (-8.55+0. 1425Cd) / (178.65 - 0.524125CD)




Pooling on H if DH < 56.91















Partially hybrid equilibrium if DH e (56.91, 58.22)
after H (B,D2 B,D,) after L (B,D2 B,D,)





f = F +rIL L
Pooling on L if DH > 58.22
Auditor after H (B,D2 B,D,) after L (BjD, B,D,)
xH e X xL = 0.516761
Type 1 S, = 0 f1L=(FL*-0.1)/0.9
Type 2 S2 = 0 f2L = 1
X- (MAX(x2H, 6.28180 - 0.09569DH), MIN(x1H, 0.61086 + 0.00171DH))
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Region 25 - Auditor never uses D, after observing Low effort - only pooling on L
Pooling on L V Dh
b,d2
51 — 0 f1L = 1
52 = 0f2L=l
Figure 6.4 can be divided into six areas, shown in figure 6.5, representing the
different kinds of equilibrium set. The full equilibrium set is detailed in appendix C.
In area I (regions 1-3), the auditor always uses test D, and hence no fraud occurs. The
equilibrium changes from pooling on L to pooling on H as DH increases. In area II
the auditor still uses D, after observing h, but a small rate of fraud does occur in a
low effort internal control environment. The type 1 auditee does not commit fraud
however, and thus benefits from a test involving D,. This means that again the
equilibrium changes from pooling on H to pooling on L as the type 1 auditee mimics
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In area III a higher level of fraud (involving both auditee types) occurs after low
effort, although there is still no fraud after high effort. For low DH, the advantages of
reducing random errors outweigh the benefits of a limited occurrence of fraud and
both types put in high effort (and never commit fraud). As DH increases the cost of
reducing errors increases to the point where both types abandon any attempts to
prevent errors and resort to a mixed strategy fraud equilibrium. In these areas there is
still no occurrence of fraud after high effort. The change to low effort and fraud
becomes increasingly attractive as DH increases. However, the type 2 auditee (who
finds it easier to commit fraud) will stop putting in high effort for a lower level of DH
than type 1. This leads to a partially separating equilibrium (with a pure test after
High effort) where type 2 commits fraud with certainty and puts in low effort. Type 1
never commits fraud and randomises between high effort (which identifies him as
"honest") and low effort (where he benefits from the D, test). The frequency with
which the auditor uses test D, after low effort decreases as DH increases until for all
sufficiently high DH, both types choose low effort (and some positive fraud rate) and
the auditor tests to limit fraud by type 1. In this situation the auditor reduces his use
of the depth test to encourage the "honest" type 1 auditee to work harder (high effort)
to prevent errors.
In area IV the auditor has a strategy that involves randomisation after
observing either effort level. The auditee correspondingly has a non-zero fraud rate
after either level, although the fraud rate is higher if low effort controls are in use.
With high effort controls type 2 has a mixed fraud strategy whilst type 1 never
commits fraud. If the auditee does not commit fraud then reducing the number of
random errors will avoid potentially costly outcomes for the auditee. For small DH
therefore both types put in high effort. As DH increases, the advantages of this error
reduction are outweighed by the cost of the effort involved (and the associated lower
fraud rates after high effort). Thus for all sufficiently high DH both auditee types will
put in low effort and the auditor will test to limit type 1 fraud whilst type 2 commits
fraud with certainty. A second equilibrium can occur when the merits of high effort
(low fraud rate) and low effort (high fraud rate) are comparable. In this case both
auditee types randomise between high and low effort whilst type 1 chooses no fraud
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and type 2 always commits fraud. The auditor randomises to prevent type 1 also
committing fraud and to limit the occurrence of low effort. The level of depth testing
after observing either effort level increases as DH increases until high effort is a more
expensive option for either type. This hybrid equilibrium has a level of auditor
uncertainty about auditee type that lies between pooling (where he learns nothing)
and separating (where he always learns the auditee's type).
In area V there are high rates of fraud after both high and low effort. For
sufficiently low DH both types put in high effort to reduce the occurrence of errors
whilst the auditor tests to limit type 1 fraud. As DH increases, type 1 prefers to play L
which in turn alters the auditor's testing after observing H. A partially separating
equilibrium occurs in which type 2 puts in high effort and commits fraud with
certainty whilst type 1 randomises between high effort (no fraud) and low effort
(some fraud). The auditor tests to prevent type 1 fraud after H, to limit type 1 fraud
after L, and to encourage type 1 to play low effort. In this situation the auditor is
willing to put up with a higher occurrence of random errors in order to identify the
auditee's type and limit fraud.
Finally, in area VI the cost of the D-test is quite high. After observing L there
is a fair chance that any irregularity detected will be an error, in which case any
further work (D,) is of no benefit to the auditor. After observing H however there is a
much better chance that a discovery by the B-test is a result of fraud, in which case
the cost of the D,-test is offset by the potential costs of failing to investigate fraud.
The auditor therefore only uses test D, after observing high effort. In this case both
auditee types will always put in low effort (and hence no D,-test) irrespective of DH
and will commit fraud with certainty. For even larger CD the auditor will not use test
D, after either effort level. In this situation there is still some incentive for the auditee
to use high effort and reduce errors as he would still prefer a completely unqualified
audit report. However, reducing error occurrence involves effort DH and also
increases the difficulty of concealing fraud. In this example the increased difficulty in
overriding a high effort internal control system outweighs the benefits of reduced
error occurrence and both types will always choose L.
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Assessing Audit Risk
The three main factors that determine the audit outcome are the expected fraud rate
F, the rate of occurrence of high effort S, and the frequency with which the auditor
uses the D-test (1-x). The high effort rate and fraud rate for certain kinds of
equilibrium can be influenced by changes in CB and CD. On the other hand, if the
auditee uses a mixed effort level strategy the auditor's use of the D-test can be
influenced by either DiFH (in a partially hybrid equilibrium) or DH (in a hybrid
equilibrium).
These three factors will in turn influence the components of the audit risk
model. In an error detection setting inherent risk (IRJ relates to the susceptibility of
an account balance or class of transactions to material error. Control risk (CRe) is the
risk that material errors are not prevented or detected by the internal controls and
detection risk (DRe) is the risk that errors that are not prevented or detected by the
internal controls are not detected by the auditor. Shibano [34] argues that this
formulation can also be used to assess Audit Risk from irregularities. This requires a
separate assessment of each component:
ARe = IRexCRexDRe ARF = IRFxCRFxDRF
This model considers inherent risk and control risk in both settings as one factor. In
error detection we consider the probability pw that an error occurs and goes
undetected by the control system. For fraud detection we must assess the control risk
to be 1, in which case the product of the first two terms will be IR, since it is
assumed that the auditee can conceal fraudulent activity from the internal controls.
The detection risk component is assessed after the auditor observes the effort level
since the auditor's testing is contingent upon the standard of the internal controls.
Suppose the auditor randomises between BaD2 and BCD,. Then from equation 6.2.3
IRexCRe = P(Pl-S,(pl-Ph)+(1-P)(Pl-S2(Pl-Ph))
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16b + + -
16c + + -/+' +/-2
16d + -
19a + -
19b + + -
19c + -
table 6.10 1 le effects on strategies of varying the cost of actions
The auditor's mixed strategy in a hybrid equilibrium is influenced by D2FH-D2FL rather
than the absolute values. Thus at the entry marked (1) the effect of changing one cost
can have an ambiguous effect on the auditor's randomisation x. Also in a hybrid
equilibrium the auditee's mixed effort level strategies are influenced by the critical
fraud rate. At the entry marked (2) S2 is increasing in FH* whilst S, is decreasing in
Fh*. The changes in mixed strategies as the action costs vary can be used to consider
how the Audit risk terms described above are affected by changes in the action costs.
This is shown in table 6.11 The two comments made above for region 16b will still
hold. In addition, there are some regions where the decision to use D, does not affect
the choice of B-test and hence the error-detection risk term is unchanged. These
entries are marked (3) in the following table:
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10b + + -
10c + + +
16a + + 03
16b + + - o3
16c -/+2 +/-1 +
16d + + -
19a + + 1o
19b + + - 0Ul 1
19c + + io
table 6.11 the effects on audit risk components of varying the cost of actions
These audit risk factors will be determined by each players' equilibrium strategy.
Tables 6.10 and 6.11 consider a candidate equilibrium set from the areas of interest
discussed above. The effects of varying the action costs on the three equilibrium
determinants F , (1-x) and Sf and the components of audit risk are considered.
These variations only occur in a mixed strategy and so candidates from
regions 1-3 and 25-26 (which have pure effort levels and fraud rates) are not
included. These variations in costs must be of limited size to ensure only localised
changes. A large change in CD, for example, will change the auditor's equilibrium
strategies and thus the equilibrium set. The equilibrium within a region changes as
Dh varies. Each region is considered as DH increases so that, in 6 say, 6a occurs for
low Dh whilst 6b occurs for higher DH. Almost all the regions have a unique type of
equilibrium for a given set of costs (although technically there are a continuum of
pooling equilibria differing only in the action they prescribe after observing a zero
probability event) with a unique optimal play prediction. However regions 16a, 16b,
16c and 16d overlap. In this case there is not a unique type of optimal strategy. This
suggests that, as the assessment of audit risk depends upon the equilibrium, in some
situations there may two or more equally valid assessment for the level of audit risk.
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It can be seen from table 6.10 that a decrease in the cost of the D-test CD will
result in a decrease in the occurrence of fraud. Decreasing the cost CB has an
ambiguous effect on the occurrence of fraud. In some circumstances this also
decreased the fraud rate as the more extensive B, test is more likely to find evidence
of fraud which can subsequently be classified as fraud by the D-test. However, in
other situations lowering CB can raise the fraud rate. This will happen when the
auditor is choosing between B, and D, . In this case an increase in CB will result in D,
being used for a lower fraud rate.
The frequency of D, in the auditors mixed strategy can be influenced either
way by a change in DH. In the partially hybrid equilibrium 10b the auditor's use of
the D-test decreases as DH increases. In this equilibrium the type 1 auditee does not
commit fraud and is therefore only concerned with the prevention of unqualified
errors. The auditor encourages the auditee to put in high effort by reducing his use of
the D-test after observing low effort. As DH increases high effort becomes a less
attractive option to a type 1 auditee and the auditor must further reduce his use of the
D-test after low effort to continue to encourage high effort. In region 16c, a hybrid
equilibrium, the auditor adjusts his use of the D-test after high and low effort so that
both auditee types are indifferent between high and low effort. As the cost of high
effort increases the auditor increases his use of D, after both effort levels.
Table 6.11 shows that, as we might expect, a decrease in CD will result in a
decrease in the inherent risk of fraud occurring since this is determined by the
equilibrium fraud rate. In region 10b however this will have the opposite effect on
the inherent risk of error. In this case an "optimal" level for the cost CD must strike a
balance between the two kinds of inherent risk. Thus the need for the auditor to strike
a compromise between error and fraud detection is reflected in the inherent risk
terms.
This compromise can also be seen in the detection risk component. In region
10b an increase in the cost of high effort DH increases the risk that fraud will go
unnoticed. However the same increase will decrease the risk that an error goes
undetected. In region 19b an increase in the cost of D, will lead to a correspondingly
increased risk of errors going undetected by the internal control system. However an
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increase in CD will also lead to a decrease in the error detection risk. In this region the
auditor is once again trying to strike a compromise between using the B-test and the
D-test. If CD is increased the auditor will need to expect a higher fraud rate to start
using test D,. A higher chance of fraud occurring means a lower chance that the B-
test will detect nothing. Thus the overall audit risk for errors may be reduced by
increasing the D-test cost CD.
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7 CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Comparisons between the models
Both models considered the auditor to be uncertain about the auditee's motivations.
In a setting of error detection this was modelled by uncertainty about the chance of
errors occurring in the accounts. In a fraud prevention setting the auditor did not
know how difficult the auditee would find it to commit fraud. In each case, to
highlight the effects of the potential difference in auditee types, the auditee was
considered to be either a "good" or a "bad" type by the auditor. In error detection a
"good" type had a lower risk of errors occurring, whilst in a fraud prevention setting
a "good" type found it more difficult to commit fraud. In both models the difference
between the types of auditee was a question of degree - both types had some chance
of errors occurring or, in the fraud prevention model both types could commit fraud.
There are four main differences between the models. In the fraud model the
auditee has a second unobservable action choice (whether to commit fraud or not).
This increased the number of potential outcomes, increased the auditor's uncertainty
and led to an increase in the frequency of mixed strategies since even if the auditor
knows the auditee's type and effort level there is still uncertainty about the fraud
action. Secondly, in the fraud model the auditor had two areas of responsibility, to
detect errors and prevent fraud. These two responsibilities can be in conflict, in
which case the auditor must divide his resources between them. In a fraud setting the
players preferences are more at odds. If the auditee commits fraud he would prefer
this to go undetected whilst the auditor can limit his costs if he successfully detects
fraud. One consequence of this difference is that mixed strategies are common in the
second model, whilst they are quite rare in the first.
Thirdly, the auditor's testing actions are changed in the fraud detection model
to include additional forms of qualification and a means of conducting an in-depth
investigation to determine if an irregularity was deliberately introduced. The changes
in the auditor's qualification, and the increased number of outcomes, meant that the
auditor was restricted to qualifying on the evidence gathered. This effectively
removes any strategic decision over the qualification. Finally, in the model of fraud
detection the auditor is assumed to always observe the effort level since the auditor is
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uncertain about the auditee's type and fraud decision. This also makes the
equilibrium analysis more tractable since, with observation, the model is a dynamic
game.
In each model some of the costs were considered as variables to analyse the
effects of changes in this cost on the optimal behaviour. In the first model one of the
outcome costs NQ(E) was varied. This outcome occurs when an error exists and the
auditor fails to appropriately qualify his audit report. The cost of this outcome is
associated with the damages awarded to disgruntled shareholders. This permitted a
consideration of how the damages awarded to shareholders can influence the
outcome of the audit.
The cost of not qualifying an error is the expected discounted cost of the error
being discovered at some future date. This is related to the cost of an error being
discovered immediately Q(E). However the cost of an error subsequently being
brought to light may be larger for two reasons; An unnoticed error may damage the
business or generate further errors before it is found, and the cost may involve a
punitive element since both parties are considered to have failed in their duty. The
cost of the outcome NQ(E) can therefore be related to Q(E) by two factors; a punitive
factor since the error went undetected for some time (and may have damaged
shareholder's interests), and the likelihood that the error is subsequently brought to
light. Thus when we consider increasing the penalty for NQ(E) in the first model, we
are really considering increasing the punitive factor (so the shareholders are awarded
greater damages if an error is subsequently found) which, in turn, increases the
expected cost NQ(E).
In the second model there are more outcome costs as the model considers
both error detection and fraud prevention. Thus the auditor has two conflicting areas
of concern and he must divide his resources between them. Considering a single
outcome cost as a variable is unsatisfactory in such a setting since a change in the
cost will prompt either a change in the auditor's responsibility for fraud or his
responsibility for error detection, whilst leaving the other unchanged. The
relationships between the outcome costs also become more complex. The cost of
failing to qualify fraud will be the expected discounted cost of the fraud being
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discovered at some future date. The likelihood of a fraud subsequently being
discovered may be related to an error subsequently being discovered. Furthermore,
an increase in the punitive factor for a fraud going undetected may also influence the
factor for an error going undetected. Clearly, the relationship between these costs
will have a strong influence on the behaviour in the model and thus the equilibrium
behaviour will be sensitive to the particular relationship used. To avoid this problem
it was decided that the costs of actions would be considered as variables. This looks
at the motivation of the players from a different viewpoint. The auditor will use the
B,-test if doing so reduces his costs. This involves comparing the cost of the test with
the change in expected outcome costs that the B-test will make. Since B, reduces the
risk of an error going undetected, an increase in the cost CNQ(E) makes B, a more
attractive option. Thus as CNQ(E) increases, a more expensive B-test can become cost
effective. A consideration of how the cost of actions influences the players' actions
can therefore be related to the cost of the players outcomes, without having to specify
particular relationships between those outcome costs.
In both models, the inequalities derived for strategy comparisons show that
the actual magnitudes of the outcome costs do not influence the behaviour. It is the
differences between outcome costs (or the expected differences) that influence the
players' actions. In the error detection model the cost of the auditor's strategy
considers the difference between qualifying and not qualifying - the expressions
(Cq(NE)-Cnq(NE)) and (CNQ(E)-CQ(E)). The auditee's decision to put in high effort is
influenced by two considerations; Firstly, putting in high effort may lead to a
different auditor testing strategy, with a different expected cost for the auditee.
Secondly, the change in the chance of errors occurring that a better internal control
system causes will also change the likelihood of the different outcomes being
reached.
In the model of fraud detection, both players motivations are more complex.
The auditee's decision to put in high effort can, as in the error detection model,
change the auditor's strategy and reduce the chance of errors occurring. However in
this model a high effort internal control system increases the difficulty of committing
and successfully concealing fraud. The auditor's cost contains the two expressions of
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the error detection example, the difference between qualifying and not qualifying
when there is (or is not) an error present. The possibility of fraud occurring gives two
additional comparisons; The difference between correctly qualifying fraud and
misclassifying it as an error and the difference in costs between misclassifying fraud
and failing to detect it at all.
The model of error detection considered, in simplified form, the three main
stages of an audit. The auditor could observe the internal control system, conduct
substantive testing and choose to qualify based on the evidence gathered. The
auditor's choice about observing the effort level leads to a game that is simultaneous
if the auditor does not observe, or dynamic (sequential) if he does. This ambiguity
lead to an interesting analysis of mixed strategies since the nature of a mixed strategy
depends upon whether the game is simultaneous-move or dynamic. It was shown that
if the auditor does observe in a mixed strategy equilibrium then he does so with a
frequency strictly less than one. Thus if learning information is costly, the optimal
use of this resource may involve probabilistic information gathering.
In the error detection model the auditor also had the choice of whether to
qualify or not after considering the results of his testing. This permitted the strategies
"always qualify" or "never qualify" that disregard the results of the testing. These
strategies allowed the auditor to reduce the chance of one kind of sampling error to
zero. If for example the auditor never qualifies then there is no chance of a false
positive error occurring. Of course in practice an auditor will never qualify without
any evidence. However, the amount of evidence required may vary - if failing to find
an error will cost him dearly the auditor will be willing to qualify on the slimmest of
evidence. The inclusion of qualification strategies gave a means of considering this
variation in the amount of evidence collected without making the model over¬
complicated.
Qualification strategies for the auditor were not included in the model of
fraud detection. In this model the auditor had two forms of qualification, Q2 if an
error had been detected and Q, if the error proved to be the result of fraud. Since Q,
is a more serious accusation, it was assumed that the auditor could not issue Q,
without sufficient evidence. If the auditor could qualify without evidence then a
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potential low-cost method of limiting fraud would be to conduct no testing and
randomise over qualification opinions. Strategies such as "always Q2" and "always
NQ" are unlikely to be equilibrium strategies for the auditor if there is any chance of
fraud occurring since they effectively guarantee that the auditee will never be caught
committing fraud.
The auditing literature recognises that procedures for detecting errors may be
of little use for detecting fraud. If the fraudulent activity has been concealed the
auditor will need to conduct further investigations once an irregularity has been
found to determine whether it occurred as the result of some fraudulent activity. This
was modelled by the introduction of an in-depth test that can be used after broad
substantive testing. Thus the two stages of testing can be regarded as detection and
classification. It was assumed that the in-depth testing required some irregularity to
investigate, so using the D-test was only an option if the B-test found something.
This test was also of use in error detection since the B-test has a non-zero chance of
making a false positive sampling error. A detailed investigation of a spurious error is
likely to prevent the auditor issuing an incorrectly qualified report. In fact it was
assumed that an in depth investigation would always reveal a false positive.
In both models the auditee could benefit, in some situations, from not
revealing his type. In the error detection model, both players prefer errors not to
occur but each would prefer the other to do the necessary work to achieve this. The
auditor's expected chance of errors occurring will depend on his belief about the
likelihood of each auditee type. If both types send the same signal his expected error
rate will lie between the low error rate for a type 1 auditee and the high error rate for
type 2. This can be of benefit to both auditee types since the auditor works harder as
the error rate increases, until he resorts to "always qualify" to eliminate the risk of a
false negative audit report. In a pooling equilibrium , type 1 can benefit as the auditor
works harder than he would if he knew he was facing type 1. On the other hand since
type 2 has a higher error rate, as CNQ(E) increases the auditor will resort to "always
qualify", which leads to an expensive outcome for the auditee. If the auditor is
uncertain about which type he is facing he may use a reasonable qualification
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strategy against type 2 for costs where he would prefer to qualify if he knew he was
facing type 2.
In the model of fraud prevention it was shown that there are no pure strategy
equilibria where the auditee reveals his type. Again, both types can benefit from the
auditor's uncertainty. If the optimal fraud rate is low then a type 2 auditee will
commit fraud whilst type 1 does not. In this case the non-fraudulent auditee can
benefit from a mixed strategy involving the D,-test by mimicking the signal of the
fraudulent type. If the optimal fraud rate is high then type 2 commits fraud with
certainty whilst type 1 has a non-zero fraud rate. In this case the auditor randomises
to limit the occurrence of fraud by a type 1 auditee. This involves using the test D,
with a lower probability than was needed to limit fraud by type 2. Thus a type 2
auditee mimics the signal of the less fraudulent type to benefit from a lower
frequency of in depth testing.
7.2 Discussion of the Error Detection Model
Modelling the auditing process as a signalling game has two advantages. Firstly it
includes the concept of "inherent risk" in a game theoretic setting. The equilibrium
analysis shows how the auditors degree of uncertainty (P in this model) will
influence his optimal strategy. Secondly, the greater uncertainty in an incomplete
information setting increases the value of information acquisition. In particular pure
strategies exist where costly information acquisition is optimal.
The model of error detection includes the auditior's uncertainty about the
occurrence of errors. In a game of costly perfect information the auditor never uses
his A-test (observation) strategy in a pure strategy equilibrium which would seem to
be ignoring the value of the information. With the inclusion of uncertainty about the
auditee's type the model implicitly recognises the value of learning the auditee's
action. The observation can be used to infer the auditee's type. Even in the
cooperative case, where the two players are no longer at odds but rather try to
minimise their joint costs, it can be seen that observation plays an important part.
It was shown that observation can only occur if two conditions are met.
Firstly, the auditee types must respond differently to the A-test strategy if
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observation is to be of use. If both types put in the same effort level then observing
this tells the auditor nothing about which type he is facing. Secondly, the auditor
must have different optimal testing strategies after learning the effort level. If this is
not the case then the auditor will use the same test irrespective of his observation and
there is no need to incur the cost of observation. Thus the A,-test is only used in a
separating equilibrium (where by observing the auditor learns which type of auditee
he is facing and adjusts his testing accordingly) or as part of a mixed strategy. In a
mixed strategy the auditor will not always learn the auditee's type through
observation, but he is able to make a more accurate inference.
By considering the costs CNQ(E) and DNQ(E) to be variables the effects of
these costs on the equilibria can been seen. This analysis has three advantages;
Firstly, it reduces the risk that the equilibria of an example are the result of the
particular values chosen. Secondly, these variable costs allow us to see if the model
conforms to expectations. Thirdly, a consideration of the equilibrium set as these
costs vary can suggest possible penalty levels to encourage certain behaviour. An
analysis of the auditor's cost structure as CNQ(E) varies led to a categorisation of the
auditor's set of potentially optimal strategies.
For low CNQ(E) and DNQ(E) neither player works hard, which is what we
would expect to happen if in reality neither the auditor or the auditee were
particularly concerned about the outcome of the audit. The high cost of the B, test
and the degree of uncertainty P in the example considered meant that B, did not
appear in any equilibrium, even though it was an optimal auditor strategy against a
type 1 auditee playing H. In a pooling equilibrium, the auditor was sufficiently
unsure about which type he was facing that a strategy such as B2R or B2Q had a
lower expected cost than B,R. With a separating equilibrium, the range of CNQ(E) for
which B,R was optimal against a type 1 auditee was sufficiently high that it was
cheaper for the auditor to use B2Q forcing the "no work" equilibrium (B2Q, L / L).
Of more interest perhaps is the case of extremely high costs - in the model
the auditor always qualifies, in which case the auditee always plays low effort. A
related point is the area of joint and several liability. For high costs the no work
equilibrium occurs. However, the level of costs that cause this equilibrium depend
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critically on how the costs are shared between the players. If the auditor is solely
responsible the no work equilibrium occurs for low costs (Q > 647). If both players
share the responsibility then this equilibrium will not occur until much higher costs
(Q> 10000).
The inclusion of incomplete information complicates the equilibrium
behaviour in two ways. The auditor can have compromise testing strategies as a
result of uncertainty. For example the auditor may choose a strategy B,R if both
auditee types put in high effort even though he would prefer B2R against type 1 or
B2Q against type 2. In this situation the auditor can only guarantee a second-best
outcome. A second problem relates to encouraging hard work by the auditee.
Because the two auditee types can respond differently, a penalty that encourages one
to put in high effort may discourage the other. Another example of this motivation
problem occurs with the use of the A-test. It might be expected that observation of
the effort level would encourage the auditee to put in high effort so that the
subsequent auditor strategy is reasonable. However in this model the A-test only
occurs as part of a separating equilibrium in which one type puts in high effort and
the other low. The observation positively influences the behaviour of one auditee
type whilst encouraging the other not to work.
There are two influences on the nature of the equilibrium regions as CNQ(E)
and DNQ(E) vary. If there is a large difference in the size of the penalties then,
although both players prefer a low rate of errors, one player is much more concerned
about this outcome. Thus the concerned player will do all he can to reduce the risk of
errors going undetected whilst the unconcerned player will do no work. The
unconcerned player can shirk since he can be sure that the other player cannot risk
incurring the larger penalty. To give both parties an equal incentive to work hard,
their costs for failing to qualify an error must be of a similar size. This point is
further highlighted if the costs are apportioned according to a policy of proportionate
liability. This setting clearly illustrates that both players will work hard only if they
share the cost of failing to prevent errors.
If both players have a similar sized penalty for not qualifying errors then a
second factor influences the equilibrium strategies. Both players have a similar
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incentive to work hard but in some cases hard work by one of them reduces the risk
of unqualified errors to an acceptable level. The problem in this situation is one of
coordination. For moderate penalty levels the players cannot coordinate their work
and a mixed strategy compromise equilibrium occurs. For higher costs the players are
driven to coordinate as both players must work to reduce the risk of errors going
undetected. For even higher costs the auditor can eliminate the risk of incurring this
penalty by always qualifying and the no work equilibrium occurs. For the example
considered this equilibrium occurs, if both penalties are of a similar size, when the
combined penalty is about 10,000. This can be compared with the cooperative game,
where this equilibrium doesn't occur until the combined cost is greater than 28,000.
If the players are concerned with minimising their combined cost then they can
successfully work hard together for a large range of costs, whereas in the non-
cooperative game the coordination between the players breaks down when the
auditor can limit his own costs by always qualifying. This suggests that setting the
costs to encourage hard work is a policy more suited to a cooperative setting.
There are two benefits to extending the equilibrium analysis to include mixed
strategies. Firstly, the mixed strategy analysis involves considering the players'
preferences over different outcomes. This can also be used to reduce the number of
pure strategy equilibrium by pareto domination. If both players prefer the same
equilibrium it is a potential focal point and, since the auditee moves first, this focal
point is more compelling than in a simultaneous move game. When pareto
domination of equilibria does occur the players motivations are similar as they agree
on a best outcome. The extreme case where the player's motivations are identical is
considered in the cooperative game. There are regions of the costs CN0(E) and DNQ(E)
where the equilibrium will be the same regardless of whether the audit is regarded as
cooperative or non-cooperative. These areas occur when the penalties for both
players are of a similar size and thus the players motivations are similar.
If the players prefer different equilibria then mixed strategies could provide a
mechanism for compromise. It was shown that no behavioural strategies form a
stable equilibrium and if a mixed strategy exists it will involve randomising by one
auditee type. However if there are two pure strategy equilibria the players disagree
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about the best outcome. This means that mixed strategies will tend to be unstable. If
the mixed strategy costs one of the players more than either pure strategy then he has
no incentive to play his part in the mixed strategy and it fails to be in equilibrium. In
the example considered in section 4.5 mixed strategies proved to be a poor
compromise in every region with two pure strategies. This gives various regions
where the game theoretic analysis does not give a unique solution for optimal play.
By considering pure strategy equilibria we are not greatly restricting the range
of possible solutions - in this model randomising can be expensive. In those cases
where no pure strategies exist the mixed strategy is the best suggestion as to how the
game should be played. For the numerical example considered the auditor's stable
mixed strategy involved randomising between an A,-test strategy and an A2-test.
Thus the auditor has an optimal strategy that involves a random observation scheme
and the frequency of observation increases as the cost DNQ(E) increases.
7.3 Discussion of the Fraud Prevention Model
This model captures the interaction between error detection and fraud prevention.
Previous models of fraud detection have regarded random errors as noise which may
obscure the results of the auditor's testing for fraud. However, neither players'
payoffs are affected by the presence of random errors. It seems that one of the
motivations behind committing fraud is that it is unlikely to be discovered. This is
partly because the auditor may find it difficult to detect well concealed fraud and
partly because the auditor also has a responsibility to detect errors. He cannot
therefore devote all of his resources to the hunt for fraudulent activity.
The auditor's testing was divided into two stages; Broad substantive testing
(B-test) that can bring irregularities to light and in-depth testing (D-test) that
investigates the causes of the irregularity. Thus the B-test detects irregularities, and
the D-test classifies them into errors, fraud or false positive sampling errors from the
B-test. This concept of detailed investigation of the causes of an error can only be
used strategically if random errors also occur. In a model that only considers fraud,
the auditor will know the cause of any irregularity without any detailed investigation.
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Even when the auditor's options are limited there can be some complex
interactions between the two players. The players' interests are more at odds in this
model, particularly over fraud prevention. For a wide range of costs the auditor will
use D, if fraud is occurring and D2 if not, whilst the auditee will commit fraud if test
D2 is used and will not if test D, is used. These preferences lead to a mixed strategy
equilibrium. Because the auditee has two actions he could have a mixed strategy
fraud rate and a mixed strategy effort level. However, it was shown that, in most
cases, if he has a mixed fraud rate he has a pure effort level and with a mixed effort
level he has a pure fraud rate.
It was assumed that both types had the ability to commit fraud. The "honest"
type 1 auditee was simply more reluctant to commit fraud. This willingness to
commit fraud is the sole difference between the auditee types. This was modelled by
including a cost to the auditee of committing and concealing fraud. The auditee type
who is reluctant to commit fraud will have a higher level of this cost. There are a
number of factors that may increase the level of this cost in a way that is
unobservable to the auditor. For example, a type 1 auditee may be more concerned
with the prospect of fraud being detected, or he may find it more difficult to override
the internal control system. For each type the cost is higher in a high effort internal
control environment since a more effective internal control system is more difficult
to override. The level of this cost determines which auditor strategies are worth
committing fraud against, but does not affect the optimal fraud rates.
The auditee's optimal strategy is to choose a level of fraud occurrence that
minimises his costs. To be in equilibrium this level of fraud must be part of a
mutually stable pair - the auditee chooses a fraud rate so that the auditor is indifferent
between two of his strategies and the auditor in turn randomises between these two
strategies so that the auditee is indifferent between F and NF. Such a mixed strategy
may at first appear to be collusion between the auditee and the auditor - after all in
such an equilibrium the auditee commits fraud with positive probability whereas a
sampling strategy with a higher occurrence of the D, test would deter all fraud.
However such an equilibrium pair is the only efficient allocation of the auditor's
resources. If the auditor decides to always use D, he will deter all fraud. However
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conducting in depth testing in a non-fraudulent environment is a waste of resources
and such a strategy is not optimal. If the auditor never uses the D, test then this will
encourage fraud - in which case the auditor is negligent if he never looks for fraud.
The auditee's optimal rate of fraud occurrence depends on the auditor's costs.
In particular the occurrences will vary as CB and CD vary. We might expect that
lowering these costs would encourage the auditor to use the associated test more
frequently. This in turn should reduce the occurrence of fraud. In the example
considered, lowering the cost CD did decrease the fraud rate until for all sufficiently
low CD the auditor uses D, irrespective of the fraud rate. In these circumstances fraud
will not occur. Lowering the cost CB had a more ambiguous effect upon the optimal
fraud rate. In some circumstances this also decreased the fraud rate as the more
extensive test B, is more likely to find evidence of fraud (which can subsequently be
classified as fraud by the D-test). However, in other situations lowering CB can raise
the fraud rate. In these situations the auditor is compromising by using either D, or
B,. As B, becomes a cheaper option, a higher expected fraud rate is needed for the
auditor to consider changing to D,. It was shown that measures to reduce the inherent
risk of fraud (namely reducing CD) may have the opposite effect upon the inherent
risk of errors. This reinforces the idea that the auditor's testing must be a compromise
between fraud and error detection.
Each auditee type had some incentives not to reveal their type to the auditor.
Both types could benefit if the auditor focused his attentions on the other. This leads
to behaviour where one type mimics the actions of the other. If the type 2 auditee
commits fraud whilst the type 1 does not then it is in the interest of the "honest" type
1 to mimic the behaviour of type 2. By doing this he benefits from an auditor
sampling strategy that contains the D, test with non-zero probability. This test
reduces the risk of sampling errors (false positive) in a non-fraudulent environment.
If type 2 plays fraud with certainty whilst type 1 plays fraud with positive probability
then it is in the interests of 2 to mimic the less fraudulent type. If type 2 can be
distinguished by his effort level the auditor will change his testing strategy to limit
the occurrence of type 2 fraud by an increased use of the D, test.
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It was shown that separating equilibria (in which the auditee effectively
reveals his type) do not occur. However, since the auditee's payoffs are dependent
upon type, situations arise which are partially separating (hybrid) in which the
auditee's behaviour gives the auditor a better idea about which type he is facing. Two
kinds of hybrid equilibrium were shown to occur; one where both types use each
effort level with positive probability, and one in which type 1 has a mixed strategy
effort level whilst type 2 always puts in high effort. In both situations the auditor
cannot identify the fraudulent type 2 by his effort level.
In a hybrid equilibrium the auditor's mixed testing strategy limits both the
occurrences of fraud and of mimicking behaviour. In these cases the auditor's
optimal strategy uses the D, test with a probability above that required to limit type 1
fraud but below that required to limit type 2 fraud. In some situations the auditor may
reduce the frequency of the D,-test as DH increases to encourage a type 1 auditee to
put high effort into the internal controls to reduce the occurrence of errors. In other
situations the auditor is willing to put up with more random errors to identify the
auditee's type and limit fraud.
It was also shown that the type of equilibrium that occurs will depend upon
the auditor's belief about type P. This does not directly influence the overall rate of
fraud which is determined in equilibrium. Both auditee types have incentives not to
behave in a way that will reveal their private information (how difficult they find it to
commit fraud) to the auditor. However, the auditee's optimal strategies involve a
degree of "type discrimination" in a way that is unobservable to the auditor. If a low
fraud rate F* is optimal then a type 2 auditee (who finds it easier to commit fraud)
chooses a fraud rate so that the auditor's expected rate is F* whilst a type 1 auditee
never commits fraud. When the optimal fraud rate is high ( > (1-P)) this agreement is
insufficient to reach the optimal fraud rate and type 1 also commits fraud. When both
types are committing fraud with positive probability their preferences are most
dissimilar. In these situations the auditor's optimal strategy can force the auditee to
partially reveal his type.
For the example considered, as CD increases the auditor stops using D, after
observing low effort. This result is somewhat counter-intuitive. Since it is assumed
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that high effort internal controls are more difficult to override we might expect the
auditor to suspect fraud in a low effort environment where the controls can be more
easily overridden. However, a poor system of controls gives a greater chance of
errors occurring and hence a greater chance of incurring the D-test cost, whilst at the
same time reducing the chance that a given error will actually be from fraud. The
auditee has two potential signalling policies. It may be worth maintaining a high
effort internal control system, even though this requires more effort to override, as
the internal controls may convince the auditor that he does not need to search for
fraud. On the other hand, maintaining a low effort internal control system makes it
easier to commit fraud and any evidence may be lost amongst the random errors.
The assessment of the audit risk terms for the example highlights the conflict
between fraud prevention and error detection. If the costs of the auditor's tests are
changed to reduce the risk of fraud going undetected this can have the opposite effect
on the risk of errors going undetected. This analysis followed Shibano [34] in
assessing the audit risk from fraud and errors separately. Some mechanism is needed
to connect these two assessments. In this model, for example, changing from B2 to B,
will reduce the chance of an error going undetected. Since the D-test requires an
irregularity to focus upon this same change will increase the chance of fraud being
detected as an irregularity and subsequently investigated in detail. Hence a change to
B i may reduce the audit risk from both errors and fraud.
The number of equilibria raises an interesting question for the assessment of
audit risk. In the example considered almost all of the payoff regions have a unique
optimal mixed strategy, since the auditee has a unique optimal fraud rate. In one
payoff region there are two equilibria, one in which the auditee has a pure effort level
and mixed fraud rate and one in which he has a mixed effort level and pure fraud
rate. This suggests that the idea of a unique assessment of audit risk might be
inappropriate in a strategic setting.
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7.4 Limitations of the Models and Areas for Future Work
In both models the number of auditee types, effort levels and auditor testing actions
was limited to clearly illustrate the interaction between the auditor and auditee. This
gave a stylised view of the audit that may overlook some interesting interaction in a
more complex model. A more realistic approach to the auditor's uncertainty about
the auditee's motivations might consider a continuum of types. In the error detection
model for example this would involve considering an auditee type with every basic
chance of error occurring within some interval. In the fraud prevention setting this
could involve auditee types whose ability to commit fraud varies, so that some types
find it impractical to be fraudulent. A signalling equilibrium would then involve
some subset of the auditee types sending the same signal to the auditor. A further
refinement could consider different preferences over outcomes for different auditees.
In this case certain types may have incentives to signal their type.
A similar extension would give the auditee more effort levels to choose from.
This could be modelled by a function determining the cost involved in reducing the
error rate to a given level. The auditee's behaviour would depend critically upon the
nature of this cost function. If it was linear for example then the auditee's strategies
could resemble the high effort / low effort choice. If the outcome costs are low then
the auditee puts as little effort into preventing errors as possible. Once costs increase
so that it is worth reducing the error rate, the auditee puts as much effort into the
internal controls as possible. The nature of this function would need to be considered
in some detail to give the model a sense of realism.
Increasing the number of signals could also give rise to a situation where
some signals are only available to one type. It would be interesting to investigate the
circumstances under which an auditee would use a signal that uniquely described his
type. If an increase in the number of signals was combined with an increase in the
number of types then the auditor would be able to divide the set of auditees into as
many subsets as there are feasible signals. In such a setting we might expect the use
of costly observation of the signal to be more useful.
The auditor's B-test action could be extended to give a range of substantive
tests. In the model of error detection the choice between B2 and B, was often
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obscured by the choice of qualification strategy. The ability to choose to always
qualify gave the auditor another means of reducing his risk of false positive / false
negative sampling errors. Since the B, test reduces the risk of both sampling errors
occurring, by using B, the auditor effectively buys a reduced sampling risk. A more
complex approach could give the auditor a choice of a number B-tests of differing
efficiency. These tests would have sampling risks of various sizes and a division of
this risk between the two kinds of sampling error.
A consideration lacking from both models was the concept of materiality.
Random errors in both cases were described by the probability that a material error
occurred. To introduce the idea of materiality, the chance of a material error
occurring would need to be re-expressed to consider the number of errors occurring.
The auditor could then decide what level of error occurrence he deemed material. To
analyse a model with this materiality choice it would be necessary to describe the
probability of the B-test finding each error, and how the errors are distributed
through the accounts. The chance of a sampling error from the B-test would depend
upon both the extent of the test and the number of errors occurring. This would
greatly complicate the assessment of the player's costs.
The setting of costs and probabilities is, to some extent, arbitrary. Costs are
chosen to satisfy the outcome inequalities and to give a representative case. Since the
equilibrium behaviour of the model depends on these outcome costs it would be
interesting to try and estimate the values of these costs in practice. This problem is
more pronounced in the model of fraud detection because there are more outcomes to
consider.
A serious limitation in the fraud model is that the benefit from committing
fraud is fixed. This benefit will clearly depend upon the size of the fraud, and this
size will in turn affect the risk of the fraud being detected. The auditee would
therefore need to strike a balance between the benefit of fraud and the risk of
detection. This could be included as an auditee action before choosing the fraud rate.
Again, this decision will be sensitive to the method of describing the relationship
between fraud size and the probability of detection. Further investigation would need
to be done to determine a fair estimate of how this relationship works in practice. It
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could well be the case that the auditee has a unique fraud size that optimises the
trade-off between gain and risk. If this is the case the analysis would be equivalent to
assuming that the size of fraud is fixed at this optimal size.
Another important consideration lacking from both models is the size of the
audit fee. There are two ways that this could be included into the model. Firstly there
could be a stage of pre-play audit fee negotiation. This would necessitate additional
assumptions about the value which the auditee places on the audit and the availability
and likely cost of other audit firms if agreement cannot be reached. This negotiation
could be used to further refine the equilibrium set. In a payoff region with two
equilibria, the audit fee could provide a mechanism for both players to coordinate on
the same equilibrium. This could raise some interesting questions about auditor
independence.
The model could be developed by considering a different action as a signal
between the auditee and auditor. This is another way in which the audit fee could be
included - the auditee could offer a certain fee and from this the auditor tries to infer
the auditee's type. In a fraud detection setting a willingness to pay a large fee (which
would allow the auditor to conduct detailed testing) could be regarded as a signal that
the auditee has nothing to conceal. This could lead to an equilibrium in which the
auditee conducts a large fraud whilst the auditor collects a large fee which convinces
him not to test.
Another limitation of both models is that they regard the audit as a one-off
event. A more realistic approach would be to regard the audit as a repeated game,
although analysis of these can prove difficult. The models developed here could be
used as the basic one period game to be repeated. Repeated games have the potential
for a greater degree of cooperation between the players. In particular repetition could
be used to achieve a compromise in settings where each player prefers a different
outcome since the equilibrium play in the repeated game could involve alternating
between the one-period equilibria. An important consideration in the area of repeated
games would be how the duration of the auditor / auditee contract can affect the fraud
and error rates in the model.
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The setting of proportionate liability could be extended to consider two
alternate allocations of liability; One, such as (3 = 0.5, where both parties have put in
the same amount of effort and a second where one party has worked harder than the
other and thus gets a much smaller share of any liability. This could be used to
motivate hard work for relatively low penalty levels as working not only reduces the
risk of an error going undetected but also shifts the burden for any liability to the
other player. The equilibrium in such a setting would resemble the "Prisoner's
Dilemma" in which the only Nash equilibrium is the least favourable outcome for
both players. In an auditing context this would involve hard work by both players for
low penalties since neither will wish to take the majority of the liability. Although
such an outcome may not be favoured by the players it represents the most desirable
outcome for the shareholders of the company. Thus a setting of proportionate
liability could provide an alternative method of encouraging socially desirable
outcomes to the audit.
In both models the equilibrium analysis did not necessarily lead to a unique
prediction as to how the game should be played. Other equilibrium refinements could
be considered to further reduce the equilibrium set. There are two approaches to this,
considering either game theoretic refinements or considerations from auditing. One
potential mechanism mentioned above would be to use the audit fee as a means of
coordination. Alternatively, Antle's [2] concept of an independent auditor could be
used or modified - for example the auditor could choose the equilibrium that
minimises the risk to the shareholders.
On the other hand, a further game theoretic refinement could be used.
Multiple equilibria occur when the player's prefer different outcomes and are unable
to coordinate their equilibrium play. One method of reaching a compromise solution
would be to use Aumann's correlated equilibria detailed in Fudenberg and Tirole
[19]. This involves the players jointly randomising between equilibrium pairs by
observing a publicly observable randomisation (so for example the players may agree
to play one equilibrium if a tossed coin shows heads and the other equilibrium if it
shows tails). Such an equilibrium will be a good compromise as each player's
expected cost will lie between his costs for the two pure strategy equilibria. This
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approach raises interesting questions about what could be used as a public
randomisation. Furthermore, an agreement to jointly randomise could be seen as
weakening the auditor's independence.
7.5 Summary
This work has developed two models of the auditing process, considering situations
of both fraud and error detection. The foundation for the formulation of both models
is to view the audit as a process of incomplete information. In each setting, no matter
how thorough the auditor's investigation, there will remain some residual uncertainty
about the company being audited. Both these models showed that quite complex
interactions between the two players can occur from fairly simple strategy sets. This
suggests that these models could be used as the basis for further investigation into
penalty regimes, or different ways of allocating liability, to encourage certain
behaviour.
The model of error detection considered each of the three main stages of the
audit; Investigation of the internal controls, substantive testing and qualification.
Viewing the error detection process as a signalling game meant that costly
information acquiring strategies could form part of a pure strategy equilibrium. This
is an advancement over complete information models of auditing where observation
can only form part of an equilibrium if it is costless. The equilibrium set for this
model was developed as two of the outcome costs varied. This permitted the
auditor's optimal strategy sets to be classified in terms of his B-test cost CB. The
variable costs were also used to consider the effects of increased litigation on the
behaviour of the auditor and auditee.
A numerical example was considered in settings of cooperation, non-
cooperation and proportionate liability. This example suggests that increasing the
participants' penalties to encourage hard work may be counter-productive. A setting
of proportionate liability shows that both players can most effectively be encouraged
to work if they equally share the potential liability. The cooperative analysis suggests
that high levels of litigation are more likely to encourage hard work in a cooperative
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setting. In the example considered there were regions of costs for which there exists
an optimal solution irrespective of the assumptions made about cooperation
An analysis of mixed strategies showed that behavioural strategies, where the
randomisation depends on the information set reached, are an unsatisfactory solution
in this model since one player will have no incentive to participate in the
randomisation. This means that in a mixed strategy, observation can only occur with
a probability strictly less than one. It was also shown that only one auditee type could
participate in a mixed strategy. This reduced the number of potential mixed strategy
equilibria. For the example being considered it was shown that a mixed strategy was
only a reasonable compromise if there were no pure strategy equilibria. If pure
strategy equilibria exist then a mixed strategy equilibrium costs one of the players
more than either pure equilibrium. Thus there can be costs for which this model does
not have a unique solution.
The model of fraud prevention considered the occurrence of both fraud and
unintentional errors. In this model the auditor had two stages of testing; Broad
substantive testing that could detect irregularities and in-depth testing that can
determine the cause of the irregularity. It was shown that no equilibrium exist in
which the auditee reveals his private information to the auditor. The equilibrium set
is classified in terms of the auditor's uncertainty about the auditee's type. The
auditee's optimal fraud rate involved "type discrimination" where the two auditee
types act as differently as possible without indicating their type to the auditor.
An example was considered to illustrate the equilibrium set. The effects of
varying the costs of actions on the equilibrium behaviour were examined. Lowering
the cost of in-depth testing was shown to reduce the equilibrium fraud rate, but a
decrease in the cost of substantive testing could have the opposite effect. The
components of audit risk were assessed for the example. It was shown that changes in
the costs that reduce the risk of errors going undetected may increase the risk of fraud
going undetected. This highlights the auditor's testing problem in which he must
divide his resources between fraud and error prevention. For some costs there are two
mixed strategy equilibria. This suggests that the assessment of audit risk may be non-
unique in a strategic setting.
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The analysis of the equilibrium behaviour of these two models shows that
games of incomplete information can provide a rich setting in which to consider the
interaction between the auditor and auditee. The auditor's uncertainty adds the
consideration of inherent risk to his strategic planning. Although these models have
quite stylised strategy sets the interaction between the players can be quite complex.
The first model clearly demonstrated that information acquisition can play an
important role in a setting of incomplete information.
By regarding one of each players' outcome costs as a variable a family of
games was analysed. The effects of the variable costs on the equilibrium behaviour
could then be seen. This could be used to consider the policy implications of
externally influencing this cost to encourage certain behaviour. The error detection
example illustrated that a change in one of the players costs will change his optimal
strategy and thus the other player's optimal response. Hence a change in one player's
penalty can influence the behaviour of both players. Such an interaction can only be
accommodated by a strategic analysis, which suggests that game theory is a useful
tool for considering regulatory issues.
The second model showed that fraud detection can be considered alongside
error detection and that the players actions are influenced by their responsibilities for
both. It was shown that no pure strategy separating equilibrium (in which the auditee
reveals his type) can exist. The auditee's equilibrium behaviour is strongly
influenced by his desire not to reveal his type. This led to equilibria in which the
fraudulent auditee type mimicked the behaviour of the less fraudulent type to avoid a
high level of testing designed to detect fraud. However, situations also arose in which
a second, more surprising, form of mimicking occurred in which a non-fraudulent
auditee mimics the behaviour of a fraudulent type to encourage the auditor to work
harder. The example also showed that situations occur in which the auditor tests
specifically to encourage the auditee to partially reveal his type. A model of complete
information would be incapable of considering any of this interaction. This suggests
that signalling games, and other games of incomplete information, can be used to
consider a wider range of behaviour in an auditing setting. The discussion of the
limitations of these models and the associated areas for expansion suggest that
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signalling games will be a fruitful area for the development of further models of the
auditing process.
Game theory replaced decision theory as a modelling approach to auditing
because it considered the strategic interaction between the manager and the auditor
and led to a wider, more convincing, range of behaviour. This work suggests that
considering only strategic interaction may also limit the range of behaviour in a
model. Audit work is partly motivated by uncertainty about a company and it's
managers and a convincing model of the auditing process must take account of this.
In a strategic setting this leads to the description of the audit as a game of incomplete
information. If attention is focused on the auditor's attempts to infer the auditee's
motives then the result will be a signalling game.
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APPENDIX A
Sensitivity of Equilibria to Auditee's Effort Cost - DH
A2B2NQ - H is optimal for t;
« p,HDNQ(E)+(l-PiH)DNQ(NE)+DH < piLDNQ(E)+(l-piL)DNQ(NE)
« E>h < (Pi l " Pi h)(DNQ(E)-Dnq(NE))
For a given example this inequality will give us conditions on DH for each type i.
These conditions will be functions of DNQ(E), the cost that we consider varying. Let
us denote these functions f,(DNQ(E)). For the example of section 4.5 we have:
f,(DNQ(E)) = -3 + 0.3 DNQ(E)
f2(DNQ(E)) = -2 + 0.2 Dnq(E)
A2B2R - H is optimal for tj
» Pi h (r2DQ(E)+( 1 -r2)DN°(E))+( 1 -p( H)(t2DQ(NE)+( 1 -t2)DNQ(NE))+DH <
Pi l (r:DQ(E)+( 1 -r;)DNQ(E))+( 1 -Pj L)(t2DQ(NE)+( 1 -t2)DNQ(NE))
» Dh < (Pi l "PiH)(r:D°(E)+( 1 -r3)DNQ(E)-t3DQ(NE)-( 1 -t2)DNQ(NE))
For the example in 4.5 this gives us:
f,(DNQ(E)) = 41.55 + 0.06 DNQ(E)
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figure A2 auditee effort against A2B2R
Dnq(E)
A2B2R - H is optimal for t{
«• PiH(r1DQ(E)+(l-r1)DNQ(E))+(l-piH)(t1DQ(NE)+(l-t1)DNQ(NE))+DH <
piL(r,DQ(E)+(l-r1)DNQ(E))+(l-piL)(t1DQ(NE)+(l-t1)DNQ(NE))
°h < (Pi l _Pi H)(riDQ(E)+( 1 -r,)DNQ(E)-t[Dq(NE)-( 1 -t, )Dnq(NE))
For the example in 4.5 this gives us:
f,(DNQ(E)) = 56.4 + 0.015 DNQ(E)
f2(DNQ(E)) = 37.6 + 0.01 Dnq(E)
Du
100 200 300 400 500





A2B2Q - H is optimal for ts
« Pi HDQ(E)+(1 -Pl h)Dq(NE)+Dh < pi lDq(E)+( 1 -pj l)Dq(NE)
« DH<(piL-piH)(DQ(E)-DQ(NE))
For the example in 4.5 we would have:
f,(DNQ(E)) = 30
f2(DNQ(E)) = 20
200 300 400 500
figure A4 auditee effort against A2B2Q
Dnq(E)
A^jNQ/BjR - H is optimal for t;
piHDNQ(E)+(l-piH)DNQ(NE)+DH <
Pi L (r2DQ(E)+( 1 -r2)DNQ(E))+( 1 -p, L)(t2DQ(NE)+( 1 -t2)DNQ(NE))
«. Dh < PiLr2DQ(E) + (Pi L( 1 -r2)-Pi H)DNQ(E) + (l-piL)t2DQ(NE) +
((l-PiL)(l-t2Hl-PiH))DNQ(NE)
For the example in 4.5 this gives us:
f,(DNQ(E)) = 76.475 + 0.02 DNQ(E)
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figure A5 auditee effort against A,B2NQ/B2R
A,B2NQ/B,R - H is optimal for tj
« piHDNQ(E)+(l-piH)DNQ(NE)+DH <
piL(r,DQ(E)+(l-rI)DNQ(E))+(l-piL)(t1DQ(NE)+(l-ti)DNQ(NE))
«- Dh < PiLr,DQ(E) + (piL(l-r,)-piH)DNQ(E) + (l-piL)t,DQ(NE) +
((1 -p; L)( 1 "t,)-(1 "Pi h))DNQ(NE)
For the example in 4.5 this gives us:
f,(DNQ(E)) = 77.3 - 0.0325 DNQ(E)











Pooling on H H/L
0
i * /-. a #





figure A6 auditee effort against A,B2NQ/B,R
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A,B2NQ/B2Q - H is optimal for t;
o PihDnq(E)+( 1 -pj „)D«(NE)+D„ < piLD«(E)+(l-p,,.)D«(NE)
o D„ < p., D"(F.I - piHDN°(E) + (l-piL)D«(NE) -(l-piH)DN<J(NE)
For the example in 4.5 this gives us:
f,(DNQ(E)) = 145.5 + 0.05 DNQ(E)










A1B2R/B1R - H is optimal for t;
<=> piH(r2DQ(E)+(l-r2)DNQ(E))+(l-piH)(t2DQ(NE)+(l-t2)DNQ(NE))+DH<
piL(r1DQ(E)+(l-r1)DNQ(E))+(l-piL)(t1DQ(NE)+(l-t1)DNQ(NE))
<=> Dh < (PiLrrPiHr2)DQ(E) + (piL(l-r,)-piH(l-r2))DNQ(E)
+((l"Pi L)tr(l"PiH)t2)DQ(NE) + ((1 -Pi L)( 1 -t,)-(1 -PiH)( 1 -t2))DNQ(NE)
For the example in 4.5 this gives us:
f,(DNQ(E)) = 42.375 + 0.0075 DNQ(E)
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figure A8 auditee effort against A1B2R/B1R
A,B2R/B2Q - H is optimal for t(
o Pi h (r2DQ(E)+( 1 -r2)DN0(E))+( 1 -PiH)(t2D°(NE)+( 1 -t,)DNQ(NE))+DH <
Pi L DQ(E) +(1 -Pj l)D°(NE)
o D„ < (Pi L-Pi „r2)DQ(E) - Pi^l-rJD^E) +((I-PiL)-(l-piH)t2)D>[E)
-(l-PinXl-yD^fNE)
For the example in 4.5 this gives us:
f,(DNQ(E)) = 110.575 - 0.01 Dnq(E)
f2(DNQ(E)) = 90.95 - 0.06 DNQ(E)
DH
figure A9 auditee effort against A,B2R/B2Q
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A,BjR/B2Q - H is optimal for tj
» Pi H (r,Dq(E)+( 1 -r| )Dnq(E))+( 1 -Pi H)(t,DQ(NE)+( 1 -t, )Dnq(NE))+Dh <
piLDQ(E) +(1-Pi l)Dq(NE)
« D„ < (Pi L"Pi Hri)DQ(E) - Pi H(l-r,)DNQ(E) +((l-piL)-(l-piH)tI)DQ(NE)
-(l-piH)(l-t,)DNQ(NE)
For the example in 4.5 this gives us:
f,(DNQ(E)) = 124.6 - 0.0025 DNQ(E)
f2(DNQ(E)) = 92.6 - 0.015 DNQ(E)
DH
figure A10 auditee effort against A1B,R/B2Q
From the above we can determine for which values of DH each equilibrium can occur.
In particular, we are interested in the occurrence of the second separating
equilibrium, where type t, plays L. Only three of the auditor's strategies in this
example allow the possibility of this equilibrium - namely A,B2NQ/B2R,
A,B2NQ/B,R and A,B2NQ/B2Q. From figures 5,6 and 7 we can see that this
equilibrium can only occur if:




Since for this example DH is set as 55, the L / H separating equilibrium will not




Players' Preferences for the Numerical example
With a specific starting belief P = 0.9 Each of the potential outcomes can be
regarded as a function of CNQ(E) or DNQ(E). For the example of section 4.5 this gives:
CB + C1H(B,R) = 80.9 + 0.0025CNQ(E)
C1H(B2Q) = 98
C1h(B2R) = 33.275 + 0.01Cnq(E)
C1h(B2NQ) = 9.5 + 0.05CNQ(E)
CB + C2H(B,R) = 90.14 + 0.015Cnq(E)
C2H(B2Q) = 88
C2H(B2R) = 37.15 + 0.06Cnq(E)
C2H(B2NQ) = 7 + 0.3Cnq(E)
Cb+C1l(B,R) = 92.3+0.0 175Cnq(E)
C1l(B2Q) = 86
Cil(B2R) = 37.925 + 0.07Cnq(E)
C1l(B2NQ) = 6.5 + 0.35CNQ(E)
CB + C2L(B,R) = 98 + 0.025Cnq(E)
C2L(B2Q) = 80
C2L(B2R) = 40.25 + 0.1Cnq(E)
C2L(B2NQ) -5 + 0.5 CNQ(E)
Dh + D,h(B,R) = 85.4 + 0.0025Dnq(E) D1l(B,R) = 86.8 + 0.0175Dnq(E)
Dil(B2Q) = 155
Dil(B2R) = 85.975 + 0.07Dnq(E)
Dil(B2NQ) = 6.5 + 0.35Dnq(E)
Dh + D1H(B2Q) = 180
Dh + D1H(B2R) = 99.425 + 0.01DNQ(E)
Dh + D1H(B2NQ) = 64.5 + 0.05Dnq(E)
132.4 +0.01 5Dnq(E)
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Dh + D2H(B2R) = 134.05 + 0.06DNQ(E)







D2L(B2R) - 106.75 + 0.1DNQ(E)
D2L(B2NQ) = 5 + 0.5Dnq(E)
These functions generate the following preference tables (where 1 = best):
Type 1 193 224 440 873 1810 5558 27840
a2b2nq l 1 H 1 H 1 H 3 H 5 H 7 H 7 H 7
a2b2r l 6 l 6 H 6 H 6 H 3 H 3 H 6 H 6
A2BjR h 4 H 4 H 4 h 1 H 1 H 1 H 1 H 5
a2b2q l 8 L 8 L 8 l 8 L 8 L 5 L 3 L 1
b2nq/ b2r H 2 H 1 H 1 H 3 H 5 H 7 H 7 H 7
b2nq/b2q H 2 H 1 H 1 H 3 H 5 L 5 L 3 L 1
b2r/b2q H 7 H 7 H 6 H 6 H 3 H 3 L 3 L 1
b,r/b2q H 4 H 4 H 4 H 1 H 1 H 1 H 1 L 1
table B1 type lauditee preferences and optimal responses to testing strategies
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Type 2 110 1 1931 224 23, 242 234 262 K> oo OOcn | 302
a2b2nq l 1 l 1 l 1 l 1 l 2 l 2 l 4 l 5 h 5 h 6 h 6
a2b2r l 4 l 5 l 5 l 3 l 3 l 3 l 2 l 2 l 2 l 2 l 3
a2b,r l 5 l 4 l 2 l 2 l 1 l 1 l 1 l 1 l 1 l 1 l 1
a2b2q l 8 l 8 l 8 l 8 l 8 l 8 l 8 l 8 l 8 l 8 l 8
b2nq/ b2r h 2 h 2 h 3 l 3 l 3 l 3 l 2 l 2 l 2 l 2 l 3
b2nq/ b2q h 2 h 2 h 3 h 5 h 5 h 6 h 6 h 6 h 5 h 6 h 6
b2r/ b2q h 7 h 7 h 7 h 7 h 7 h 7 h 7 h 7 h 7 h 5 h 5
b,r/b2q h 6 h 6 h 6 h 6 h 6 h 5 h 5 h 4 h 4 h 4 h 2
Type 2 360 5" 633 683 1740 2507
a2b2nq h 6 h 8 h 8 h 8 h 8 h 8 h 8
a2b2r l 3 l 3 l 3 l 6 h 6 h 6 h 6
a2b,r l 1 l 1 l 1 l 1 l 1 h 1 h 5
a2b2q l 8 l 6 l 5 l 3 l 3 l 3 l 1
b2nq/ b2r l 3 l 3 l 3 l 6 l 7 l 7 l 7
b2nq/ b2q h 6 l 6 l 5 l 3 l 3 l 3 l 1
b2r/ b2q h 5 h 5 l 5 l 3 l 3 l 3 l 1
b,r/ b2q h 2 h 2 h 2 h 2 h 2 h 2 l 1
table B2 type 2auditee preferences and optimal responses to testing strategies
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h/l 213 | 250 30, 328 373 394 | 398 | 428 | 478 | 509 | 552 | 594 | 688 |
a2b2nq 1 2 3 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7
a2b2r 5 5 5 5 4 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1
a2b,r 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
a2b2q 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
b2nq/ b2r 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5
b2nq/ b,r 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 6
b2nq/ b2q 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 3
b2r/b,r 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 5 4
b2r/ b2q 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 4 3 2 2
b,r/b2q 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
h/l I 6921 770 j 8151 8271 8981 917| 12801 12941 13801 13861 14301 14361 15031
a2b2nq 7 7 7 8 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
a2b2r 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
a2b,r 8 8 8 7 7 1 7 8 7 7 6 6 6 6
a2b2q 10 10 10 10 10 7 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 8
b2nq/ b2r 5 5 6 6 6 10 6 6 8 8 8 9 9 9
b2nq/ b,r 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 7 7 7 7
b2nq/ b2q 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5
b2r/ b,r 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2
b2r/ b2q 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
b,r/ b2q 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 7 6 5 5 4 5 4
h/l 15171 15341 16591 2861 30951 3275 3413 4439 4474 4618 5609 59,7 6350 1 93321
a2b2nq 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
a2b2r 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
a2b,r 6 5 5 5 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 3
a2b2q 8 8 7 6 5 5 4 4 4 3 2 2 1 1 1
b2nq/ b2r 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
b2nq/ b,r 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
b2nq/ b2q 5 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
b2r/ b,r 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 5 5 5 5
b2r/ b2q 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 4
b,r/ b2q 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 2
table B3 auditor's strategy preference after H / l
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table B4 auditor's strategy preference after L / H
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l/l 109| 126| 217| 230| 250| 2641 5791 6471 716| 908| 9991 10911
a2b2nq 1 2 3 4 7 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
a2b2r 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 5 5 6 8
a2b,r 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 6 5 5
a2b2q 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1
b2nq/ b2r 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 6 6 7 9 9
b2nq/ b,r 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 8 7 6
b2nq/ b2q 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 2
b2r/ b,r 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 8 7 6
b2r/ b2q 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 2
btr/b2q 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 2
table B5 auditor's strategy preference after L / L
h/h 324| 407| 490| 9481 1019| 1089| 1227| 1293| 27>4| 3837| 3889| 4047| 42231
a2b2nq 1 1 2 4 4 5 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7
a2b2r 5 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
a2btr 8 8 8 8 5 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 3 3
a2b2q 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7 6 5 5 3 2 1
b2nq/ b2r 2 3 5 5 6 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
b2nq/ b,r 2 3 5 5 6 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
b2nq/ b2q 2 3 5 5 6 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
b2r/ b,r 6 6 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4
b2r/ b2q 6 6 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4
b,r/ b2q 9 9 9 9 9 6 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6
h/h 42811 4725|
a2b2nq 7 7 7
a2b2r 2 3 4
a2b,r 3 2 2
a2b2q 1 1 1
b2nq/ b2r 8 8 8
b2nq/ b,r 8 8 8
b2nq/ b2q 8 8 8
b2r/b,r 4 5 5
b2r/ b2q 4 5 5
b,r/b2q 6 4 3
table B6 auditor's strategy preference after H / H
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Equilibrium set for Fraud Model Example
1-3 Only pooling equilibria since the auditor always uses Dj
Region 1
Pooling on H if DH < 61.95
Auditor after H
xH = 0








































Pooling on H if DH < 58.8
after H B2D,
XH = 0




















pooling equilibria as type 1 mimics type 2
Fl* = (-5.85+0.3975Cd) / (181.35 - 0.368875CD)












Pooling on L if DH > 64.14








Fl* = (-5.85+0.3975Cd) / (181.35 - 0.368875CD)












Pooling on L if DH > 64.66








Fl* - (6.75-CB+0.4425CD) / (125.475 - 0.1975CD)












Pooling on L if DH > 59.41













Fl* = (-1 4.624+0.4425Cd) / (129.375 - 0.1975CD)









Pooling on L if DH > 59.73




8-12 D, optimal vs. H and FL* > (1-P) so partially hybrid equilibria occur
Region 8 Fl* = (-5.85+0.3975Cd) / (181.35 - 0.368875CD)
Pooling on H if DH < 64.14
Auditor after H B,D, after L (B,D2
XX
II o xL e X
Type 1 S, = l f,H = 0







X = (x2L, 0.41530 - 0.00171Dh)
Partially Hybrid equilibrium if DH e (64.14, 65.65)






Pooling on L if DH > 65.65
after L (B,D2 BtD,)
xL = 0.516761
S, = 0 f,L=(FL*-0.1)/0.9
S2 = 0 f2L=l
Region 9 Fl* = (-5.85+0.3975Cd) / (181.35 - 0.368875Cd)
Pooling on H if DH < 64.66
Auditor after H b2d, after L
xH = 0 XL G X
Type 1 s, = 1 f,H = 0
Type 2 S2 = l f2H = 0























Partially Hybrid equilibrium if DH e (64.66, 66.17)
after H B,D, after L (B,D2 B,D,)
Xl = (Dh-62.475)/7.15
51 ~ (Fl*-0.1)/0.9Fl* f1H= 0 f1L=0
52 = 0 f2L=l
Pooling on L if DH > 66.17
after L (B,D2 B^,)
xL = 0.516761
S, = 0 f1L=(FL*-0.1)/0.9
S2 = 0 f2L=l
FL* = (6.75-CB+0.4425CD) / (125.475 - 0.1975CD)
Pooling on H if DH < 59.41
after H B2D, after L (B,D2 B2D,)
oIIrX xL e X
s, = 1 X II o
II
<nin f2H = o
X = (x2L, 0.19589 - 0.00235Dh)
Partially Hybrid equilibrium if DH e (59.41, 62.51)
after H B2Dj after L (B,D2 B2D,)
Xl = (Dh-58.8)/10.825
S, = (Fl*-0.1)/0.9Fl* flH=0 f1L=0
S2 = 0 f2L=l
Pooling on L if DH > 62.51
after L (B,D2 B2D,)
xL = 0.343015
S, = 0 f1L=(FL*-0.1)/0.9
S2 = 0 f2L=l
FL* - (-27.224+CB+0.3975CD) / (185 - 0.368875CD)
Pooling on H if DH < 66.59
after H b2d, after L (B2D2 B,D,)
xH = 0 xL e X
s, — 1 f.« = 0
S2= 1 f2H = 0
X = (x2L, 0.39896 - 0.00164Dh)
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Partially Hybrid equilibrium if DH e (66.59, 69.4)
Auditor after H B2D, after L (B2D2 B,D,)
xL = (DH-62.475)/14.2
Type 1 S, = (Fl*-0.1)/0.9Fl* f1H= 0 f1L= 0




Pooling on L if DH > 69.4








Fl* = (-1 4.624+0.4425Cd) / (129.375 - 0.1975CD)
Pooling on H if DH < 59.73
after H B2D, after L (B2D2 B2D,)
xH 0 xLeX
Type 1 s, = 1 f,H = 0
Type 2 S2=l f2H = o




Partially Hybrid equilibrium if DH e (59.73, 64.51)
after H B2D, after L (B2D2 B2D,)
Xl = (Dh-58.8)/17.875







Pooling on L if DH > 64.51











< (1-P) Fl* > (1-P) so hybrid equilibria occur
F„* = (6.75+Cb-0.2775Cd) / (-107.925 + 0.2425CD)
Fl* = (-5.85+0.3975Cd) / (181.35 - 0.368875CD)
Pooling on H if DH < 61.25
after H (B,D2 B2D,)
xH= 0.310900
S, = 1












Partially hybrid equilibrium if DH s (57.67, 59.58)
after H (B,D2 B2D,) after L (B,D2












Hybrid equilibrium if DH g (59.58, 61.25)













Pooling on L if DH > 59.58












Fh* = (-8.55+0. 1425Cd) / (178.65 - 0.524125CD)
Fl* = (-5.85+0.3975Cd) / (181.35 - 0.368875CD)
Pooling on H if DH < 58.91
after H (B,D2 B,D,) after L (B,D2 B,D,)
xL g XxH= 0.500462
S, = 1 f,h = 0
S,= l 2h 10FH*




Partially hybrid equilibrium if DH g (56.91, 58.22)
after H (B,D2 B,D,) after L (B,D2 BjD,)











Hybrid equilibrium if DH
after H (B,D2 B,D,)
xH = 18.56884-0.30673Dh
S, =(1-Fh*)(Fl*-0.1))/0.9(Fl*-Fh*) f1H = 0
S2 = Fh*(Fl*-(0.1))/0.1(Fl*-Fh*) f2H=l
(58.22, 58.91)







Pooling on L if DH > 58.22
(B,D2 B,D,) after L (B,D2 B,D,)
xH e X xL = 0.516761
f1L=(FL*-0.1)/0.9Type 1 S, = 0
Type 2 S2 = 0






Fh* = (-21 .375+Cb+0. 1425Cd) / (193.35 - 0.524125CD)
FL* = (-5.85+0.3975Cd) / (181.35 - 0.368875CD)
Pooling on H if DH < 52.21
after H (B2D2 B,D,) after L (B,D2 B,D,)









Partially hybrid equilibrium if DH e (45.72, 48.72)
after H (B2D2 B,D,) after L (B,D2 B,D,)









Hybrid equilibrium if DH e (48.72, 52.21)
after H (B2D2 B,D,) after L (B,D2 B,D,)
xH= 3.38705-0"05595Dh xl = 3.46274-0.06046DH
S, =(l-FH*)(FL*-0.1))/0.9(FLHt-FH*) f1H = 0 f,L = 0




Pooling on L if DH > 48.72
(B2D2 B,D,) after L (B,D2 B,D,)
xH e X xL = 0.516761
S, =0 f1L=(FL*-0.1)/0.9
S2 = 0 f2L=l





Fh* - (-21.375+0.2775Cd) /(122.625 - 0.2425CD)
Fl* = (-5.85+0.3975Cd) / (181.35 - 0.368875CD)
Pooling on H if DH < 57.3













Partially hybrid equilibrium if DH e (47.83, 51.95)
after H (B2D2 B2D,) after L (B,D2 B,D,)
xH = (36.36984-Dh)/26.125 xL = 0.516761







Hybrid equilibrium if DH e (51.95, 57.3)
after H (B2D2 B2D,) after L (B,D2 B,D,)
xH= 3.09385-0.04908Dh xl = 2.56668-0.03946DH
S, =(1-FH*)(FL*-0.1))/0.9(FL*-FH*) f,H = 0 f1L = 0




Pooling on L if DH > 51.95







X = (MAX(x2H, 2.53282 - 0.03828DH), MIN(x1H, 0.42896 + 0.00222DH))
Region 17 F„* = (-21.375+0.2775CD) / (122.625 - 0.2425CD)




Pooling on H if DH < 59.23
after H (B2D2 B2D,) after L (B2D2 B,D,)
xL e XxH= 0.281859
mh 0
f2H=10FH*




Partially hybrid equilibrium if DH e (51.1, 55.21)
after H (B2D2 B2D,) after L (B2D2










Hybrid equilibrium if DH e (55.21, 59.23)




after L (B2D2 B,D,)
xl = 3.24162-0"03498Dh
f.H = 0 f1L = 0
f2H = 1 f2L = ^
199
APPENDIX C
Pooling on L if DH > 55.21















Fh* = (-21.375+0.2775Cd) / (122.625 - 0.2425CD)
FL* = (-14.624+0.4425Cd) / (129.375 - 0.1975CD)
Pooling on H if DH < 52.37






f = 10F *X2H lurH




Partially hybrid equilibrium if DH e (46.17, 50.29)











Hybrid equilibrium if DH e (50.29, 52.37)
after H (B2D2 B2D,) after L (B2D2 B2D,)
xH= 6.88172-0.12603Dh xl = 6.76838-0.12825DH
S, =(1-Fh*)(Fl*-0.1))/0.9(Fl*-Fh*) fjH = 0






Pooling on L if DH > 50.29
after H (B2D2 B2D,) after L (B2D2 B2D,)





X = (MAX(x2H, 2.46920 - 0.03828DH), MIN(x1H, 0.43265 + 0.00222DH))





F„* = (-8.55+0. 1425Cd) / (178.65 - 0.524125CD)
Fl* = (-5.85+0.3975Cd) / (181.35 - 0.368875CD)
Pooling on H if DH < 56.91
after H (B,D2 B,D,) after L (B,D2 B,D,)
xH = 0.836342 xL e X
S, = 1 f1H =(F„*-0.1)/0.9
S2 = 1 2H 1






Partially hybrid equilibrium if DH e (56.91, 58.22)
after H (B,D2 B,D,) after L (B,D2 B,D,)
xH = (65.64484-Dh)/10.45 xL = 0.516761
Si = (0.1(1-Fh*))/0.9Fh* f,H = 0 f,L = FL*'i
S,= 1 ^2H = 1
Pooling on L if DH > 58.22














FH* = (-23.175++Cb+0.1425Cd) / (178.65 - 0.524125CD)
Fl* = (-5.85+0.3975Cd) / (181.35 - 0.368875CD)
Pooling on H if DH < 45.72
after H (B2D2 B,D,) after L (B,D2 B,D,)
xH = 0.778216 xL e X
S, = l f|„ =(Fh*-0.1)/0.9
S, = 1 f2H=l




Partially hybrid equilibrium if DH e (45.72, 48.72)












Pooling on L if DH > 48.72
after H (B2D2 B,D,) after L (B,D2 B,D,)
xH e X xL = 0.516761
S, = 0 f,L=(FL*-0.1)/0.9
S2 = 0 f2L=l
X = (MAX(x2H, 2.56425 - 0.03906DH), MIN(x]H, 0.58170 + 0.00163DH))
Region 21 FH* = (-21.375+0.2775CD) / (122.625 - 0.2425CD)




Pooling on H if DH < 47.83
after H (B2D2 B2D,) after L (B,D2 B,D,)













Partially hybrid equilibrium if DH e (47.83, 51.95)
after H (B2D2 B2D,) after L (B,D2 B,D,)





f = F *ml r l
Auditor
Pooling on L if DH > 51.95














Fh* = (-23.175+Cb+0.1425Cd) / (193.35 - 0.524125CD)
Fl* = (-27.224+Cb+0.3975Cd)/(181.35 - 0.368875Cd)
Pooling on H if DH < 48.99











Partially hybrid equilibrium if DH e (48.99, 51.99)
after H (B2D2 B,D,) after L (B2D2 B,D,)





f = F 11ml l
Pooling on L if DH > 51.99

















Fh* = (-21.375+0.2275Cd) / (122.625 - 0.2425CD)
Fl* = (-27.224+Cb+0.3975Cd) / (185.25 - 0.368875CD)
Pooling on H if DH < 51.1










Partially hybrid equilibrium if DH e (51.1, 55.21)













Pooling on L if DH > 55.21












Fh* = (-21.375+0.2775Cd) / (122.625 - 0.2425CD)
FL* - (-5.85+0.3975Cd) / (181.35 - 0.368875CD)
Pooling on H if DH < 46.17













Partially hybrid equilibrium if DH e (46.17, 50.29)
after H (B2D2 B2D,) after L (B2D2









Pooling on L if DH > 50.29
Auditor after H (B2D2 B2D,) after L (B2D2 B2D,)
xH e X xL = 0.319316
Type 1 S, = 0 f1L=(FL*-0.1)/0.9
Type 2 S2 = 0 f2L = 1
X = (MAX(x2h, 2.46920 - 0.03828DH), MIN(xIH, 0.43265 + 0.00222DH))
25-26 Auditor never uses D, after observing Low effort - only pooling on L
Region 25
Pooling on L V Dh














Pooling on L V Dh
after L
xL= 1
b2d2
f,L
a2l
204
